Chapter 3: Determinism and Free Will
The Intermediate Position Between the Two
90. It is cited in tradition that: “There is no jabr (compulsion, determinism, predestination) nor tafwīḍ (delegation, entrustment, unbound free will), but a matter in-between.” What is jabr? What is tafwīḍ? And what is that matter which is in-between the two?
Answer: Jabr points to the notion that humankind has no choice whatsoever in carrying out any action, and that what he does is compulsory upon him. Tafwīḍ is the notion that an action carried out by an individual is completely dependent on the volition of that person, and that God’s will has no influence on it. Finally, “the matter in-between” refers to the reality that both the will of God and the human will have a role.
To further clarify the matter, one should know that fatalists say that the actions of humankind are solely dependent on the will of God; a servant’s volition has no influence at all, just like a tool in someone’s hands which has no consequence on the occurrence or the non-occurrence of the action. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, in his exegesis of the Qur’an, is clearly among those who subscribe to jabr. In contrast, those who advocate tafwīḍ say that the actions of humankind are executed solely through the will of the human, and God’s will has no effect. This means that even if God wills an action but the individual does not, then it will not happen; and if the individual wills an action but God does not, then it will nevertheless occur.
The “matter in-between” supports the notion that God wills that the person achieves an action with his own will. This is confirmed by a verse where God says: Yet you do not will, unless Allah wills ().
91. Khayyām says:
God knew from day one that I’ll be a drunkard,
so His knowledge would be ignorance if I don’t drink wine.
Is Khayyām right in saying this? Can one say that in drinking wine, Khayyām had no choice and was thus obligated?
Answer: His drinking of wine is voluntary. The object of God’s knowledge is the action of the human being as it is, which is a voluntary act. However Khayyām wants to say that God’s knowledge of an action makes the action compulsory. This is wrong. Rather, the action is voluntary, and God knows the action as it will occur: it will occur as a voluntary act. In other words, God knows that a person will perform the action out of his human will. God’s knowledge is not the cause of the person’s action.
92. Perhaps in this verse of poetry, Khayyām does not want to support jabr. Instead, he wants to say that some of our knowledge does not parallel the realities present within the world, but they are compound ignorance. Divine knowledge, on the other hand, is far from ignorance, for it always matches the reality. Can we say this?
Answer: The apparent meaning of Khayyām’s verse is that he is forced to drinking wine, and that divine knowledge is the cause of his sin. This means that his actions do not stem from his own volition, but rather from divine predetermination.
93. How does an action which has many involuntary pre-conditions become voluntary, especially given that according to God’s knowledge, it must happen?
Answer: The necessary occurrence of an event is not equivalent to compulsion (jabr). An event happens and becomes necessary when all of its constituent causes are fulfilled and completed. Its voluntary trait derives from the fact that one of its constituent causes is the free will of the agent, such that he may or may not do the act. The act is contingent with regard to each of its constituent causes, but with respect to the complete cause [that is, all of the constituent causes together] its occurrence is necessary and inevitable.
94. Is free will itself a destiny from God?
Answer: It is God’s will that humans should act with free will. Therefore free will is a destiny by God.
95. Is free will (irādah) itself a matter of choice (ikhtiyār)?
Answer: No. The actions of humankind are based on choice as one of their pre-conditions. Yet, irādah (will, volition) itself is not necessarily voluntary. The action may be the result of a chain of emotions and causes. First, there is knowledge of action; then one imagines the benefits of such action; that it is followed by desire; and then comes will. Once these pre-conditions occur, choice is naturally achieved.
(In another occasion, the ʿAllāmah explained) The fact that an action is voluntary means that it was carried out with will and choice. This does not mean that choice should itself be chosen. The focus of the debate on free will and determinism is that actions must be carried out with choice and must not be pre-determined, not that choice should also be a matter of choice.
96. Is it possible that a bad decision be predetermined for an individual, but that he chooses to do good instead?
Answer: God says: So take the lead in all good works (, ). Therefore, choice and predetermination are not mutually exclusive.
Voluntary Acts
97. Why did God create evil beings?
Answer: All that God has created is only good, as He says: Whatever mercy Allah unfolds for the people, no one can withhold it ().
98. Are Shimr and Ibn Muljam not evil in comparison to Imam al-Ḥusayn and Imam ʿAlī?
Answer: The human world is an abode of trial, and for the purpose of examination, both good and evil are required. Evil is the non-existential facet (ʿadamī) and good is the existing one (wujūdī). Unless evil exists, good cannot be discerned.
99. Consequently, the creation of Shimr in should have been in God’s knowledge and His plan of the world’s system. Doesn’t this amount to jabr then? Doesn’t it prove Khayyām’s words, where he says:
I drink wine, and whoever is in line
would realize that my drinking is perfectly fine.
God knew from day one that I’ll be a drunkard,
so His knowledge would be ignorance if I don’t drink wine.
Answer: This is a necessity (ḍarūrah) of the world, not compulsion (jabr). Shimr could still choose to not commit his crimes. Yet, he chose to commit it by his ill choice.
And what Khayyām says is not true. What is in God’s foreknowledge is not “action without choice” but it is a “voluntary action.” God’s knowledge of humankind’s actions includes the will and choice of the individuals. Thus the actions occur voluntarily, exactly as outlined in God’s foreknowledge. This is what prevents God’s knowledge from becoming ignorance! God’s knowledge would be ignorance if the action were to be carried out without will and choice! God’s knowledge is not the cause of actions.
100. God says: Is it they who dispense the mercy of your Lord? It is We Who have dispensed among them their livelihood in the present life, and raised some of them above others in rank, so that some may take others into service, and your Lord’s mercy is better than what they amass (). Does the expression “some of them may take labor from others” refer to exploitation, colonization and enslavement?
Answer: The intended meaning is utilization, since rabb (lord) means mudabbir (regulator, director of affairs, planner). The verse aims to say: “God is the provider for the human community, and this is God’s mercy. Do they want to take the matter of material sustenance in their own hands while We have placed all beings in a hierarchy of master and servant proportionately and based on an appropriate measure?!”
101. Can we infer from this that a worker must always remain a slave?
Answer: He is a servant only at times of his service. Since God says: It is We Who have dispensed among them their livelihood in the present life (), meaning that God has established the system upon which the livelihood of humankind operates. It is based on wisdom and foresight that some have been made rich and others poor.
102. Does not this division present a contradiction to free will?
Answer: No, this division aims at spiritual and moral growth. At the same time, people choose to behave by their free will.
103. God says: Thus have We installed in every town its major criminals that they may plot there (). Can we conclude from the word “We installed” that God has made the evil plot and crime of the wrongdoers incumbent on them?
Answer: They are independent in their actions in the sense that they have choice and free will. There is no contradiction between their self-determination and the system put in place by God. No event takes place unless its complete cause is realized; and once the complete cause is realized, the event must necessarily follow.
104. But then we can say that the occurrence of the complete cause is under God’s command, and the servant has no impact or influence on it.
Answer: We have to regard these elements: (1) For example, the complete cause of eating a piece of bread is assembled from a multitude of constituent causes such as the existence of bread, having a mouth, and having the two in the same time and place (otherwise, a bread from hundreds of years ago and a person in the present cannot join to execute the action of eating). Further, one of the components of the complete cause is the person’s will. (2) The event is necessary with regards to its complete cause, meaning all of the constituent causes together. However, it is contingent with regards to each of the constituent causes in separation. One of these constituent causes is the person and his will.
The irrevocable decree [stating the occurrence of an event] pertains to the necessary relationship between an act and its complete cause. Yet, the relationship of this action to the person and his will is that of continence or possibility. God’s will is also inferred at the level of divine actions, not the divine essence. It is not an essential attribute of God [and thus it is not necessary or irrevocable].
105. Based on the fact that martyrdom of Imam al-Ḥusayn followed from God’s definitive decree, the imam did not have a choice. Therefore, how can we say that the imam had free will?
Answer: The definiteness of an action or an event does not contradict free will. What makes an action definite is its constituent causes, including the free will of the doer. This means that God wills that someone carries an action of his own volition. In this way, a voluntary action is definitive and bound to occur in the sense that it is willed by God. At the same time it is contingent and optional with reference to the doer. That is why it is subject to divine command or prohibition.
Based on this, the martyrdom of Imam al-Ḥusayn in relation to God’s perspective is incumbent and necessary, while in relation to the imam it is voluntary and may or may not occur. Thus it is also subject to divine command and prohibition. Therefore, God willed that the imam chooses martyrdom of his own volition; and the will of God is incumbent and bound to realize itself above all else.
The Narrations About ṭīnah and badāʾ
106. What is meant by the narrations about ṭīnah (substance, clay, nature, inborn disposition)?
Answer: The narrations of ṭīnah tell us that God created the people from clay gathered from all around the world, and they will return to their origin: those who were created from heaven will return to heaven, and those from hell to hell. Further, they tell us that humans differ on the account of their souls, not because of their bodies.
107. Does this not necessitate jabr (compulsion, determinism, predestination)?
Answer: The system on which the world operates is that of necessity, meaning that an event will occur only when it becomes definite [in terms of its complete cause being achieved]. At the same time, humans are given free will. They can choose to do or not without compulsion. An action is considered possible or contingent with regards to the person carrying it and his will; but it is necessary with regards to all its constituent causes which make up the complete cause. God’s definite decree refers to this relationship at this level. The will of God is inferred from the divine actions, not from the divine essence. Will (irādah) is not an essential attribute of God, but it is an attribute of His actions [thus it is subject to change and is contingent].
108. What is the meaning of this hadith: “The happy was happy in his mother’s womb, and the wretched was wretched in his mother’s womb”?
Answer: The correct version of this hadith is: “The happy one is one who attains happiness in his mother’s womb, and the wretched one is one who attains wretchedness in his mother’s womb.” This is originally part of a narration from Imam al-Bāqir which explains the creation of humankind. The imam says: “Four month after the intimacy between husband and wife, and after the establishment of the zygote in the womb of the mother—which marks the beginning of the child’s [human] life—God commands two angels, one in the womb and the other outside of it, to write all the events of the child’s life from its birth to its death. The angels ask: ‘From where should we write?’ God replies: ‘Look at the forehead of the mother and acquire the information from it.’” Then the imam adds at the end: “But they retain the right and possibility of badāʾ (alteration, apparent change of the course of events) for God in all of that.”
Following that, the imam relates from the Holy Prophet: “The happy one is one who attains happiness in his mother’s womb, and the wretched one is one who attains wretchedness in his mother’s womb.”
This means that all events, whether happy or unhappy, whether good or bad, are ordained and measured (muqaddar) in the womb, while reserving badāʾ for God. Therefore one’s felicity or misery in the womb is not definite, but are subject to change and badāʾ. What the two angels write is what would naturally follow, but it can always change.
109. Why do those two angels look at the mother’s forehead in order to write the destiny of the child?
Answer: This reflects a genetic component and a certain connection between the mother and the child. Nevertheless, the fate or destiny is subject to change and humans maintain their ability to choose.
110. What is the truth behind alteration (badāʾ)?
Answer: Badāʾ is the unveiling of a hidden thing according to all of its causes involved. It is similar to meteorological predictions, where we forecast it to be sunny in the next hour, but it turns out to be cloudy. Imam al-Bāqir said, “They [the two angels] retain the right and possibility of alteration (badāʾ) for God.” This means that, for example an individual is ordained to live until 70 unless God wills, or that he is ordained to fall ill unless God wills, and so on. Hence, anything that is predetermined is at the level of iqtiḍāʾ (preponderance, propensity). It is only God’s will which makes a complete cause [which is irrevocable].
111. Do the narrations about ṭīnah (substance, clay, nature, inborn disposition) imply iqtiḍāʾ (preponderance, propensity) [as opposed to definite causality]?
Answer: Based on the aforementioned tradition from Imam al-Bāqir, after having competed the shaping of the child’s form, God commands two angels, one in the womb and one outside of it, to write all the events of the child’s life from its birth to its death. To the outside angel, God commands to look at the mother’s forehead and write the child’s material wealth, health, and other properties. The hadith subsequently says: “But they retain the right and possibility of badāʾ (apparent change of the course of events) for God in all of that.” This part of the hadith shows that all of the above ordainments are at the level of iqtiḍāʾ (preponderance, propensity). They are not at the level of complete cause to be definite, incumbent and necessary. They are subject to change by God, and they do not interfere with human free will.
112. Based on the narrations about ṭīnah, we can derive that “humans created from heaven will return to it, and those from hell will return to it.” Does this not make the actions of humankind pre-determined? Does this not reduce to fatalism?
Answer: In this way, yes, human actions occur out of necessity. God commands humankind to will. God has willed that humankind carry their actions with their own volition, in a way that if they do not carry their actions according to their own choice, it would be opposite to God’s will. This means that while humans carry their actions out of necessity due to God’s will, the same will necessitates that they should do so with their choice and free will. What is wrong with God wanting us to desire paradise, meaning that we choose heaven with our own will?
113. Do the narrations about ṭīnah, felicity and misery pertain to the soul or to the body?
Answer: They do not pertain to the body, but they are annexed to the body as a genitive ascription. Humankind reaches perfection—in the form of either happiness or misery—trough the rout of action. And action belongs to the material realm. The soul is an immaterial entity which has a connection to matter; it acts by means of the body. Therefore, the soul is not a perfectly immaterial entity that is detached from the physical body altogether. The body inherently grows towards perfection from the time of its creation, as long as it is not blocked by any obstacles. It is firstly inorganic matter, then a fertilized egg, then a blastula, and then a human spirit is connected to it. It is consequently capable of feeling, and connects with its environment. This continues until death, at which point the soul’s link is severed from the body. Therefore we should not think of the soul in the body as an object is placed in a container or something that dwells in a location, because the soul is immaterial whether the body exists or not.
God says: Say, “You will be taken away by the Angel of Death, who has been charged with you” (). What the Angel of Death will take away is our soul. From this verse, we can gather that what defines us in our entirety is our soul, which we refer to as “I” or “you.” The soul is our essence, while the body is its tool. However, the soul is not totally disconnected from the body; otherwise it would have no trans-substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah). It advances to its perfection by means of the body.
114. If the clay of a believer is from heaven and that of a disbeliever from hell, then that is the ultimate cause of their end. Then there would be no credit to be attributed to the believers for their belief.
Answer: God says: And there is not a thing but with Us are the treasures of it, and We do not send it down but in a known measure (). This means that whatever God decrees will first be measured and apportioned. This has no connection to free will. Therefore, at the same time as one may be from heaven or hell, he has free will.
115. If someone is if from hell, then he more or less has no choice.
Answer: No, he still has choice, but this choice is under the rule of God’s definitive decree and incumbent determination. Every action carried out by humankind is dependent on a series of constituent causes, which together form the complete cause, without which the action would not occur.
For example, for eating a piece of bread, one needs bread, hand, mouth, teeth, tongue, esophagus, and appetite. All these elements have to be united in time and place. Otherwise, if a piece of bread is five hundred years in the past or the future from the person, or if it is at a very far distant away, he cannot eat it. All of these elements are necessary prerequisites without which the action of eating bread is impossible. The sum total of all constituent prerequisites is the complete cause which makes the event incumbent to occur.
Without any of the constituent prerequisites, the action will not occur. With respect to each of these constituent causes, the action is contingent: it may or may not occur, without any necessity. However, with respect to all of the constituent causes together—which make the complete cause—the action would be necessary: it is bound to occur.
Therefore, when it is said that “the Shias are from heaven,” it underlines one of the constituent elements which do not necessitate the effect, for God maintains an absolute will and the right of alteration (badāʾ) in that. Thus, the narrations about ṭīnah, as well as the narrations about people belonging to heaven and hell, express an incomplete causal nature. One’s ṭīnah (substance, clay, nature, inborn disposition) cannot on its own bring the action to completion, but it needs other prerequisites, including the individual’s will and choice. All of these constituents have to be united to create the complete relationship between cause and effect.
116. With all this, the will of God is still at the top of the prerequisites of good and evil actions, meaning that if God wills positively, the event occurs, and if He wills not, it will not occur.
Answer: Will is not among the essential attributes of God, but among the action attributes. The divine will is applied to the completion, combination and proper arrangement of all incomplete prerequisites, including the individual’s will. God’s will is not something parallel and competing with these constituents to outdo them, but it is in a vertical order with respect to the individual’s will.
Supplications and Destiny
117. Does duʿāʾ (supplication, prayer) conflict with God’s decree and destiny?
Answer: No. In fact, supplication is part of decree and destiny.
118. Any supplication or request pertains to a matter that will either necessarily occur or necessarily not occur [irrespective of whether the person makes supplication or not]. So what is the advantage of supplication?
Answer: Supplication is one of the constituent causes of existence and occurrence. A matter that is not destined to happen can come about with supplication.
119. Are things that are predestined during the Night of Ordainment (including the human life) definite?
Answer: To a certain degree of definiteness, not entirely. They are still subject to change.
Ibid., vol. 4, p. 197, tradition 2, vol. 5, p. 11, tradition 18, p. 17, traditions 27-28, p. 22, tradition 30, vol. 25, p. 328, tradition 3, vol. 78, p. 354, tradition 9. Also see ibid., vol. 5, p. 56, tradition 103, p. 70, tradition 1, vol. 69, p. 3, tradition 4. ↩︎
TR: These lines are commonly attributed to Khayyām but they are not found in his Rubāʿiyyāt. Not to mention that there are serious doubts even in the authenticity of most of the poems in his Rubāʿiyyāt. ↩︎
See al-Kāfī, vol. 2, p. 2; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 5, p. 225, vol. 64, p. 77. ↩︎
For the narration from Imam al-Bāqir see al-Kāfī, vol. 6, p. 13, tradition 4; Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 60, p. 344, tradition 31. For the narration from the Prophet see Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 5, p. 9, tradition 13, p. 157, tradition 10. ↩︎
See Biḥār al-Anwār, vol. 5, p. 225. ↩︎
This refers to the narrations about ṭīnah (substance, clay, nature, inborn disposition). ↩︎
TR: In this case, God decrees the happiness or misery of certain people, but He also apportions and defines this decree to occur through the free will and voluntary actions of the people. ↩︎
TR: In other words, the entire universe, with all of its mechanisms and causes, is already something that God has willed and created. God has willed the universe to be as it is. Therefore, His will is exactly the occurrence of events whenever all of their constituent causes are achieved. If anything works in the universe and has any effect, it means that it has God’s permission. This is called creational permission (al-idhn al-takwīnī). God’s decree is not a counterpart to the causes in the universe; no factor in the universe poses any challenge to God’s decree. Rivalry between causes and the defeat of one by another is applicable to causes on the same plane, which are called parallel or horizontal causes (al-ʿilal al-ʿarḍiyyah). However, there is no such dualism between God’s will and any constituent cause in the world. Understanding the true meaning of this and how it could be possible is, of course, very intricate. That is what has given rise to all the debates and disputes over predestination and free will over the centuries. The ultimate solution lies in transcending dualism, and also in comprehending the relationship between the timeless and the temporal. The world with all of its gradual processes and temporal events is a result of a single eternal decree of God: Our command is but a single [word], like the twinkling of an eye (). ↩︎