Verses 7–9

Chapter 3: Āl-Imrān (The Family of Imrān) · Printed edition: Volume 5, pp. 21–114

Commentary

هُوَ الَّذِي أَنْزَلَ عَلَيْكَ الْكِتَابَ مِنْهُ آيَاتٌ مُحْكَمَاتٌ هُنَّ أُمُّ الْكِتَابِ وَأُخَرُ مُتَشَابِهَاتٌ ۖ فَأَمَّا الَّذِينَ فِي قُلُوبِهِمْ زَيْغٌ فَيَتَّبِعُونَ مَا تَشَابَهَ مِنْهُ ابْتِغَاءَ الْفِتْنَةِ وَابْتِغَاءَ تَأْوِيلِهِ ۗ وَمَا يَعْلَمُ تَأْوِيلَهُ إِلَّا اللَّهُ ۗ وَالرَّاسِخُونَ فِي الْعِلْمِ يَقُولُونَ آمَنَّا بِهِ كُلٌّ مِنْ عِنْدِ رَبِّنَا ۗ وَمَا يَذَّكَّرُ إِلَّا أُولُو الْأَلْبَابِ ۝٧

(3:7) He is the one who has sent down to you the Book. Parts of it are definitive verses, which are the mother of the Book, while others are metaphorical. As for those in whose hearts is deviance, they pursue what is metaphorical in it, courting temptation and courting its interpretation. But no one knows its interpretation except God and those firmly grounded in knowledge; they say, ‘We believe in it; all of it is from our Lord.’ And none takes admonition except those who possess intellect.

Cited elsewhere in al-Mizan: 18 places →

In this verse, God describes the sending of the Book as inzāl rather than tanzīl. This is significant because, as we have said, inzāl means sending down all at once, while tanzīl means sending down gradually. The reason God uses inzāl here is that He intends to explain some of the attributes and characteristics of the Book as a whole, rather than the attributes of some of its parts. One of the attributes of the Book as a whole is that it contains definitive verses (āyāt muḥkamāt) and ambiguous verses (āyāt mutashābihāt), where the second category (the ambiguous verses) refers back to the first category (the definitive verses), and by means of them, the ambiguous verses are explained and clarified. Thus, from this perspective, the Book is conceived as a single entity, not as something possessing multiple and numerous parts. In such a context, it is appropriate to express its sending down using inzāl rather than tanzīl.

Parts of it are definitive verses, which are the Mother of the Book, while others are ambiguous—The term muḥkamāt (“definitive”) derives from the root ḥ-k-m, whose forms consistently convey strength and firmness. We call a thing muḥkam (“firm”) when corruption cannot penetrate it, and nothing can disrupt its function. The same connotation of imperviousness and structural solidity runs through iḥkām (“making firm”), taḥkīm (“fortification”), ḥukm (“judgment”), ḥikma (“wisdom”), and ḥakama (“bridle”). All these forms share the base qualities of restraint and precision. Some scholars have said the root indicates two things: imperviousness and restraint coupled with rectification.

What is meant by the definitiveness (iḥkām) of the definitive verses (muḥkamāt) in this verse is their precision: unlike the ambiguous verses, they contain no ambiguity (tashābuh) whatsoever, and the reader grasps their meaning without doubt or confusion. This does not mean, of course, that some verses are meaningful while others are vague or meaningless—God has called all the verses of the Qur’an definitive and precise in: a Book, whose signs have been made definitive and then elaborated, from One who is all-wise, all-aware. ()

Note that in the verse just quoted, the phrase “then elaborated” (thumma fuṣṣilat) follows “whose signs have been made definitive” (uḥkimat āyātuhu). From this sequence we understand that iḥkām here refers to the state of the Book prior to its revelation: the Qur’an, before being revealed, was a single undivided reality, not yet subject to division into verses and parts. When it was decided that it should be revealed—that is, made suitable for human understanding—it acquired verses and parts, and therefore division. So iḥkām in Sūrat Hūd describes the entire Book as a whole, whereas in the verse under discussion it describes some verses in relation to others: some are definitive and free of ambiguity, while others are not.

To put it more simply: since the verse under discussion divides the Qur’an’s verses into muḥkam (definitive) and mutashābih (ambiguous), the iḥkām meant here differs from that in Sūrat Hūd (). Likewise, the tashābuh (ambiguous) meant here differs from the tashābuh (similar) that characterizes the Qur’an as a whole in Sūrat al-Zumar: God has sent down the best of discourses, a scripture of similar (mutashābih) motifs ().

Now let us examine the Mother of the Book (umm al-kitāb) and why the definitive (muḥkam) verses are called the Mother of the Book. The word umm (“mother”) in its original linguistic meaning refers to a point of reference to which something returns, and the definitive verses are called the Mother of the Book for this reason—that they are the point of reference for the ambiguous verses. Thus, it becomes clear that some verses of the Qur’an, namely its ambiguous ones, refer back to others, namely the definitive verses. From this, it becomes clear that the genitive construction (iḍāfa), Mother of the Book (umm al-kitāb), does not signify possession as might the phrase “mother of the children” (umm al-aṭfāl), but rather it conveys the meaning of “from” (min), in the same vein as the phrases “the women of the people” (nisāʾ al-qawm) and “the elders of the jurists” (qudamāʾ al-fuqahāʾ) and similar expressions.

Accordingly, the Qur’an comprises definitive verses that are the mother and point of reference for other verses. Note that the use of the word umm in the singular form (“mother,” instead of the plural form ummahāt, “mothers”) is to show that the definitive verses are in complete harmony with one another and without disagreement—as though they were a single entity.

In the present verse, the term “definitive” (muḥkamāt) is placed in opposition to “others that are ambiguous” (ukhar mutashābihāt). The term tashābuh (“similarity” or “resemblance”) means the correspondence of several different things with one another and their commonality in some attributes or qualities. On the other hand, the Qur’an is described as being a book that is mutashābih (“similar”)): a scripture of similar motifs, whereat quiver the skins of those who fear their Lord (). The meaning of tashābuh in the verse quoted here (“similarity”) is different from the meaning of tashābuh (“ambiguity”) in the verse presently under discussion. What is meant in the quoted verses is that the verses of this Book (both its definitive and ambiguous ones) are similar and alike to one another in that they have a single incomparable style, and all of them have an explicit and firm approach in explaining realities and wisdoms and guiding toward the truth. Hence, the use of tashābuh in refers to the Book as a whole.

By contrast, in the verse under discussion here (), tashābuh is placed in opposition to the muḥkam verses, which are the Mother of the Book. In addition to this, God says that those with a sickness in their hearts refer only to the ambiguous verses in order to create discord and interpret them according to their own desires. This shows that the mutashābih verses are such that their intended meaning is not immediately apparent to the listener. Rather, he is uncertain whether the intended meaning is one thing or another, and his uncertainty is not removed until he refers back to the definitive verses and, with their help, determines the intended meaning of the ambiguous verses; as a result, those same ambiguous verses also become definitive. Thus, the definitive verses are definitive in and of themselves, and the ambiguous verses become definitive by referring to the definitive verses.

For example, the verse: the All-beneficent, sitting on the Throne () is an ambiguous verse, because it is not clear what is meant by God’s sitting upon the Throne (ʿarsh). The listener, at the first moment of hearing it, is uncertain about its meaning, but when he refers to the verse: Nothing is like Him (), he understands that God’s sitting is not like the sitting of other existents, and that the intended meaning of the word istawā (“settled”) is the establishment of dominion over the kingdom and encompassment of creation, not sitting upon a throne and leaning upon a place, which is the action of corporeal existents, and such a thing is impossible for God.

And again, similar to the verse: looking at their Lord (), when the listener refers to the verse: The sights do not apprehend Him, yet He apprehends the sights (), then he understands that the intended meaning of looking (naẓar) in this verse is not gazing with the physical eye. And likewise, when he compares the abrogated (mansūkha) verse with the abrogating (nāsikha) verse, he understands that the duration of the validity of the ruling of the former verse is limited by the boundary of the abrogating ruling, and so forth.

This is what we understand from the two words definitive and ambiguous, and the simple understanding grasps it from the totality of the verse: It is He who has sent down to you the Book. Parts of it are definitive verses, which are the Mother of the Book, while others are ambiguous (). This is because even if we suppose that all the other verses of the Qur’an are ambiguous, this verse is certainly definitive. After all, if this verse were ambiguous, then all the verses of the Qur’an would become ambiguous, and there would no longer be any scope to divide them into the categories of definitive and ambiguous, and the phrase which are the Mother of the Book would be meaningless, because we have supposed that it too is ambiguous. Likewise, the verse: a Book whose signs have been elaborated, an Arabic Qur’an, for a people who have knowledge () would not be true, and God’s argument against those who do not contemplate the verses of the Qur’an in the verse: Do they not contemplate the Qur’an? Had it been from (someone) other than God, they would have surely found much discrepancy in it () would not be sound. Similarly, other verses that describe the Qur’an as guidance, light, exposition (tibyān), explanation (bayān), clarifying (mubīn), reminder (dhikr), and the like would not have a correct meaning.

Moreover, anyone who carefully examines the verses of the Qur’an from beginning to end will not doubt that there is not even a single verse in it that is without signification and meaning (such that the reader would understand no meaning from it). Rather, all its verses speak of their signification. Either, like the definitive verses, they speak of one signification and meaning, such that no one knowledgeable in speech doubts it, or like the ambiguous verses, which are ambiguous among several meanings, and we know with certainty that one of those meanings is intended; else the verse would not be true, as has been discussed.

The case is that the reader is in doubt and uncertainty as to which of those meanings is intended. We know that the single meaning that is God’s intention is certainly not alien to the established principles (uṣūl muslima) in the Qur’an, such as: the existence of the Creator and His oneness, the mission of the prophets, the legislation of rulings (aḥkām), the Resurrection, and so on. Rather, it is in accordance with those principles, and those principles also yield that very meaning. In the case under discussion, our reference point is those very principles, by means of which we must determine that true meaning from among the other meanings. The Qur’an is its own exegete, and some of its verses provide the foundation and reference for understanding others.

Therefore, if a thoughtful person encounters the verse, Parts of it are definitive verses, which are the Mother of the Book, while others are ambiguous, he will no longer have any doubt that what is meant by the word definitive verses (muḥkamāt) are verses that contain established principles from the Qur’an, and what is meant by the word “ambiguous verses” are verses whose meanings are clarified by means of the verses of the first category.

Someone might ask: No one disputes the return of subsidiary matters (furūʿ) to foundational principles (uṣūl). Of course, we all know that when such principles are found in the Qur’an, its subsidiary matters must return to those principles. However, this does not necessitate that such subsidiary matters be ambiguous, so why has the Qur’an called them thus?

Response: It is for one of two reasons. Qur’anic knowledge (maʿārif) is of two types. Some of them concern matters beyond nature, which lie outside material perception. When the understanding of ordinary people encounters them, they fall into error and cannot conceive of a non-material meaning for them, such as the verses: Indeed your Lord is in ambush () and: And your Lord comes (). When humans encounter these verse, and because they human mind is more familiar with material things, they understand from God’s ambushing and coming the same meaning that they might understand from a living being performing the same actions. However, upon referring to verses concerning the established principles of Islamic teachings that indicate that God is beyond physical matter and bodies, one is freed from this error. This phenomenon occurs with regard to all non-material teachings unattainable by the senses, including in other divine revelations (those parts of them that are free from distortion) and in the discourses of theistic philosophy; it is not specific to the Qur’an alone. God alludes to this phenomenon in the verses: He sends down water from the sky whereat the valleys are flooded to (the extent of) their capacity () and: We have made it an Arabic Qur’an so that you may apply reason, and indeed it is with Us in the Mother Book (and it is) surely sublime and wise ().

The second type consists of verses related to social laws and subsidiary rulings (aḥkām farʿī). This is because, on the one hand, the social concerns upon which religious rulings are promulgated do not have a fixed state and occasionally change, causing the rulings to be abrogated. On the other hand, the Qur’an was also revealed gradually. As a result, the verses related to social laws and subsidiary rulings inevitably become subject to ambiguity. When someone refers to the definitive verses, they will find in them the explanation for the ambiguous verses, thereby removing their ambiguity. The definitive verses remove the ambiguity of the ambiguous verses, and the abrogating verses (nāsikh) remove the ambiguity of the abrogated ones (mansūkh).

As for those in whose hearts is deviance (zaygh), they pursue what is ambiguous in it, courting temptation and courting its interpretation—The word zaygh (“deviance”) means deviation from straightness (istiqāma), the consequence of which is disturbance of the heart and confusion of mind. The verse continues to describe an opposing category: those who possess knowledge are not disturbed and say, with peace of mind, that all verses of the Qur’an, whether definitive or ambiguous, are from our Lord. But as for those who have zaygh and deviation of heart, they are disturbed and seek ambiguous verses to interpret them on their own and sow corruption. And those who are not afflicted with such zaygh and deviation follow definitive verses and believe in ambiguous ones, yet do not follow them. These people always ask of God: Our Lord! Do not make our hearts swerve (lā tuzigh qulūbanā) after You have guided us ().

Hence, it is evident that pursuing the ambiguous verses means to pursue them in practice, not merely in belief. And such pursuit of the ambiguous verses is only blameworthy when it is done without reference to the definitive ones, because pursuing the ambiguous after reference to the definitive is no longer pursuit of the ambiguous but rather pursuit of the definitive, and there is no blame in this.

What is meant by courting its temptation (ibtighāʾ al-fitna) is that they pursue ambiguous verses and seek, through them, to lead people astray, because fitna (“temptation”) and iḍlāl (“leading astray”) have meanings close to each other.

God mentions a more dangerous aim for this action, namely attaining knowledge of the taʾwīl (interpretation) of the Qur’an, or in today’s terminology, the philosophy of the rulings on what is lawful and unlawful. They seek by this means to make themselves independent of following the definitive teachings of religion, and ultimately to abrogate and abandon the religion of God altogether.

The word taʾwīl (“interpretation”) is derived from the root awl, meaning “to return.” Taʾwīl of the ambiguous (mutashābih) means returning it to its reference point, and the taʾwīl of the Qur’an means the source from which the Qur’an’s teachings are drawn.

God has also used the word interpretation in several places in the Qur’an. For example, He has said: We have certainly brought them a Book, which We have elaborated with knowledge, as a guidance and mercy for a people who have faith. Do they await anything but its fulfillment (interpretation)? The day when its fulfillment comes, those who had forgotten it before will say, ’Our Lord’s messengers had certainly brought the truth (). Here, the truth signifies their teachings, that God is their true protector, that what they call upon besides Him is false, that prophethood is true, that the religion is true, and that the Resurrection of the dead is true. In short, interpretation in this verse denotes the manifestation of the reality of the prophetic teachings on the Day of Resurrection.

It is based on the above-quoted verse that some say the term interpretation in the verse under discussion refers to the external realities to which true reports correspond, such as the events that will occur on the Day of Resurrection and those transmitted in the reports of the prophets, messengers, and heavenly books.

However, this is erroneous, because if the meaning of interpretation were this, then it would be exclusive to verses that concern the attributes of God, some of His acts, and some of the events of the Resurrection. But as for verses related to rulings and legislation, since all of these are of the category of imperatives (inshāʾ), meaning commands and prohibitions, they have no correspondence with an external reality. This is also true for verses on matters of ethics and verses that narrate the stories of the prophets and past nations, whose interpretation, according to this meaning, has already passed in the past and no longer has interpretation in the Resurrection. Moreover, in the verse, the word interpretation has been attributed to the entire Book, not to a specific category of its verses.

In a similar vein, God says: Rather, they deny that whose knowledge they do not comprehend, and whose interpretation has not yet come to them. Those who were before them denied likewise. So observe how was the fate of the wrongdoers! (). As you observe, it considers the entirety of the Qur’an to have an interpretation, because it says that the interpretation of the Qur’an has not yet come to them.

And for this reason, some exegetes have said: Interpretation is the external reality to which the statement requiring interpretation returns and describes. For example, interpretation in the case of reports is that very thing about which the report has been given, whether the report of the event has already occurred, such as the stories of the prophets and past nations, or it will occur in the future, such as verses about the attributes of God, His names, His promises, and all the events that will take place in the Resurrection.

According to this view, in the case of laws and imperatives (inshāʾ)—commands, prohibitions, and the like—interpretation refers to the benefit (maṣlaḥa) attained from that very law. For example, in the verse: When you measure, observe fully the measure, (and) weigh with an even balance. That is better and fairer in outcome (), the interpretation of observing the measure and setting up the balance is the benefit that follows from them in society, which is the rectification of human social order.

However, this explanation is not compatible with the apparent meaning of the verse under discussion. This is for several reasons:

Firstly, the apparent meaning of verse suggests that interpretation is an external matter and an objective effect that follows from the external action, which is observing the measure and setting up the balance, not from the legislative command contained in the sentence When you measure, observe fully the measure, [and] weigh… Thus, interpretation here is an external matter that is the referent and object of another external matter. Accordingly, Qur’anic verses are described as having interpretation because they give information about external meanings, such as reports of prophets and past nations, or relate to external matters such as God’s laws. The interpretation, therefore, is not an attribute of the verse itself but an attribute of the subject of the verse.

Secondly, although interpretation is a referent to which the possessor of interpretation returns, return here is meant in a specific sense, and not every return is a form of interpretation. For example, an employee of an office “returns” to the director in administrative matters, but this form of return is not called interpretation, and a number reverts to “one”, but this is also not called interpretation.

Therefore, interpretation is a specific reference, not an absolute one, as evidenced by the fact that in the verses below it is used with a specific reference. Khiḍr says to Moses: This is where you and I shall part. I will inform you about the interpretation (taʾwīl) of that over which you could not maintain patience (). And another verse says: This is the inner reality (interpretation) of that over which you could not maintain patience (). What Khiḍr informed Moses about the purpose of each action he had performed regarding the boat, the wall, and the boy. Moses was unaware of the true purpose, and instead had imagined the reality of these actions to be something else—something that did not accord with his reason and compelled him to object with ever greater impertinence. The Qur’an recounts the objects of his objections in sequence: When they boarded the boat, he made a hole in it (); When they encountered a boy, he slew him (); and When they came to the people of a town, they asked its people for food, but they refused to extend them any hospitality. There they found a wall which was about to collapse, so he erected it ().

When Moses witnessed Khiḍr making a hole in a boat, he thought that he wanted to drown its passengers. He asked Did you make a hole in it to drown its people? You have certainly done a monstrous thing! ().

Likewise, Moses imagined that Khiḍr had repaired the wall in order to take a wage and, so to speak, secure provisions. When he saw that he did not take a wage, he pointed out: Had you wished, you could have taken a wage for it ().

Then, regarding the slaying of that boy, Moses feared that Khiḍr was a man who enjoyed killing. Thus, he asked: Did you slay an innocent soul, without (his having slain) anyone? You have certainly done a dire thing! ().

The interpretation that Khiḍr mentioned for his actions was that he said: As for the boat, it belonged to some poor people who work on the sea. I wanted to make it defective, for behind them was a king seizing every ship usurpingly. As for the boy, his parents were faithful (persons), and We feared he would overwhelm them with rebellion and unfaith. So We desired that their Lord should give them in exchange one better than him in respect of purity and closer in mercy. As for the wall, it belonged to two boy orphans in the city. Under it there was a treasure belonging to them. Their father had been a righteous man. So your Lord desired that they should come of age and take out their treasure—as a mercy from your Lord (). Then he answered all of Moses’ objections collectively by saying: I did not do that out of my own accord ().

The meaning of interpretation in these verses, as you can observe, is the return of every action to its true purpose. This resembles saying that striking a child returns to discipline, and piercing a vein and drawing blood returns to the purpose of treatment. It is unlike saying “Zayd came” to express his arrival in reality.

Similar meanings for interpretation appear in several places in the story of Joseph.

For example, When Joseph said to his father, ’Father! I saw eleven planets, and the sun and the moon: I saw them prostrating themselves before me’ (); and the verse, And he seated his parents high upon the throne, and they fell down prostrate before him. He said, ’Father! This is the fulfillment (interpretation) of my dream of long ago, which my Lord has made come true’ ().

This is the fulfillment (interpretation) of the dream Joseph received at the beginning of the story, in which he saw the sun, the moon, and eleven stars prostrating before him. Therefore, in this instance, the prostration of Joseph’s parents and brothers before him is called the interpretation of his vision, and this return is of the type of the return of a parable (mithal) to what it represents (mumthal).

In another place, regarding the dream of the King of Egypt and Joseph’s interpretation of it, He says: (One day) the king said, ‘I saw (in a dream) seven fat cows being devoured by seven lean ones, and seven green ears and (seven) others (that were) dry. O courtiers, give me your opinion about my dream, if you can interpret dreams.’ They said, ‘(These are) confused nightmares, and we do not know the interpretation of nightmares.’ Said the one of the two who had been delivered, remembering (Joseph) after a long time: ‘I will inform you of its interpretation; so let me go (to meet Joseph in the prison).’ ‘Joseph,’ (he said), ‘O truthful one, give us your opinion concerning seven fat cows who are eaten by seven lean ones, and seven green ears and (seven) others dry, that I may return to the people so that they may know (the truth of the matter).’ He said, ’You will sow for seven consecutive years. Then leave in the ear whatever (grain) you harvest, except a little that you eat. Then after that there will come seven hard years which will eat up whatever you have set aside for them—all except a little which you preserve (for seed)’ ().

Another story is reported about the dream of those two prisoners: There entered the prison two youths along with him. One of them said, ‘I dreamt that I am pressing grapes.’ The other said, ‘I dreamt that I am carrying bread on my head from which the birds are eating.’ ‘Inform us of its interpretation,’ [they said], ’for indeed we see you to be a virtuous man’… O my prison mates! As for one of you, he will serve wine to his master, and as for the other, he will be crucified, and vultures will eat from his head. The matter about which you inquire has been decided.’ ().

Other verses about Joseph include: and teach you the interpretation of dreams (); Thus, We established Joseph in the land and that We might teach him the interpretation of dreams (); and My Lord! You have granted me a share in the kingdom, and taught me the interpretation of dreams ().

So you have observed that in all these instances from the story of Joseph, the word interpretation is used for the events which the dreams foretell, and what the dreamer sees in sleep is a metaphorical form of those events. Thus, the relationship between those events and the dreams is the same as between a form and a meaning—a form through which the meaning manifests itself. In other words, it is the relationship between a reality that has become embodied and the metaphorical form of that reality, just as was the case in the verses we quoted from the story of Moses and Khiḍr, and also in the verse: When you measure, observe fully the measure… and fairer in outcome. ()

Careful consideration of the verses on Resurrection shows that this principle applies to those verses as well, and the term interpretation conveys the same meaning in them. For example, in the verses: Rather, they deny that whose knowledge they do not comprehend, and whose explanation (interpretation) has not yet come to them (), and Do they await anything but its fulfillment? The day when its fulfillment (interpretation) comes (); what is meant by interpretation is the embodiment of realities.

Verses such as You were certainly oblivious of this. We have removed your veil from you, and so your sight is acute today () clearly indicate that what the prophets and heavenly books foretold would be witnessed on the Day of Resurrection but not with physical sight—in short, it is not sensory and worldly witnessing, just as the very occurrence of the Resurrection itself and the system that governs it are not of the kind of event or system with which we are familiar in this world. Its occurrence is of another kind, and the order governing it is another order, as we shall discuss later.

Therefore, the way in which the teachings of the Prophets and the divine scriptures refer to events that will occur on the Day of Resurrection is not the same as the way in which ordinary reports refer to future worldly events.

From what has been discussed, three points have become clear:

First: That a verse having an interpretation to which it returns is different from a verse being ambiguous (mutashābih) and returning to a definitive verse.

Second: Interpretation is not exclusive to ambiguous verses; rather, all verses of the Qur’an have an interpretation. Thus, just as ambiguous verses have interpretation, definitive verses also have interpretation.

Third: Interpretation is not among concepts with verbal meanings and significations; rather, it is among external and concrete matters. And if it is said that the verses of the Qur’an have interpretation, in reality the attribute of interpretation is not a quality of the verses themselves, but rather a quality of what they relate to, which might be human actions or something else. As for the fact that the word interpretation is sometimes used in the sense of something contrary to the apparent meaning of the word, this is a usage that appeared after the revelation of the Qur’an, and we have no evidence that the Qur’an also intends this meaning by interpretation, such that when it says courting its interpretation (interpretation) we should say that the interpretation of a verse signifies a meaning contrary to the apparent sense of its words. Similarly, we have no evidence that the other meanings proposed for interpretation are correct; rather, most of them, which we will soon relate, are meanings without evidence.

But no one knows its interpretation (interpretation) except God—From the apparent sense of the statement, it emerges that the pronoun “it” in its interpretation refers only to the ambiguous verses, because mutashābih is the nearest possible antecedent, and a pronoun always refers to the nearest possible antecedent. In the same vein, the apparent sense of the word interpretation in the phrase “courting its interpretation (taʾwīl) also refers to the ambiguous verses.

However, as we previously noted, the mere fact that the pronoun refers back to the word “ambiguous” does not indicate that interpretation as a whole belongs only to the ambiguous verses, such that the definitive verses do not have any interpretation. It is also possible that we refer the pronoun in its interpretation back to the word “Book,” just as the pronoun in the phrase “what is ambiguous in it” refers back to the entire Book.

The phrase under discussion conveys restriction. It means: no one knows the interpretation of the Book except God, and the apparent sense of this restriction is that knowledge of interpretation belongs exclusively to God.

As for the phrase and those firmly grounded in knowledge, it is not conjoined with it, such that the meaning would be: no one knows its interpretation except God and those firmly grounded in knowledge. Rather, and those firmly grounded in knowledge is a new statement, which, in reality, continues from the sentence As for those in whose hearts is deviance…

Therefore, the meaning of the two sentences is this: people are of two groups with respect to the Book of God: One group, those who are sick of heart, pursue its ambiguous verses, while others, when they encounter ambiguous verses, say: We believe in all of the Qur’an, because all of it has come from our Lord. And this difference in behavior among people is due to the difference in their hearts: The first group’s hearts are afflicted with deviance, whereas the second group has knowledge firmly grounded in their hearts.

Moreover, if the wāw mentioned here were conjunctive (meaning that and those firmly grounded in knowledge followed directly from But no one knows its interpretation except God) and the intention were that only God and those firmly grounded in knowledge know the interpretation of the Book, in that case one of those firmly grounded in knowledge would be the Messenger of God, for he is the most excellent of all this group. But how could the Qur’an have been revealed to his blessed heart without him understanding its ambiguous verses?

It is one of the customary practices of the Qur’an that when it wishes to describe the Muslim community (umma) or a group in which the Messenger of God is also present, it first mentions that personage specifically, then mentions the other individuals separately, in order to observe his nobility and greatness. After mentioning that personage, it then mentions the name of the community or that group, as in this verse which says: The Messenger has faith in what has been sent down to him from his Lord, and all the faithful (), Then God sent down His composure upon His Messenger and upon the faithful (), But the Messenger and the faithful who are with him (), and the Prophet and those who believe with him ().

And other verses of this kind mention the Prophet before mentioning the rest of the community.

Given this, if the intended meaning of the phrase and those firmly grounded in knowledge were that those firmly grounded in knowledge are knowledgeable about the interpretation of the Qur’an—and considering that the Messenger of God is certainly one of them—it would have been appropriate, as we said, for it to say: “and none knows its interpretation except God, His Messenger, and those firmly grounded in knowledge”, because as we said, it is the custom of the Qur’an that whenever it wishes to mention something common to the community and the Messenger of God, it mentions the name of the Messenger of God separately. But this is not the case in the verse under discussion.

However, one could argue that, since the beginning of the verse, which says It is He who has sent down to you the Book (), indicates that the Prophet is knowledgeable about the Book, there was no need to mention him specifically a second time.

Based on the above, the apparent meaning of the verse becomes that knowledge of interpretation belongs exclusively to God, and this exclusivity does not preclude the Prophet from possessing this knowledge; verses of the Qur’an restrict knowledge of the Unseen (ʿilm al-ghayb) to God, while at the same time, in the verse: Knower of the Unseen, He does not disclose His Unseen to anyone, except to a messenger He approves of (), it makes an exception for some of the messengers.

In this verse too, there is no contradiction between saying that those firmly grounded in knowledge say: Whether we understand a verse or do not understand it, we believe in the entire Qur’an, and other verses which say that those firmly grounded in knowledge who speak thus are knowledgeable about the interpretation of the Qur’an. This is because the verse under discussion highlights one characteristic of those firmly grounded in knowledge. Even though they are knowledgeable about the reality of the Qur’an and the interpretation of its verses, they pause when they encounter doubt somewhere, because, unlike those in whose hearts is deviance, they are submissive before God.

…and those firmly grounded in knowledge; they say, ‘We believe in it; all of it is from our Lord’—The word rusūkh (firmly grounded) means firmness and stability. The fact that those firmly grounded in knowledge are placed in opposition to those in whose hearts is sickness, combined with the fact that they are introduced as saying that all of the Qur’an is from our Lord, indicates that this is their complete characterization. In other words, those firmly grounded in knowledge have such knowledge of God and His signs that it is not mixed with even a particle of doubt or uncertainty. Consequently, the knowledge they have of the definitive verses (muḥkamāt) is never subject to wavering, and they have faith in those definitive verses and also act upon them. And when they encounter an ambiguous verse, its ambiguity does not disturb the firm knowledge in their hearts; rather, they have faith in it and refrain from acting on it until they have understood its meaning properly.

In their statement: We believe in it; all of it is from our Lord, both the reason is mentioned and the result, because the fact that both the definitive and the ambiguous verses come from God causes them to have faith in both, and the definitiveness of the definitive verses causes them to act upon them as well, whereas the lack of clarity in the ambiguous verses leads them to pause at the stage of action but not to reject the verse, because they know that it is from God. In fact, it is not permissible for them to act on it because doing so contradicts the definitive verses, and this is exactly what referring the ambiguous back to the definitive means.

Therefore, the statement: all of it is from our Lord serves as evidence for both their believing in the entirety of the Qur’an and for their acting upon the definitive verses and pausing at the ambiguous ones. In other words, it is evidence for both faith and action regarding the definitive verses, and it is also evidence for having faith alone regarding the ambiguous verse and referring it back to the definitive one.

And none takes admonition except those who possess intellect—The intended meaning of tadhakkur (“taking admonition”) is that a person becomes aware of something through evidence, so that wherever he sees that evidence, he derives that thing as a conclusion. And since the statement all of it is from our Lord was, as we said, evidence by which they concluded what must be done, God therefore called it tadhakkur and praised them for this taking of admonition.

The word al-albāb is the plural of lubb (with the lām vowelled with ḍamma and the bāʾ doubled), and lubb means pure intellect (ʿaql) free from impurities (shawāʾib). God has praised the possessors of intellect in several places in the Qur’an. For example:

As for those who stay clear of the worship of the Rebel (ṭāghūt) and turn penitently to God, there is good news for them. So give good news to My servants, who listen to the word (of God) and follow the best (sense) of it. They are the ones whom God has guided, and it is they who possess intellect ().

Indeed in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day, there are signs for those who possess intellects, those who remember God standing, sitting, and lying on their sides ().

This constant remembrance (dhikr) and what follows from it of humility and submission is the turning penitently (ināba) that necessitates their taking admonition from God’s signs and their transition to true knowledge, as God said: Yet no one takes admonition except him who returns penitently (to God) ().

And in another place, He says: And none takes admonition except those who possess intellect ().

رَبَّنَا لَا تُزِغْ قُلُوبَنَا بَعْدَ إِذْ هَدَيْتَنَا وَهَبْ لَنَا مِنْ لَدُنْكَ رَحْمَةً ۚ إِنَّكَ أَنْتَ الْوَهَّابُ ۝٨

(3:8) [They say,] Our Lord! Do not make our hearts swerve after You have guided us, and bestow Your mercy on us. Indeed You are the All-munificent.

Cited elsewhere in al-Mizan: 3 places →

This supplication is one of the effects of them being firmly grounded (rusūkh) in knowledge. For, when they have come to know God as He should be known, they are certain that they possess nothing of themselves, and that ownership belongs exclusively to God. And since they have such faith, they are in every state fearful that God might make their hearts swerve after their being firm in their knowledge. Therefore, they seek refuge with their Lord and request: “Our Lord! Do not make our hearts swerve after You have guided us, and bestow upon us a mercy from Yourself, so that the blessing of firmness in knowledge may remain with us, and may help us in our journey upon the straight path of guidance, and may assist us in our spiritual wayfaring through the stations of proximity.”

One might ask: Why did they request mercy after this supplication (Our Lord! Do not make our hearts swerve)? The answer is that not making hearts swerve does not necessarily entail that they will always possess firmness in knowledge, because it is possible that He might not make their hearts swerve, yet take knowledge away from their hearts; as a result, they would be left in spiritual purgatory—possessing neither knowledge to attain felicity, nor deviation to become wretched. Rather, they would remain perpetually in a state of ignorance and weakness, while having a necessary and urgent need for knowledge.

Moreover, the need of this group is not merely the preservation of their knowledge; rather, they are treading a path on which they need various kinds of mercy—kinds that no one but God knows of or can enumerate. They are evidently conscious of this need, as they say in the following verse: Our Lord! You will indeed gather mankind on a day in which there is no doubt ().

In their previous statement, Our Lord! Do not make our hearts swerve after You have guided us… they first sought refuge with God from deviation and swerving entering their hearts, which would consequently take away the firmness in knowledge from their hearts.

Then in the phrase …and bestow Your mercy on us. Indeed You are the All-munificent, they requested the outpouring of His mercy so that the life of their hearts might continue. And if they made the word “mercy” (raḥma) indefinite without the definite article, and then described it with the phrase “from Yourself” (min ladunka), it was because, as we said, they themselves do not have detailed knowledge of those conditions, and do not know what kind of mercy that should be. They only know that if a mercy from their Lord does not encompass their state, and if that mercy is not from God, none of their needs will be fulfilled and none of their affairs will be set right.

The fact that they seek refuge with God alone and plead for His mercy alone indicates that they see dominion as belonging exclusively to God and apparent causes as possessing no power in and of themselves.

رَبَّنَا إِنَّكَ جَامِعُ النَّاسِ لِيَوْمٍ لَا رَيْبَ فِيهِ ۚ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُخْلِفُ الْمِيعَادَ ۝٩

(3:9) Our Lord! You will indeed gather mankind on a day in which there is no doubt. Indeed God does not break His promise.

Cited elsewhere in al-Mizan: 3 places →

This statement from those firmly grounded in knowledge serves as an explanation, through which they clarify the reason for their request for mercy. For they know that the establishment of the order of creation, the call of religion, and human striving on the path of existence are all preliminaries for the gathering on the Day of Resurrection—a day on which nothing avails except God’s mercy, and there is no helper save His mercy.

As God has said: Indeed the Day of Judgment is the tryst for them all, the day when a friend will not avail a friend in any way, nor will they be helped, except for him on whom God has mercy ().

It was for this reason that those firmly rooted in knowledge requested the mercy of their Lord, leaving the specification and determination of its type to God Himself, so that He might encompass their state with a mercy that would be beneficial for them.

And in their speech, they described the Day of Resurrection as a day in which there is no doubt regarding its occurrence. Through this, they justified the utmost concern in their request. They also explained this characterization by saying, Indeed God does not break His promise. This is because, as we said, this is the speech of those firmly rooted in knowledge, and knowledge of something does not become firmly rooted and established in a heart unless knowledge of its cause also becomes firmly rooted. And the reason they do not doubt the occurrence of the Day of Resurrection is that God has promised its occurrence. For this reason, when they said, on a day in which there is no doubt, they followed it by saying there is no doubt in it because God does not break His promise.

A similar approach appears in their other statements as well, namely when they said: and bestow Your mercy on us (). They then mentioned the reason for this, saying Indeed You are the All-munificent (). So, God being the All-munificent (al-wahhāb) causes them to request mercy. And in addition to the pronoun ka (“you”) in “innaka,” they also brought the word “anta,” it was in order to make the predicate of “inna” exclusive, and consequently to provide a reason for the phrase “min ladunka” (“from You”), as if to say: if we asked You to bestow upon us a mercy from Yourself, it was because we know of no other munificent giver (wahhāb) besides You.

And again, a similar approach appears in their other statement, where, after saying Our Lord! Do not make our hearts swerve (), they said something that serves as the reason for that request, which was: after You have guided us (). The meaning of these two sentences together is thus: Our Lord! Do not afflict our hearts with deviation (zaygh) and swerving, for You have guided us.

And likewise in the statement: We believe in it (), which they followed by saying: all of it is from our Lord (). These two sentences are also of the same type, and their combined meaning is that those firmly rooted in knowledge say: We believe in it, because all of the Qur’an is from our Lord.

Thus, this group is people who have believed in their Lord and have demonstrated steadfastness in their faith. As a result, God has guided them and perfected their intellects (ʿuqūl). And the result of the perfection of their intellects is that they do not speak except with knowledge, and they do not perform any action except with knowledge of its correctness. And it is for this reason that God has called them those firmly grounded in knowledge and referred to them by the epithet those who possess intellect (ūlū l-albāb).

If you reflect on the descriptions that God has given of those who possess intellect, you will see that they are precisely those whose characteristics are mentioned in the following verses: As for those who stay clear of the worship of the Rebel and turn penitently to God, there is good news for them. So give good news to My servants who listen to the word (of God) and follow the best (sense) of it. They are the ones whom God has guided, and it is they who possess intellect (). In these verses, they are described as possessing several characteristics: first, having faith; second, following the best speech (aḥsan); third, turning penitently (ināba) and returning to God. And if you refer to the verse under discussion, you will see that those firmly rooted in knowledge are also described with these same attributes.

As for the shift from direct address to third person in His saying Indeed God does not break His promise, the reason for this is that the promise mentioned is not exclusive to those firmly rooted in knowledge, but rather is a promise for them as well as for others. For this reason, it was appropriate that instead of “rabbanā” (our Lord, which connects His lordship specifically to them), they should bring the word “Allāh,” because divinity (ulūhiyya) is a general attribute that encompasses all things.

Discourse

The discussion “A Detailed Discussion about the Definitive (muḥkam) and Ambiguous (mutashābih) Verses, and of Interpretation (taʾwīl)” appears here in the printed volume. Read it in the Al-Mizan App.

Examining Narrations

1. In Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī: Abū ʿAbdallāh was asked about the definitive and the ambiguous. He said: “The definitive is what is acted upon, and the ambiguous is what is unclear to one who does not understand its meaning.”

Author’s comment: In this, there is an indication that the ambiguous is not something whose meaning cannot be grasped at all; rather, understanding it is possible.

2. Also from him in Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī: “The Qur’an contains definitive and ambiguous verses. As for the definitive, you believe in it, act upon it, and practice your religion by it. As for the ambiguous, you believe in it but do not act upon it.” And this is the saying of God: As for those in whose hearts is deviance, they pursue what is ambiguous in it, courting temptation and courting its interpretation. But no one knows its interpretation except God and those firmly grounded in knowledge; they say: ‘We believe in it; all of it is from our Lord’ (). And those firmly grounded in knowledge are the Family of Muḥammad.

Author’s comment: There will come a discussion on the meaning of his statement that “those firmly grounded in knowledge are the Family of Muḥammad.”

The flow of the Qur’an (al-jary) →

3. Also in al-ʿAyyāshī from Masʿada b. Ṣadaqa, who said: I asked Abū ʿAbdallāh about the abrogating (nāsikh) and abrogated (mansūkh), and the definitive and the ambiguous. He said: “The abrogating is the established ruling that is acted upon; the abrogated is what used to be acted upon until something came and abrogated it; and the ambiguous is what is unclear to one who does not understand it.” And in another narration: “The abrogating is the established, the abrogated is what has passed, the definitive is what is acted upon, and the ambiguous is what resembles one part to another.”

4. In al-Kāfī from al-Bāqir, in the course of a narration, he said: “The abrogated verses are among the ambiguous ones.”

5. In al-ʿUyūn from al-Riḍā: “Whoever refers the ambiguous parts of the Qur’an to its definitive verses is guided to a straight path.” Then he said: “Indeed in our narrations there are ambiguous parts, just as there are in the Qur’an. So refer their ambiguous parts to their definitive parts, and do not follow the ambiguous lest you go astray.”

Author’s comment: These narrations, as one can see, are akin to one another in explaining the ambiguous, and they confirm what was stated earlier: that the quality of being ambiguous (tashābuh) is removable, and it is removed only when the definitive explains it. As for the abrogated being among the ambiguous, this is indeed so, as has been discussed: the aspect of their being ambiguous is what appears from their outward meaning—namely, the continuity and permanence of the ruling—and the abrogating verse clarifies that this continuity is cut off.

As for what he mentioned in the narration of al-ʿUyūn—that “in our narrations there are ambiguous parts like the ambiguous parts of the Qur’an”—abundant narrations have come from the Imams to this effect, and reason supports it, for the narrations contain only what the Qur’an contains and explain only what it addresses. As was established earlier, the quality of being ambiguous belongs to the meaning that an expression indicates—its being such that it can apply both to what is intended and to something other than it. It is not an attribute of the expression itself (like obscurity or ambiguity), nor of the relationship between expression and meaning in general. In other words, the ambiguous quality arose in certain verses because their expressions function as parables for the true divine knowledge, and this same quality exists in the narrations. It has been narrated from the Prophet that he said: “We, the community of prophets, speak to people according to the measure of their intellects.”

6. In Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī from Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad from his father: A man said to the Commander of the Faithful: “Will you describe our Lord to us so that we may increase in love and knowledge of Him?” He became angry and delivered a sermon to the people, saying among what he said: “Hold fast, O servant of God, to what the Qur’an has indicated to you of His attributes, and to what the Messenger has preceded you with in knowledge of Him, and seek light from the illumination of His guidance, for it is a blessing and wisdom that you have been given. So take what you have been given and be among the grateful. And what Satan has burdened you with—regarding that which is not obligatory upon you in the Book, nor commanded in the tradition (sunna) of the Messenger and the Imams of guidance—refer its knowledge to God, and do not measure the greatness of God by the measure of your intellect.

And know, O servant of God, that those firmly grounded in knowledge (al-rāsikhūn fī l-ʿilm) are those whom God has spared from plunging beyond the veils of the unseen (al-ghuyūb). They adhered to a general acknowledgment of what they did not know in its detailed explanation, and they said: ‘We believe in it; all is from our Lord’ (). God has praised their confession of inability to grasp what they did not encompass in knowledge, and He called their refraining from delving into what He did not burden them to investigate ‘being firmly grounded’ (rusūkh). So confine yourself to that, and do not measure the greatness of God by the measure of your intellect, lest you be among the perishing.”

Author’s comment: His statement “And know, O servant of God, that those firmly grounded in knowledge” and so forth clearly indicates that the Imam took the wāw (“and”) in the phrase and those firmly grounded in knowledge say () as introducing a new clause (wāw istiʾnāfiyya) rather than as a conjunction (ʿāṭifa). This is what we too have derived from the verse. The implication is that the verse does not by itself establish that those firmly grounded in knowledge know the interpretation (interpretation), but neither does it rule out the possibility—so it does not contradict the existence of another proof to that effect, as will be apparent from certain narrations of the Imams of the Household.

The speech is evidently aimed at encouraging the listener to adopt the way of those firmly grounded in knowledge—by confessing ignorance regarding what one does not know—so that he too may be counted among them. This confirms that the Imam explained those firmly grounded in knowledge as referring generally to whoever adheres to what he knows and does not trespass into what he is ignorant of. What is meant by “the unseen concealed by veils” is the meanings intended by the ambiguous verses that are hidden from ordinary understanding. For this reason he followed it with: “They adhered to a general acknowledgment of what they did not know in its detailed explanation (tafsīr)”—and he said tafsīr, not interpretation. Note this carefully.

7. In al-Kāfī from al-Ṣādiq: “We are those firmly grounded in knowledge, and we know its interpretation.”

Author’s comment: This narration might initially suggest that the phrase and those firmly grounded in knowledge () is conjoined to except God—but this impression dissolves in light of the preceding explanation and narration. It is not far-fetched that what is meant by “interpretation” here is the meaning intended by the ambiguous verses, since this sense of interpretation—equivalent to the exegesis (tafsīr) of the ambiguous—was common usage among people in the early period. As for his statement “We are those firmly grounded in knowledge,” together with what was narrated previously by al-ʿAyyāshī from al-Ṣādiq that “those firmly grounded in knowledge are the Family of Muḥammad”—all of this is a case of application and conformity to a particular instance (jarī wa-inṭibāq), as the preceding and following narrations attest.

8. In al-Kāfī from Hishām b. al-Ḥakam, who said: Abū l-Ḥasan Mūsā b. Jaʿfar said to me—until he said: “O Hishām, God has related about righteous people that they said: ‘Our Lord! Do not make our hearts swerve after You have guided us, and bestow Your mercy on us. Indeed You are the All-munificent’ (). They knew that hearts swerve and return to blindness and corruption. Indeed, whoever does not derive his understanding from God does not fear God, and whoever does not derive his understanding from God does not bind his heart to a firm knowledge that he contemplates and finds its reality in his heart. No one can be like this except one whose speech confirms his action and whose secret corresponds to his outward behavior, because God did not indicate the hidden inner aspect of intellect except through what is apparent from it and speaks for it.”

Author’s comment: His statement “Whoever does not derive his understanding from God does not fear God” is in the meaning of the verse: Only those of God’s servants having knowledge fear Him (). And his statement “Whoever does not derive his understanding God does not bind his heart…” is the best explanation for the meaning of being firmly grounded in knowledge (al-rusūkh fī l-ʿilm). For when a person has not truly understood a matter, the different possible understandings of it are not closed off, and the heart continues to be unsettled in its acceptance of it. But when a person’s understanding of something is complete, and the heart is firmly convinced of it, it does not contradict this understanding by following what opposes it out of desire (hawā). Thus what is in his heart is what appears in his limbs, and what he says is what he does. And his statement “No one can be like this” is an explanation of the sign of being firmly grounded in knowledge.

9. In al-Durr al-Manthūr, it is related that the Messenger of God was asked about those firmly grounded in knowledge. He said: “One whose oath is true, whose tongue is truthful, and whose heart is upright, and who restrains his stomach and his desires—that is one who is firmly grounded in knowledge.”

Author’s comment: This narration can be interpreted in a way that returns to the meaning of the previous hadith.

10. In al-Kāfī from al-Bāqir: “Those firmly grounded in knowledge are those whose knowledge does not fall into disagreement.”

Author’s comment: This corresponds precisely to the verse, for those firmly grounded in knowledge are contrasted in it with those in whose hearts is deviance (). So being firmly grounded in knowledge is the absence of disagreement and doubt in the scholar’s knowledge.

11. In al-Durr al-Manthūr from Umm Salama: “The Messenger of God used to frequently say in his supplication: ‘O God, Turner of hearts, make my heart firm upon Your religion.’ I said: O Messenger of God, do hearts really turn? He said: Yes, God has not created any human being from the children of Adam except that his heart is between two fingers of the fingers of God. If He wills, He makes it upright, and if He wills, He makes it deviate.”

Author’s comment: This meaning has been narrated through numerous chains from several Companions, such as Jābir, Nawwās b. Shamʿān, ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar, and Abū Hurayra. What is well-known in this regard is the hadith of Nawwās: “The heart of the son of Adam is between two fingers of the fingers of The Merciful.” Al-Sharīf al-Raḍī narrated this expression (as I recall) in al-Majāzāt al-Nabawiyya.

ʿAlī was asked: “Do you have anything from the revelation?” He said: “No, by the One who split the grain and created life, except that God gives a servant understanding (fahm) in His Book.” This is among the most precious of traditions, and the very least it indicates is that the wondrous knowledge emanating from his scholarly station—which has left intellects bewildered—is all taken from the Qur’an.

12. In al-Kāfī from al-Ṣādiq from his father from his forefathers, from the Messenger of God: “O people, you are in an abode of truce (dār hudna), and you are on a journey—a very swift journey. You have seen the night and day, the sun and moon, wearing out everything new, bringing near everything distant, and fulfilling everything promised. So prepare provisions for the distant passage.” Al-Miqdād b. al-Aswad stood up and said: “O Messenger of God, what is the abode of truce?” He said: “An abode of conveyance and severance.

So when trials (fitan) become confusing to you like pieces of dark night, hold fast to the Qur’an, for it is an intercessor whose intercession is accepted (shāfiʿ mushaffaʿ), and a disputant who is believed (māḥil muṣaddaq). Whoever places it before him, it leads him to Paradise; whoever casts it behind him, it drives him to the Fire. It is the guide that points to the best path. It is a book containing detailed explanation (tafṣīl), clarification (bayān), and verification (taḥṣīl). It is the decisive word (faṣl), not jest (hazl). It has an exterior (ẓāhir) and an interior (bāṭin); its exterior is judgment (ḥukm) and its interior is knowledge (ʿilm). Its exterior is elegant (anīq), and its interior is profound (ʿamīq). It has boundaries (ḥudūd), and its boundaries have boundaries; its wonders cannot be counted, and its marvels do not grow old.

13. In it are the lamps of guidance (maṣābīḥ al-hudā), the beacons of wisdom (manār al-ḥikma), and a guide to knowledge (maʿrifa) for one who recognizes the attribute (ṣifa). So let the one who contemplates sharpen his sight, and let the one seeking the attribute extend his gaze. He will be saved from destruction (ʿaṭab) and delivered from entanglement (nashab). For reflection (tafakkur) is the life of the heart of the insightful, as the illuminated one walks in darkness. Hold fast to good deliverance (ḥusn al-takhaluṣ) and little waiting (qillat al-tarabbuṣ).”

Author’s comment: Al-ʿAyyāshī narrated this in his exegesis up to “So let the one who contemplates.”

14. In al-Kāfī and Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, from al-Ṣādiq from the Messenger of God: “The Qur’an is guidance from misguidance, clarification from blindness, reprieve from stumbling, light from darkness, illumination from calamities, protection from destruction, right guidance from error, clarification from trials (fitan), and a means of conveyance from this world to the next. In it is the perfection of your religion, and no one turns away from the Qur’an except toward the Fire.”

Author’s comment: The narrations with this meaning from the Prophet and the Imams of his Household are very numerous.

15. In Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī from Fuḍayl b. Yasār, who said: I asked Abū Jaʿfar about the narration: “There is no verse in the Qur’an except that it has an exterior (ẓāhr) and an interior (baṭn), and there is no letter except that it has a boundary (ḥadd), and for every boundary there is a point of ascent (maṭlaʿ).” What does he mean by “exterior and interior”? He said: “Its exterior is its revelation (tanzīl) and its interior is its interpretation (interpretation). Some of it has already come to pass, and some has not yet occurred. It flows as the sun and moon flow—whenever something from it comes, it is realized. God said: ‘And no one knows its interpretation except God and those firmly grounded in knowledge’ (). We know it.”

Author’s comment: The narration quoted within the narration conveys the same meaning narrated from the Prophet through Sunni chains with different wording, as in Tafsīr al-Ṣāfī from the Prophet: “The Qur’an has an exterior and an interior, a boundary, and a point of ascent.” And in another narration from him: “The Qur’an has an exterior and an interior, and its interior has an interior, up to seven interiors.”

His statement “Some of it has already come to pass, and some has not yet occurred” appears to refer to the Qur’an in consideration of its encompassing both revelation (tanzīl) and interpretation. So his statement “it flows as the sun and moon flow” applies to both. In the case of revelation, this corresponds to the “application” (jarī) that the narrations have established as a term for the application of speech to its instances (maṣādīq). For example, the application of O you who have faith! Be wary of God, and be with the Truthful () to every group of faithful across the ages—this is one type of application. A second, more subtle type is the application of the verses on struggle (jihād) to the struggle against the self (jihād al-nafs), and of the verses about the hypocrites to the transgressors among the faithful. A third, subtler still, is the application of those same verses to the people of vigilance (murāqaba), remembrance (dhikr), and presence of heart (ḥuḍūr), in respect of their shortcomings and negligence. And a fourth, the most subtle of all, is their application to those same people in respect of their essential deficiency (quṣūr dhātī) in fulfilling the right of Lordship (ḥaqq al-rubūbiyya).

The flow of the Qur’an (al-jary) →

The flow of the Qur’an (al-jary) →

From this, two points become clear. First: the Qur’an has levels of intended meaning corresponding to the levels and stations of its people, and scholars who have investigated the stations of faith (īmān) and guardianship (wilāya) have discerned meanings from it even more subtle than those mentioned here. Second: the exterior (ẓāhir) and interior (bāṭin) are relative matters—every exterior is an interior in relation to its own exterior, and vice versa—as the following narration also illustrates.

16. In Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī from Jābir, who said: I asked Abū Jaʿfar about something from the exegesis of the Qur’an, and he answered me. Then I asked again, and he answered differently. I said: “May I be your ransom—you had answered this question differently before!” He said: “O Jābir, the Qur’an has an interior, and the interior has an interior, and an exterior, and the exterior has an exterior. O Jābir, nothing is more distant from the minds of people than the exegesis of the Qur’an. A verse may have its beginning about one thing, its middle about another, and its end about another—yet it is connected speech that turns upon different aspects.”

17. Also from him in a narration: “If when a verse was revealed about a people, then those people died and the verse died with them, nothing would remain of the Qur’an. But the Qur’an flows—its beginning upon its end—as long as the heavens and earth endure. For every people there is a verse they recite; they are from it, whether in good or evil.”

18. In Maʿānī al-Akhbār from Ḥumrān b. Aʿyan, who said: I asked Abū Jaʿfar about the exterior and interior of the Qur’an. He said: “Its exterior is those about whom the Qur’an was revealed, and its interior is those who acted according to their actions—what was revealed about those people flows in them.”

19. In Tafsīr al-Ṣāfī from ʿAl: “There is no verse except that it has four meanings: exterior (ẓāhir), interior (bāṭin), boundary (ḥadd), and point of ascent (muṭṭalaʿ). The exterior is the recitation (tilāwa), the interior is the understanding (fahm), the boundary is the rulings of the lawful and unlawful (aḥkām al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām), and the point of ascent is what God intends from the servant through it.”

Author’s comment: What is meant by “recitation” (tilāwa) is the apparent meaning of the expression, as evidenced by the fact that he is enumerating meanings—pronunciation being the work of the tongue is not one of them. So “understanding” (fahm) is the meaning beneath the apparent; and “rulings of the lawful and unlawful” is the outward religious knowledge that everyone grasps, though this outward itself has degrees—one level for the common people, and higher levels for the elite. The “point of ascent” (muṭṭalaʿ) is the highest level. It is also possible that the “boundary” and the “point of ascent” are relative, just as the exterior and interior are relative: every higher level is a point of ascent in relation to what is lower. The word muṭṭalaʿ is either from iṭṭilāʿ (“to become aware”) or from ṭulūʿ (“to rise”), and according to the Imam, it is what God intends from His servant.

Regarding these four matters, the well-known Prophetic hadith states: “The Qur’an was revealed in seven letters (aḥruf); for each of its verses there is an exterior and an interior, and a boundary and a point of ascent”—and in another narration: “and for each boundary and point of ascent.” According to the first narration, each of the exterior and interior (which are themselves boundaries) has a point of ascent to which one rises. The second narration can be understood similarly: for each of them there is a boundary (which is itself) and a point of ascent (the end-point of the boundary, from which one ascends to the inner reality). However, this does not obviously accord with ʿAlī’s narration that lists four distinct meanings—unless we say he meant four aspects, even if some overlap. In summary: the exterior of the Qur’an is the apparent meaning at first glance; the interior is what lies beneath the apparent, whether one meaning or many, near or distant; the boundary is the meaning itself, whether exterior or interior; and the point of ascent is the meaning from which the boundary emerges—its connected interior.

20. In a hadith narrated through both Shīʿī and Sunnī channels from the Messenger of God , it states that the Qur’an was revealed in seven letters (aḥruf).

Author’s comment: Although this hadith has been narrated with slight variations in its wording, it is extensively narrated, and the versions are close in meaning, reported by both communities. There has been severe disagreement about its meaning—perhaps reaching forty opinions. What makes the matter easier is that the narrations themselves contain an explanation of these seven letters, and upon that we rely.

21. In some reports: “The Qur’an was revealed upon seven letters: command (amr), prohibition (nahy), encouragement (targhīb), warning (tarhīb), disputation (jadal), narratives (qiṣaṣ), and parables (amthāl).” And in others: “prohibition, command, lawful (ḥalāl), unlawful (ḥarām), definitive, ambiguous, and parables.”

22. From ʿAlī: “God revealed the Qur’an in seven divisions, each of which is sufficient and healing: command, prohibition, encouragement, warning, disputation, parables, and narratives.”

So the seven letters (aḥruf) should be understood as the divisions of discourse and types of exposition, seven in number yet united in their call toward God and His straight path. It is also possible to understand from these narrations that the principles of divine knowledge reduce to parables, since the remaining six—command, prohibition, encouragement, warning, disputation, and narratives—are not divine knowledge in themselves but rather its practical and illustrative dimensions.

On The Meaning of True Tafsīr and Tafsīr Based on Personal Opinion

23. In al-Ṣāfī from the Prophet: “Whoever explains the Qur’an according to his opinion (raʾy), let him take his seat in the Fire.”

Author’s comment: This meaning has been narrated by both Sunni and Shī’ī chains, and there are other traditions to the same effect from the Prophet and the Imams of the Household.

24. In Munyat al-Murīd, from the Prophet: “Whoever speaks about the Qur’an without knowledge, let him take his seat in the Fire.”

Author’s comment: Abū Dāwūd narrated it in his Sunan.

25. Also from him: “Whoever speaks about the Qur’an without knowledge will come on the Day of Resurrection bridled with a bridle of fire.”

26. Also from him: “Whoever speaks about the Qur’an according to his opinion, even if he is correct, he has erred.”

Author’s comment: Abū Dāwūd, al-Tirmidhī, and al-Nasāʾī narrated it.

27. Also from him: “What I fear most for my community after me is a man who takes the Qur’an and misplaces it.”—meaning he fears the wrongful explanation of the Qur’an.

28. In Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī from Abū Baṣīr, from Abū ʿAbdallāh: “Whoever explains the Qur’an according to his opinion, if he is correct he will not be rewarded, and if he errs, his distance from heaven will be even greater.”

29. Also in it, from Yaʿqūb b. Yazīd from Yāsir, from al-Riḍā: “Opinion (raʾy) regarding the Book of God is disbelief (kufr).”

Author’s comment: Other narrations to this effect are reported in al-ʿUyūn, al-Khiṣāl, Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, and others.

As for the Prophet’s statement “whoever explains the Qur’an according to his opinion”—“opinion” (raʾy) means a belief arrived at through independent reasoning (ijtihād), and is sometimes applied to speech driven by desire (hawā). Since he said bi-raʾyihi (“according to his opinion”), with the pronoun attached, the intent is clearly not to prohibit all independent reasoning in exegesis—for that would mean one must confine oneself to the narrations transmitted from the Prophet and the People of the House, as the people of hadith maintain. Such a restriction would contradict the many verses that describe the Qur’an as Arabic and clear, and that command contemplation of it. It would also contradict the many narrations that command reference to the Qur’an and the presentation of reports to it.

Rather, the pronoun in bi-raʾyihi conveys exclusivity and independence: the exegete relies solely on his own tools for understanding Arabic speech, comparing God’s speech to human speech. When we receive any piece of speech from any speaker, we immediately apply the established rules for uncovering the intended meaning and judge accordingly—as we do with confessions, testimonies, and the like. All of this is because our discourse is built upon what we know of the language and the referents of words, both literal and metaphorical.

But Qur’anic discourse, as explained in the preceding sections, does not follow this course. It is speech whose parts, while distinct, are connected—each explaining the other and, as ʿAlī stated, bearing witness to the other’s intended meaning.

One should not, therefore, be satisfied with a single verse interpreted through the rules of Arabic alone. Without scrutinising other relevant verses, one cannot rely on the meaning derived from a single verse in isolation—as the verse Do they not contemplate the Qur’an? Had it been from (someone) other than God, they would have surely found much discrepancy in it () itself indicates: all verses of the Qur’an are interconnected. This was explained in our discussion of the inimitability (iʿjāz) of the Qur’an.

On this basis, exegesis by personal opinion (tafsīr bi-l-raʾy), which the Messenger of God forbade, concerns the method of discovery, not what is discovered. He forbade understanding God’s speech in the same way as the speech of others—even though such understanding may sometimes prove correct. This is confirmed by the narration: “Whoever speaks about the Qur’an according to his own opinion, even if he speaks correctly, has still erred.” The judgment of error despite correctness can only mean error in the method, not in the conclusion itself. The same point is made in the hadith of al-ʿAyyāshī: “Even if he speaks correctly, he receives no reward.”

This is supported by the situation in the Prophet’s time: the Qur’an had not yet been compiled, and only scattered chapters and verses were in people’s hands, making it dangerous to interpret individual verses in isolation. The conclusion is that what is forbidden is the exegete’s independence—relying solely on his own understanding without reference to others. And those “others” must be either other Qur’anic verses or the narrations of the Sunnah. The second option is untenable, since both the Qur’an and the Sunnah itself instruct us to refer reports back to the Book of God. Nothing remains, then, but the Qur’an itself as the reference for interpreting its own verses. With this established, we can now examine the various opinions scholars have expressed about this hadith. Ten opinions have been put forward:

First: exegesis by personal opinion means exegesis by someone who lacks the prerequisite sciences. One can only explain Qur’anic verses after learning the sciences which, according to al-Suyūṭī in al-Itqān, number fifteen:

1- Grammar (naḥw), 2- Morphology (ṣarf), 3- Etymology (ishtiqāq), 4- Semantics (maʿānī), 5- Rhetoric (bayān), 6- Figures of speech (badīʿ), 7- Recitation (qirāʾa), 8- Principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn), 9- Principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), 10- Occasions of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), 11- Stories (qiṣaṣ), 12- Abrogating and abrogated verses (nāsikh wa-mansūkh), 13- Jurisprudence (fiqh), 14- Knowledge and comprehension of those particular narrations which explain the ambiguities and obscurities of the Qur’an, 15- Divinely bestowed knowledge (ʿilm mawhibat). What al-Suyūṭī means by divinely bestowed knowledge is that knowledge to which the following prophetic hadith refers when it says:

“Whoever acts upon what he knows, God will bequeath to him knowledge of what he does not know.”

Second: what is meant is exegesis of the ambiguous verses, since no one knows their exegesis except God.

Third: exegesis that takes a corrupt doctrine as its foundation, subordinating the Qur’an to it and interpreting the verses to fit that doctrine by whatever means possible—even if weak and incorrect.

Fourth: claiming with certainty that God’s intention in a particular verse is such-and-such, without any evidence.

Fifth: exegesis driven by the exegete’s personal taste and caprice.

Al-Suyūṭī transmitted these five opinions in al-Itqān from Ibn al-Naqīb. The remaining opinions are as follows:

Sixth: speaking about difficult Qur’anic verses in a way that has no precedent in the doctrines of the Companions and Successors (tābiʿīn)—thereby exposing oneself to the wrath of God.

Seventh: speaking about a verse’s meaning while knowing that the truth is otherwise. These two were transmitted by Ibn al-Anbārī.

Eighth: speaking about the Qur’an without knowledge—giving a verse a meaning of one’s own without certainty that it is correct.

Ninth: relying on the apparent meaning (ẓāhir) of the Qur’an, on the premise that the Qur’an has no apparent meaning (ẓuhūr) and one must follow only explicit narrations from the Infallible. On this view, it is not the Qur’an’s statement that is followed, but rather the hadith, and only the Infallibles have the right to provide exegesis.

Tenth: relying on the apparent meaning of the Qur’an, on the premise that while it does have an apparent meaning, we cannot understand it—only the Infallible can.

These are the ten opinions, some of which may be referred to others. In any case, none is accompanied by proof.

The invalidity of some is self-evident, while the invalidity of others becomes clear from the preceding discussions. We will not prolong the discourse by repeating them.

In short, what is derived from the narrations and the supporting verses—such as Do they not contemplate the Qur’an? (), who reduced the Qur’an into pieces (), Indeed those who commit sacrilege in Our signs are not hidden from Us (), Among the Jews are those who pervert words from their meanings (), and Do not follow that of which you have no knowledge ()—is that the prohibition in the narrations concerns the method of exegesis, not exegesis itself. God’s speech is not to be explained by the same method as the speech of His creation.

The difference between God’s speech and other speech is not in the manner of using words, constructing sentences, or employing literary devices—for the Qur’an is Arabic speech observing all the conventions of Arabic, as He said: We did not send any messenger except with the language of his people, so that he might make (Our messages) clear to them (), and: while this is a clear Arabic language ().

And it also states: We have made it an Arabic Qur’an so that you may apply reason ().

Rather, the difference lies in the intended meaning (murād) and the instance (miṣdāq) to which the general concept of the speech applies. We human beings, because of our connection with the natural world—having come into being in it, living in it, and ultimately dying in it—have minds familiar with material things. From every meaning we grasp its material concept, and we apply every concept to its corporeal instance. When we hear speech from someone like ourselves describing some matter, we naturally apply it to the instance familiar to our minds and governed by the system we know, because we know the speaker had no other instance in mind—he is a human being like us and understands nothing else from such speech. This governing system of the instance also operates within the concept itself: it may make exceptions to the general, generalize the particular, or in other ways modify the concept—modifications we call the intervention of non-verbal rational contextual indicators (qarāʾīn ʿaqliyya ghayr lafẓiyya).

An example: when we hear a wealthy and noble person say:

There is not a thing but that its sources are with Us ()—we first understand the individual words, then grasp the concept as a whole. At the stage of applying the universal to the particular, we judge that this person must have thousands of storehouses filled with goods: gold, silver, furnishings, ornaments, and weapons, since that is what people store in treasuries. It does not occur to us that “thing” might include the earth and sky, land and sea, stars and human beings—because although “there is not a thing” includes them, these are not things that can be stored. We therefore judge that the speaker’s “thing” (shayʾ) means only some things, and his “sources” (khazāʾin) means a little from much.

Thus the system governing the instance caused the wide scope of “thing” and “sources” to be remarkably curtailed.

Now when we hear that God has revealed the same words to His Messenger—There is not a thing but that its sources are with Us ()—if our minds do not rise above that ordinary level, we give His speech the same explanation as human speech, despite having no knowledge or proof for it. Our only basis is that we understand such a meaning from such an expression.

But if we rise a little above that level, recognizing that God does not store money—especially when the verse continues: and We do not send it down except in a known measure (), and also: and what God sends down from the sky of provision with which He revives the earth after its death ()—we judge that “thing” means provision, and “sending down” means rain, because our understanding of “sending down from the sky” comprehends nothing else.

The storing of all things with God and their sending down in known measures then appears as a metaphor for rain accumulating in the sky and descending to prepare food sources.

This exegesis too is exegesis by opinion and without knowledge, for which we have no evidence. Our only basis is that we know of nothing other than rain that descends from the sky.

Our evidence is lack of knowledge, not knowledge of non-existence—the fact that nothing other than rain descends.

If we rise further still and refuse to speak about the Qur’an without knowledge—leaving its speech in its full generality rather than applying it to a particular instance—we might say: this verse explains the matter of creation; since earthly existents come into being on earth rather than descending from the sky, the phrase “with Us are its sources” must be a metaphor for God’s will as a storehouse from which only that existent receives existence upon which His will has been bestowed.

But this exegesis too is exegesis by opinion: we have no evidence beyond our assumption that earthly existents do not fall from the sky—because we equate “descent” (nuzūl) with physical falling and know of no other kind.

If we reflect carefully on what God has said in His Book about His names, attributes, and actions, the angels, books, messengers, the Resurrection and all that relates to it, and contemplate the wisdom of His rulings, we see clearly that every exegesis we offered using rational indicators was exegesis by opinion and following non-knowledge—distorting speech from its proper places.

30. In the fifth discussion on the definitive (muḥkam) and ambiguous, we noted that Qur’anic statements in relation to divine knowledge function as parables (amthāl) for what they represent. These statements are dispersed across various verses and cast in different forms so that subtle points concealed in one verse are explained by others. For this reason, some Qur’anic verses bear witness to others, and one is the exegete of another. Were it otherwise, an exegete could not explain a verse without falling into speaking without knowledge.

It is thus clear that exegesis by opinion, as described, is never free from speaking without knowledge—as another narration puts it: “Whoever speaks about the Qur’an without knowledge, let him take his seat in the Fire.”

It also becomes clear that exegesis by opinion leads to contradictions among Qur’anic verses.

It disrupts the conceptual order among the verses, placing each verse and each word somewhere other than where it belongs. The consequence is that some or most Qur’anic verses are interpreted in a sense contrary to their apparent meaning.

Thus the fatalists (jabriyyūn) interpreted verses with an apparent meaning of human free will, and the delegationists (mufawwiḍa) interpreted verses with an apparent meaning of divine decree and the limited nature of human free will.

This is not confined to these two groups. Most Islamic schools have interpreted Qur’anic verses to fit their views. When asked “But this verse has an apparent meaning other than your interpretation,” they respond that rational proofs are also an indicator by which one may set aside the apparent meaning—and that this is the very interpretation the Qur’an mentions.

In short, exegesis by opinion destroys the order of God’s verses: each negates the purpose of the other, and the purpose of both is lost. According to the Qur’an itself, there is no inconsistency in it—and if inconsistency appears, it is solely due to the disruption of the verses’ order and the contradiction of their purposes.

This is what the narrations express as “striking some parts of the Qur’an against others” (ḍarb baʿḍ al-qurʾān bi-baʿḍ), as in the following narrations.

31. In al-Kāfī and Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, from al-Ṣādiq from his father: “No one strikes some parts of the Qur’an against others except that he becomes faithless.”

32. In al-Maʿānī and al-Maḥāsin (with chains of transmission) and Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, from al-Ṣādiq: “There is no one who strikes some parts of the Qur’an against others except that he becomes faithless.”

Al-Ṣadūq says: I asked Ibn al-Walīd about the meaning of this narration. He said: “Striking some parts of the Qur’an against others means answering someone’s exegesis of a verse with the exegesis of a different verse.”

Author’s comment: Ibn al-Walīd’s response is ambiguous. It could mean the practice common among scholars of setting one verse against another in debate, relying on one to interpret the other. Or it could mean that someone seeks to derive the meaning of one verse from other verses—making other verses a witness for the verse in question.

If Ibn al-Walīd intended the first meaning, he is correct—that is indeed striking parts of the Qur’an against others. But if he intended the second meaning, he is wrong, and the two narrations above refute him.

33. In the exegesis of al-Nuʿmānī, it is narrated with a chain of transmission to Ismāʿīl b. Jābir, who said: I heard Abū ʿAbdallāh Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad say: “God sent Muḥammad, and through him sealed the prophets, so there will be no prophet after him. And He revealed a book to him, and through that book sealed the heavenly books, so there will be no book after it. And in that book He made certain things lawful (ḥalāl) and certain things unlawful (ḥarām).”

“So the lawful of Muḥammad is lawful until the Day of Resurrection, and the unlawful of him is unlawful until the Day of Resurrection. In that book is your law (sharʿ) and the account of the nations before you and after you. And the Messenger of God made this book the knowledge of his executors (awṣiyāʾ), a knowledge that always remains among them. But the people abandoned them.

Even though the executors of the Messenger of God are witnesses over the people of every age, they turned away from these personages and followed others, and did not obey them purely. They brought matters to the point where they considered an enemy anyone who was a Shī’ī and who professed allegiance (wilāya) to the true guardians (awliyāʾ), that is, those same executors of the Prophet, and who sought their knowledge. And they became the exemplification of this verse which says: and have forgotten a part of what they were reminded. You will not cease to learn of some of their treachery ().

Because these people, as a result of distancing themselves from the knowledge of the executors, arbitrarily engaged in the exegesis of the Qur’an and struck some parts of the Qur’an against others. They argued using a verse that had been abrogated (mansūkh), imagining it to be abrogating (nāsikh). They argued using an ambiguous verse, supposing it to be definitive. They used a verse specific to a particular case as evidence for a general matter, imagining that verse to be general (ʿāmm). They argued from the beginning of a verse and abandoned the reason for its interpretation. They paid no attention to the beginning and end of a verse, and did not recognize its occasions and sources, because they did not wish to refer to the People of the Qur’an. As a result, they both went astray and led others astray.

And you (may God have mercy upon you) should be aware that whoever does not distinguish the abrogating (nāsikh) from the abrogated (mansūkh) in the Book of God, the specific (khāṣṣ) from the general (ʿāmm), the definitive from the ambiguous, the permissible rulings (aḥkām jāʾiz) from the obligatory rulings (aḥkām ḥatmī), the Meccan from the Medinan, and is unaware of the occasions of revelation of the verses, the obscure words and phrases of the Qur’an, the knowledge contained in it regarding the issue of decree and destiny (qaḍāʾ wa-qadar), knowledge of what should be given precedence or deferred, and does not distinguish the evident verses from the profound, the outward (ẓāhir) from the inward (bāṭin), the beginning from the end, the question from the answer, the disconnected from the connected, the exception (mustathnā) from that from which the exception is made (mustathnā minhu), does not differentiate between what is a description of past events and what is a description of what comes after, confuses the emphatic (muʾakkad) with the detailed (mufaṣṣal), the strict obligation (ʿazīma) with the dispensation (rukhṣa), and mixes up the places of obligations and rulings, takes the lawful as unlawful (the unlawful in which the heretics perished), and does not know whether a particular phrase is connected to what precedes or what follows, or has no connection to what comes before or after at all—such a person is not knowledgeable about the Qur’an and is not at all among the People of the Qur’an.

And wherever and whenever you see someone who claims such knowledge, know that he is a claimant without proof and a cunning liar who wishes to fabricate lies against God and His Messenger, and his abode will be Hell, which is the worst destination.

34. In Nahj al-Balāgha and al-Iḥtijāj, the Commander of the Faithful, ʿAlī, said:

A time will come when people present a matter to an Islamic judge, and he will issue a ruling according to his own opinion. Then the very same matter will be presented to another judge on another occasion, and this judge issues a ruling contrary to the ruling of the first judge. Then the judges will differ regarding that matter. When the one who appointed these judges to their positions summons them and asks for their opinions, even though he understands that their opinions differ, he approves all of those opinions—although they have one God, and their Prophet and their Book are one!

Has God commanded them to differ, and do they obey God in this difference? Or has God forbidden them from it, and they disobey Him? Or was the religion of Islam incomplete at the time of its revelation, and God called upon them for help to complete His incomplete religion? Or are they partners of God and give themselves the right to say whatever they wish, and God must be pleased with their words? Or was the religion of Islam complete at the time of its revelation, but the Messenger of Islam fell short in conveying it? Which of these excuses can they possibly have? Yet God says:

We have not omitted anything from the Book (), and in it is the clarification of all things. And He also said: that the verses of this Book confirm one another, and there is no difference in it Do they not contemplate the Qur’an? Had it been from (someone) other than God, they would have surely found much discrepancy in it (). And the Qur’an has a beautiful and miraculous outward (ẓāhir) and a profound inward (bāṭin); it is a wonder whose marvels cannot be counted, and whose extraordinary aspects never come to an end, and no darkness is removed except by means of it.

Author’s comment: This narration explicitly states that every religious consideration must ultimately lead back to the Qur’an. The phrase “in it is the clarification of all things” conveys the meaning of verse .

35. In al-Durr al-Manthūr, Ibn Saʿd, Ibn al-ḍarīs (in his Faḍāʾil), and Ibn Mardawayh narrated from ʿAmr b. Shuʿayb, from his father, from his grandfather: One day the Messenger of God came upon people arbitrarily explaining the Qur’an, and said in anger: “The nations before you were led astray by this very approach. They dispute with their prophets and strike parts of the book against other parts. God did not reveal the Qur’an so that you would deny some of it because of other parts, but rather so that some parts would confirm others. Whatever you understand from the Qur’an, follow it, and whatever you do not understand, just believe in it.”

36. Also in the same book, Aḥmad narrated through another chain from ʿAmr b. Shuʿayb, from his father, from his grandfather: The Messenger of God heard a group disputing about Qur’anic verses and said: “Those before you were destroyed by such discussions—they strike parts of the divine Book against other parts. The Book of God was revealed so that some parts confirm others. Do not deny some because of others. Say what you know, and leave what you do not know to the One who knows it.”

Author’s comment: These narrations treat “striking parts of the Qur’an against others” as the opposite of “some parts confirming others.” “Striking” means confusing the levels (maqāmāt) of the verses’ meanings and disrupting the order among their purposes—for example, taking the definitive as ambiguous and the ambiguous as definitive.

Speaking about the Qur’an based on opinion, speaking without knowledge, and striking the Qur’an against itself are all different expressions of one reality: do not seek assistance from other than the Qur’an to understand the Qur’an.

Now if one asks: How can these narrations prohibit referring to anything other than the Qur’an, when the Qur’an was revealed for people to understand? As He said: We have sent down the Scripture to you for mankind (), and This is an explanation for mankind (). And there is no doubt that its clarifier is the Messenger of God, as He said: We have sent down the reminder to you so that you may clarify for the people that which has been sent down to them (). He clarified it for the Companions, who passed it to the Successors. What has been narrated from the Prophet is prophetic exposition that, by the ruling of the Qur’an, cannot be disregarded.

As for what the Companions and Successors said without attributing it to the Prophet—although it does not have the status of validity of prophetic narrations, there is at least this: the heart finds tranquility in it. What they conveyed either reached them without a chain of transmission from the Prophet, or a sound intuition acquired from his instruction guided them to it. The same applies to later scholars of exegesis.

And how can it be said that the Qur’an’s meanings remained hidden from these individuals, when they were proficient in Arabic, strove to receive the Qur’an from the source of the Prophetic mission, and—as history attests—exerted their utmost effort in the jurisprudence of religion?

From this it follows that departing from their way and explaining a verse with an explanation not found among their statements is an innovation (bidʿa) in religion. And if nothing has been received from them regarding a verse, one must remain silent and leave that verse as not understood.

Moreover, what has been left from them should suffice anyone who wishes to understand the Qur’an: their statements amount to thousands of narrations. Al-Suyūṭī alone counted them as seventeen thousand—either from the Messenger of God, the Companions, or the Successors.

Response: We have already established that the Qur’anic verses invite all human beings—faithless and faithful, those who witnessed the revelation and those who did not—to reflect and contemplate. In particular, the verse Do they not contemplate the Qur’an? Had it been from (someone) other than God, they would have surely found much discrepancy in it (), provides definitive evidence that the Qur’an’s teachings are accessible to any scholar through contemplation. Since this verse is in the context of challenge (taḥaddī) and demonstrating the Qur’an’s inimitability, it makes no sense to condition understanding the Qur’an on the Companions’ understanding—or even on the Prophet’s exposition.

For this verse either conveys a meaning that accords with its apparent sense—which the words themselves convey, even if it requires contemplation—or it conveys a meaning contrary to its apparent sense.

If the instruction “Why do you not contemplate the Qur’an?” intends something contrary to its apparent sense, such speech is not fitting in a context of challenge, and the argument is incomplete. This is very definitive.

Admittedly, the details of rulings (aḥkām) cannot be extracted independently from the Qur’an without reference to the Prophet’s exposition, as He referred people to him: Take whatever the Messenger gives you, and relinquish whatever he forbids you (). The same applies to details of narratives and certain teachings like the Resurrection.

From this it is clear that the Prophet’s role here is solely to teach—and teaching is the guidance of an expert to what the learner can grasp independently but has not yet reached. Teaching makes the path easier and brings the destination closer; it does not create the path or fashion the destination. The teacher delivers the material in an organized manner so the student’s mind can grasp it more readily, without wasting time on arrangement and occasionally falling into error.

This is what is indicated by the verse: We have sent down the reminder to you so that you may clarify for the people that which has been sent down to them (); and the verse: and to teach them the Book and wisdom ().

According to these verses, the Prophet taught and clarified only what the Book itself indicates and what God desired people to understand through His word—not things to which human beings have no path of understanding and cannot possibly derive from the word of God. Such a claim is incompatible with: a Book whose signs have been elaborated, an Arabic Qur’an, for a people who have knowledge (), and while this is a clear Arabic language. ()

Moreover, continuously transmitted narrations (akhbār mutawātira) from the Prophet instruct the community to hold fast to the Qur’an and present any transmitted narration from him to it—accepting what accords with it and casting aside what contradicts it. These instructions only make sense if everything in the prophetic traditions can be derived from the Qur’an; otherwise a vicious circle would result. If understanding the Qur’an would depend on the Prophet’s explanations, it would be a vicious circle.

Moreover, the traditions narrated from the Prophet through the Companions, regardless of the chains of transmission, contain disagreements among themselves—even contradictions—as no thorough scholar of hadith can fail to recognize.

One might suggest that Muslims choose from the Companions’ statements one that does not contradict the consensus (ijmāʿ). But the Companions themselves did not follow this approach—each would give an exegesis without concern for consensus, sometimes contradicting other Companions. A Companion’s statement carries no more authority than anyone else’s, and it is not the case that contradicting a Companion is permissible for some Companions but forbidden for others.

Furthermore, confining oneself to the early exegetes’ statements would halt knowledge in its tracks and strip Muslims of freedom of thought. As we have seen, the first generation produced little of note in this regard, leaving only simple words devoid of precision and depth, whereas the Qur’an, according to We have sent down the Book to you as a clarification of all things (), contains subtleties of knowledge.

As for the view that the Qur’an’s meanings could not have remained unknown to the Companions with the knowledge they had and serious investigation: this is refuted by the very disagreements in their statements—the different explanations of the meaning of verses and the discrepancy in their transmitted narrations. Disagreement and contradiction cannot be conceived except through the concealment of truth and the confusion of the paths of truth and falsehood.

The truth is that the path to understanding the Qur’an is not closed to anyone. The divine discourse (bayān ilāhī) and wise reminder (dhikr ḥakīm) is itself the best path for understanding it. How can a book that God has introduced as guidance and light, and called a “clarification of all things,” be in need of another guide—illuminated by a light other than itself, or made clear by something other than itself?

One might further object: it has been authentically narrated that in his final sermon the Messenger of God said: “I am leaving among you the two weighty things (al-thaqalayn): the greater is the Book of my Lord, and the lesser is my progeny (ʿitra), the People of my House. Preserve me in them both, for you will not go astray so long as you hold fast to them both.”

This has been narrated by both Shīʿī and Sunnī scholars through multiple chains from up to thirty-five Companions. Some versions add: “they will never separate until they meet me at the Pool (al-ḥawḍ).” The hadith indicates that the statement of the People of the House is authoritative (ḥujja).

Therefore, whatever they have said regarding the Qur’an is authoritative and must be followed, and one must confine oneself to their statements—otherwise the People of the House would not be “with” the Qur’an and would be considered separate from it.

Response: The same meaning established above for following the Prophet’s discourse applies here. The hadith does not invalidate the Qur’an’s own authority (ḥujjiyya) in explaining itself. How could it, when the hadith itself states that “the Qur’an and the progeny will never separate”—making both the Qur’an and the progeny jointly authoritative?

This hadith tells us that the Qur’an indicates its own meanings and reveals divine knowledge, and the People of the House guide us to the path of this indication and lead us toward its purposes and objectives.

Moreover, similar narrations calling people to take hold of the Qur’an, reflect upon it, and present hadiths before it, have been transmitted from the Imams of the People of the House themselves.

Furthermore, a great many exegetical narrations from the People of the House employ the method of using one verse as evidence for another and citing one meaning as proof for another. This method presupposes that the meaning lies within the listener’s capacity to understand independently—what is needed is guidance toward a specific path of reflection.

There are also narrations from the People of the House that explicitly state this, such as what the author of al-Maḥāsin transmitted from Abū Labīd al-Baḥrānī, from Abū Jaʿfar, who said: “Whoever claims that the Book of God is obscure (mubham) has destroyed both himself and others.” Similar content appears in al-Maḥāsin and al-Iḥtijāj from the same Imam: “When you hear a hadith or a statement from me, ask the Book of God about that matter” (to the end of the hadith).

With this explanation, the two groups of narrations are reconciled. The first group indicates that understanding the Qur’an’s teachings from the Qur’an itself is possible, since its teachings are not hidden from human intellects. The second group appears to say the opposite, such as the narration in Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī from Jābir, who said: al-Ṣādiq said: “O Jābir, the Qur’an has an interior, and the interior has an exterior. O Jābir, nothing is more distant from the minds of people than the exegesis of the Qur’an. A verse may have its beginning about one thing, its middle about another, and its end about another—yet it is connected speech that turns upon different aspects.” This meaning appears in several narrations. It has also been narrated from the Prophet himself, and from ʿAlī, who said: “The Qur’an is a bearer of multiple aspects” (ḥammāl dhū wujūh)—to the end of the hadith.

Therefore, what is recommended in exegesis is that people explain the Qur’an through its own method, and what is prohibited is exegesis from other than its proper method. The correct method is to seek help from other verses in clarifying the meaning of each verse—but only someone who has mastered the narrations transmitted from the Prophet and the Imams of the People of the House, acquiring from them an informed discernment (dhawq), can undertake this work. And God is the guide.

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1. From Ibn Jarīr, Ibn Abī Ḥātim, and al-Ṭabarānī from Anas, Abū Umāma, Wāʾila b. al-Asqaʿ, and Abū l-Dardāʾ ↩︎

2. From Ibn Abi Shaybah, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Al-Tirmidhi, Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Al-Tabarani, Ibn Mardawayh ↩︎