Verses 78–98
In the previous verses, God warned them [the polytheists] of a severe chastisement that they would not be able to escape or deflect. He refuted every possible excuse that they could have, and clarified that the only cause of their disbelief in God and the hereafter is they dislike the truth and prefer to follow their desires. In these verses, He complements that discussion by providing clear signs and irrefutable arguments that prove His unity in lordship and the return of the creatures to Him.
Then He orders the Prophet to seek refuge in Him from: (1) being afflicted by the punishment that has been promised to the polytheists; (2) the whispers of devils; and (3) the presence and company of the devils with him, just as they accompany the polytheists.
Commentary
وَهُوَ الَّذِي أَنْشَأَ لَكُمُ السَّمْعَ وَالْأَبْصَارَ وَالْأَفْئِدَةَ ۚ قَلِيلًا مَا تَشْكُرُونَ ٧٨
(23:78) And He it is Who originated for you the ears and the eyes and the hearts; little is it that you give thanks.
God starts describing His blessings upon the audience by referring to ears and eyes, two organs that are unique to animals. The creation of these two organs in animals is original, unprecedented, and not based on anything similar in the simpler forms of being, such as plants, objects and elements.
Given these two senses, the creatures that are equipped with them find themselves at a new plane of existence with an immeasurably wider scope of activities compared to creatures that lack these two faculties. These creatures can understand what is good for them and what is bad, what is beneficial and what is harmful. Then they can perform voluntary movements toward what they like, and away from what they dislike. Therefore, they live in a new realm of existence with certain manifestations of beauty, pleasure, might, dominance and love, which were nowhere to be found at more primitive planes of existence.
It has been said that the verse only mentions hearing and sight out of all senses because these two are necessary and sufficient in completing the proof.
Then He mentions the “heart,” which refers to the faculty of intellection and understanding in humankind. This is a bounty that is specifically given to humankind out of all animals. The salient feature of the animal world is the physical senses. However, the creation of heart [that is, intellect] in human beings marks another plane of existence that is much higher and loftier than that. The intellect expands the power and effectiveness of the senses in practice immeasurably, compared to the rest of the animals. Thus, human beings can employ their hearing and sight to comprehend things that are absent from them and things that are present with them, things that happened before and things that exist at present. They can acquire knowledge about the details and properties of objects, either directly or through instruments.
Then, they can rise higher by their power of intellection, above sensory and particular comprehensions, to derive universal laws and think deeply about theoretical knowledge and absolute facts. They can penetrate the corners of the heavens and the earth through contemplation.
This origination of ears, eyes and hearts is due to an amazing plan of God. One cannot ever do justice in being grateful for these capacities.
…little (qalīlan) is it that you give thanks: This sentence involves a sense of rebuke. This sentence involves an omitted word. The implied meaning is: “What you thank is little gratitude,” where “gratitude” is the omitted object of the verb “thank.” “Little” (qalīlan) is an adjective for this omitted object and has taken its place.
وَهُوَ الَّذِي ذَرَأَكُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَإِلَيْهِ تُحْشَرُونَ ٧٩
(23:79) And He it is Who multiplied you (dharaʾakum) in the earth, and to Him you shall be gathered (tuḥsharūn, from ḥashr).
Al-Rāghib says:
Dharʾ means God’s act of making His creatures apparent and visible. Dharaʾa Allāhu al-khalq means: God gave existence to individual creatures…
Ḥashr means bringing a group out of their position and moving them [collectively] toward war or the like.
The meaning is: After making you sensitive and intelligent beings, God made you appear on the earth as earthly creatures. Then He will gather you and return you to meet Him.
وَهُوَ الَّذِي يُحْيِي وَيُمِيتُ وَلَهُ اخْتِلَافُ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ ۚ أَفَلَا تَعْقِلُونَ ٨٠
(23:80) And He it is Who gives life and causes death, and [in] His [control] is the alternation of the night and the day; do you not then understand?
The overall meaning of the verse is clear. This verse follows logically from the previous verse. The last verse said that God has made you intelligent beings and has made you appear in the earth, until when you are resurrected and gathered toward Him. This necessitates a cycle of life and death, because being intelligent hinges on life, and being resurrected hinges on death. That is why here it says: And He it is Who gives life and causes death.
… and [in] His [control] is the alternation of the night and the day…: This again follows logically from the previous statement, because the cycle life followed by death necessitates the passing of time, meaning the sequence of night and day after one another. This is how one completes his lifespan and reaches his ordained death. In this interpretation, “the alteration of the night and the day” refers to their sequence, where one comes after the other. However, it could also refer to their alteration in terms of length, which results in the four seasons of the year based on the varying lengths of night and day. It is through the different seasons that animals are fed and their lives are managed, as He says: And He made therein its foods, in four periods: alike for the seekers ().
Therefore, what is said in these three verses build on each other, and lead one to another. The origination of ears, eyes and hearts—that is, senses and intellect—for humankind [] necessitates a corporeal life; meaning life in the earth until an appointed time, followed by return to God []. This in turn necessitates life and death, which consequently necessitates a temporal duration and a provision to live by [].
Thus we can see, in these three verses, an outline of how human life is planned from their creation until their return to their Lord. The verses imply that since the creation of humankind belongs to God, the direction of their affairs is also in His hands, because their direction is an existential matter that is inseparable from their creation and existence. The two cannot be severed from one another. What is meant by the direction of affairs (tadbīr) is the system of cause and effect that governs how different things relate to one another in various ways according to their creation. God is their Lord Who directs their affairs, and to Him they shall return.
… do you not then understand?: This rhetorical question serves to rebuke the disbelievers and stir them to wake up and thus believe.
بَلْ قَالُوا مِثْلَ مَا قَالَ الْأَوَّلُونَ ٨١
(23:81) Nay, they say the like of what the ancients said:
The question at the end of the previous verse implies a negation. The word “nay” in this verse indicates a transition from that negation. That is: No, they do not understand, but instead they say…
Comparing their speech to that of the ancient generations alludes to the root cause of the problem: what prevents them from following the truth is that they are blindly following their forefathers. That is why they have fallen into a belief that renders religion useless: denial of the hereafter. The verse also shows that clinging to the earth [that is, earthly life] and engrossment in materialism has been an ongoing custom and practice among them from the beginning, and will continue to be so till the end.
قَالُوا أَإِذَا مِتْنَا وَكُنَّا تُرَابًا وَعِظَامًا أَإِنَّا لَمَبْعُوثُونَ ٨٢
(23:82) They say: What! When we are dead and become dust and bones, shall we then be raised?
This verse explains what is meant by “they say” in the previous verse. Their statement in this verse involves a tone of unlikelihood and doubt.
لَقَدْ وُعِدْنَا نَحْنُ وَآبَاؤُنَا هَٰذَا مِنْ قَبْلُ إِنْ هَٰذَا إِلَّا أَسَاطِيرُ الْأَوَّلِينَ ٨٣
(23:83) Certainly we have been promised this, we and our fathers, before; this is naught but fables (asāṭīr) of those of old.
Asāṭīr means “fables, superstitious stories.” It is the plural of usṭūrah, similar to akādhīb (lies) which is the plural of ukdhūbah, as well as aʿājīb (wonders, marvels) which is the plural of uʿjūbah. The demonstrative pronoun “this” in the verse refers to the topic of resurrection. Based on the context of the verse, “before” qualifies “we have been promised this.” The promise of resurrection is in singular form [indicated by “this” (hādhā)], but it is described as “fables” in plural (asāṭīr). This is because resurrection consists of multiple events, such as reviving, gathering, mustering, reckoning, heaven and hell. Therefore, the promise of resurrection involves multiple promises, each of which is considered to be a fable.
The meaning is: The promise of resurrection is an old one. We swear that indeed we, and our forefathers, have already been promised this, yet the promised resurrection is nothing but superstitious accounts that were made up by people of the yore in the form of resurrection of the dead, reckoning of deeds, heaven, hell, reward and punishment.
Their argument for calling these promises “fables” was: It has been ages that the prophets have constantly promised and threatened us about the occurrence of the Hour. If it were true and not a myth, it would have happened by now.
This clarifies two points:
(1) They said that they were already promised this from “before” as a prelude to prove their subsequent conclusion: this is naught but fables of those of old.
(2) There is an escalation in their speech. Their statement in the previous verse—“What! When we are dead and become dust and bones, shall we then be raised?” ()—implied unlikelihood and doubt, but this verse implies firm denial—albeit based on a weak argument.
قُلْ لِمَنِ الْأَرْضُ وَمَنْ فِيهَا إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ ٨٤
(23:84) Say: Whose is the earth, and whoever is therein, if you know?
After mentioning the disbelievers’ doubt and denial of the resurrection, in this verse God starts a series of arguments to show its possibility based on His absolute ownership, lordship and sovereignty. The questions in these verses are addressed to the idolaters who did not believe in the resurrection. They nevertheless believed in God as the Creator of the universe, and the ultimate Lord of the lords and gods that they worshiped among His creatures. That is why His existence is taken as a given in these arguments.
Say: Whose is the earth, and whoever is therein…: Here God orders the Prophet to ask them [the polytheists] about the owner of the heavens, the earth and the intelligent beings within them. Clearly, what is meant in the verse is “real ownership” (al-milk al-ḥaqīqī), which is where the existence of one thing depends on another, such that no aspect of the owned property can be assumed to stand independently from the owner. This is contrary to “conventional ownership” (al-milk al-iʿtibārī) that we humans have set up in our societies for social order. It is the conventional ownership that can be either valid or invalid, and which can be bought or sold. The subject of the verse is real ownership because the verse is meant to identify the source of all control and authority in creation. What determines such authority is real existential ownership, not conventional or legislative ownership.
سَيَقُولُونَ لِلَّهِ ۚ قُلْ أَفَلَا تَذَكَّرُونَ ٨٥
(23:85) They will say: Allah’s. Say: Will you not then mind?
This verse states their response; they admit that the earth and everyone on it belongs to God. They have no escape from acknowledging this because the question is about a type of ownership where the property cannot exist without relying on its creative cause. The effect totally depends on the cause, such that it cannot stand independently of it in any way whatsoever. Even the idolaters admitted that the creative cause of the earth and everyone on it is God, without having any partner [in creating the universe].
… Will you not then mind?: After narrating their answer, the Prophet is ordered to rebuke them with this question for failing to realize how this argument proves the possibility of resurrection. The implied meaning is: Tell them: Given that God is the Owner of the earth and everyone in it, why do you not realize that He—as the Owner—has the control and authority to revive the people on earth after taking their life?
قُلْ مَنْ رَبُّ السَّمَاوَاتِ السَّبْعِ وَرَبُّ الْعَرْشِ الْعَظِيمِ ٨٦
(23:86) Say: Who is the Lord of the seven heavens and the Lord of the mighty Throne?
God orders the Prophet to ask them a second question, this time about the Lord of the seven heavens and the mighty Throne. What is meant by “the Throne” (al-ʿarsh) in a position of central authority in the universe. It refers to a focal point at which everything is managed, all events are orchestrated, and the reign of every being is held. The verse indicates the significance and magnificence of the Throne in two ways: (1) by describing it as “mighty”; and (2) by repeating the word “Lord” before it. We presented a discussion on the Throne in our exegesis of Chapter 7 (al-Aʿrāf) [under verse ].
Some exegetes have said: “Who is the Lord of the seven heavens?” is the same as “Whose are the seven heavens?” It is similar to when one asks about the owner of a house by either saying, “Whose is this house?” or “Who is the lord of this house?” They are equivalent. Therefore, when God says, “Who is the Lord of the seven heavens,” He is asking about the owner of the seven heavens. That is why He narrates their answer as: They will say: Allah’s (). The answer matches the meaning of the question. If they had simply said “Allah” instead of “Allah’s” [in verse ], then their answer would match the wording of the question.
The problem with this view is that the lexical meaning of “lord” (rabb) is more specific than that of owner (mālik). “Lord” does not simply mean “owner,” but it means “an owner who exercises control and authority over its possession and directs its affairs.” If “lord” and “owner” were used interchangeably in these verses, then the polytheists would have given a different answer to the previous question: Say: Whose is the earth, and whoever is therein, if you know? They will say: Allah’s (). In that case, the question would be equivalent to: “Who is the Lord of the earth and whoever is therein?” The problem is that they did not believe in God’s lordship over the earth and whoever is therein, for they believed in the lordship of their gods besides God. Hence, their answer would have been in favor of their gods, as opposed to admitting “Allah’s”. This is contrary to asking about the owner of the earth and whoever is therein, because then they would acknowledge that God is their Owner. The argument is: (1) You already believe that God is the Creator. (2) ownership is inseparable from creation. (3) Thus you must admit that God is Owner.
Now, if we take “lord” to be more specific than “owner,” then the same problem would apply to the question in the current verse and their answer to it: Say: Who is the Lord of the seven heavens and the Lord of the mighty Throne? They will say: [This is] Allah’s (). The problem is that most idolaters—such as the Sabeans and others—believed in gods besides Allah for the heavens and its inhabitants, such as the sun, the moon, and other gods. Therefore, they could have answered the question about the lord of the heavens by affirming the lordship of their gods besides Allah. Then it would be wrong to claim that: “They will say: [This is] Allah’s” (), because their belief system would not require them to admit God’s lordship.
What solves the problem from the root is a comprehensive study of these schools and systems of beliefs. Such examination would reveal a total lack of any principle or structure view that was unanimously agreed upon by the polytheists as a basis for their beliefs. Some of them—such as the Sabeans, Hindus and Buddhists—classified the affairs of the universe into different regions and species, like the heavens, the earth, different types of animals and plants, lands, seas, and so on. They believed that each of these had a god other than God, whom they used to worship so that it may intercede for them and bring them closer [to God]. Subsequently, they made idols to represent these gods.
However, the general scattered population living in different locations of the earth at the time, including the Arabs during the pre-Islamic era, did not have any structured system of beliefs. Some of them believed that there are gods besides God for the earth and its inhabitants, which are represented by idols, while others believed that the very idols are gods. As with the heavens and its inhabitants, as well as the seas, they believed them to be under God’s lordship. They viewed God to be the Lord of these parts of creation, as it can be deduced from what He narrates from Pharaoh: O Hāmān! Build for me a tower that I may attain the means of access—the means of access to the heavens, then reach the God of Moses, and I surely think him to be a liar (). This shows that Pharaoh believed that what Moses called to—that is, Allah—was the god of the heavens and everything and everyone therein. They believed that the angels in the heavens are subject to God’s lordship, then they are in turn lords over what lies under the heavens.
Then there were also the Sabeans and others with similar beliefs. As we said, they believed that the heavens and the heavenly bodies have gods other than Allah, namely the angels and the jinn. They believed that the angels and the jinn are immaterial beings that are completely undefiled by the realm of nature. They believed that these beings inhabit the “heavens,” meaning the inner aspect and layer of this world, which would be the transcendent celestial realm where the affairs of this world are determined, from which the divine decree descends, and which is the source of natural events and forces. They believed that this transcendent realm, including its angels and other beings, is under God’s lordship. Its inhabitants are gods and lords for the corporeal world, and God is the Lord of lords.
Given the above clarification, we can say that if this noble verse [] is addressed to the Arab polytheists—which apparently it is—then their claimed acknowledgement that God is the Lord of the seven heavens [] is true. This should be clear.
Even if the question is addressed to other polytheists—who believed in gods other than God for the [physical] heaven—then what is meant by “heavens” in the verse is not the physical heavens, but the transcendent celestial realm and its inhabitants including the angels and the jinn. This is confirmed by the addition of “the Lord of the mighty Throne,” because the Throne is the position from which the universal laws for the entire creation are issued, including the laws that apply to their lords and gods. Clearly, they believed that the only god for that position is Allah, because nothing else is above that position. Their lords and gods of the transcendent realm have no lord other than Allah. Hence, asking about its lord and claiming that they acknowledge God’s lordship over them is also true, based on what we said above.
The meaning of the verse would then be, and God knows best: Say: Who is the Lord of the seven heavens, where the affairs are determined and from which the divine decrees descend, and the Lord of the mighty Throne, which is the issuing source of the universal laws that govern everyone from the angels down? Do you not believe [O polytheists] that your gods and their subjects all belong to God? Do you know and acknowledge that God is the One Who has given them ownership over what they own?
سَيَقُولُونَ لِلَّهِ ۚ قُلْ أَفَلَا تَتَّقُونَ ٨٧
(23:87) They will say: [This is] Allah’s. Say: Will you not then guard [against evil]?
This verse narrates their answer. They acknowledge that the seven heavens and the mighty Throne belong to God.
The meaning is: They will respond to you that these things belong to God. Then tell them with reproach and censure: Given that the seven heavens and the mighty Throne—from of which the divine command issues—belong to God, would you still disregard His wrath by continuing to deny the resurrection, counting it as the fables of the ancients, and mocking his prophets who have warned you about it? After all, it is certainly up to Him to order the resurrection of the dead and the initiation of the second creation of humankind. He can certainly issue such command from the heaven.
A subtle point to note in the expression of the verse is that it says “Allah’s”—referring to God’s ownership, not lordship—because this argument would be complete by the mere acknowledgement of God’s ownership, even if one does not accept His lordship.
قُلْ مَنْ بِيَدِهِ مَلَكُوتُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَهُوَ يُجِيرُ وَلَا يُجَارُ عَلَيْهِ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تَعْلَمُونَ٨٨
(23:88) Say: Who is it in Whose hand is the kingdom (malakūt) of all things and Who gives refuge, but against Him there is no refuge, if you know?
Malakūt is the same as mulk, meaning “rule, dominion,” but with more emphasis in the meaning. The difference between the terms malik (king, sovereign, ruler) and mālik (owner, possessor) is that the latter is “one who owns some property,” while the former is “one who owns the owner and his property.” Therefore, a malik holds one ownership on top of another, meaning that he has control and authority over both the property and its owner.
God has described His kingdom (malakūt) in the verse: His command, when He intends anything, is only to say to it: Be, so it is. Therefore glory be to Him in Whose hand is the kingdom (malakūt) of all things (). Based on this verse, the malakūt of everything is the aspect of that thing which exists by God’s command (amr) through the creative word “Be” (kun). In other words, the malakūt of everything is its existence as given by God.
Therefore, saying that “the malakūt of all things are in His hands” is a metaphorical way of saying that the creation of all that can be called a “thing” is exclusively by Him, as He says: Allah is the Creator of all things (, , , ). Thus His kingdom encompasses everything, His authority is binding upon everything, and He maintains an irrevocable rule over everything.
Now, one may suppose that even though God has universal kingdom and binding authority over everything, it is still perceivable that some of the means and causes that He has created by His command may violate His wishes and act in His creation contrary to what He wants, or prevent Him from what He wants. That is why He complements “in Whose hand is the kingdom of all things” by saying: and Who gives refuge, but against Him there is no refuge. This addition effectively implies exclusivity of kingdom and authority to Him. That is, the kingdom of the entire universe fully and literally belongs to Him, such that nothing has any sovereignty or authority over anything else that can parallel His sovereignty and authority. This means that no one can make any prevention, disruption or objection against Him, for kingdom and rule are His alone.
… and Who gives refuge (yujīru), but against Him there is no refuge…: Yujīru is derived from jiwār, which originally means “neighborhood, proximity of residence.” Now, neighbors have some rights over one another due to the proximity of their homes, one of which is to support and protect each other against anyone who wants to harm one of them. Some verbs derived from this root convey this aspect of protection. For example, when one person “asks for protection” from another person, it is said: istajārahu. When one “gives shelter” to another person, it is said: ajārahu.
What is mentioned in this verse applies to all of God’s actions. No one and nothing can take away what God gives to any creature, whether as an initial bestowment or a continuation of a previous one. He does what He wants and gives what He wills in the way He wants and as much as He wills. Any prevention of His act or termination of His blessing is only possible with His will, which makes it something not against God, but from Him. He would be limiting one of His actions by another action of His. Meanwhile, there is no force or cause that acts in the world except that it is subject to God’s control, Who can stop it from achieving its purpose. God is the One Who has given it the impact that it has; thus, it is up to Him to take away all or part of that impact from it.
… Who gives refuge, but against Him there is no refuge…: Given the above explanation, the meaning of this sentence is that He can prevent other beings from harming one another, but nothing can prevent Him if He wills to harm a being.
The verse means: Ask these deniers of resurrection: Tell me, if you know, Who is it that sole creator of all things with all their traits and effects? And Who is it that gives refuge to anyone who seeks refuge in Him, but nothing can protect against Him if He wills harm for something?
سَيَقُولُونَ لِلَّهِ ۚ قُلْ فَأَنَّىٰ تُسْحَرُونَ ٨٩
(23:89) They will say: [This is] Allah’s. Say: From whence are you then bewitched (tusḥarūna, from siḥr)?
Some exegetes have defined siḥr (sorcery, magic, bewitchment) as “the appearance of something to the person in a form other than its real form.” This means that the word siḥr (bewitchment) is not meant literally in this verse, but it is used metaphorically [referring to their misconception].
The meaning is: They will respond to you that the kingdom is Allah’s. Then tell them in reproach and censure: How come the truth appears to you in the form of falsehood? If absolute sovereignty belongs to God, then He can certainly bring about a second creation and return the dead for reckoning and retribution by a single command—which is the creative command, “Be!” (kun).
It should also be noted that the three arguments above [in verses ] prove not only the possibility of resurrection, but also God’s Oneness in lordship. For real ownership is not separable from having authority and control over one’s property, and a lord (rabb) is exactly one who has authority and control over his property.
بَلْ أَتَيْنَاهُمْ بِالْحَقِّ وَإِنَّهُمْ لَكَاذِبُونَ ٩٠
(23:90) Nay! We have brought to them the truth, and most surely they are liars.
“Nay” in this verse builds on an implied negation that is understood from the arguments in the previous verses. The meaning is: Given the above arguments—which the polytheists acknowledge to be true, and which prove the occurrence of the resurrection—it follows that what Our messengers have promised them is not false. Rather, We have brought to them the truth via the tongues of Our messengers, while the polytheists are liars in their claims and in their denial of the resurrection.
مَا اتَّخَذَ اللَّهُ مِنْ وَلَدٍ وَمَا كَانَ مَعَهُ مِنْ إِلَٰهٍ ۚ إِذًا لَذَهَبَ كُلُّ إِلَٰهٍ بِمَا خَلَقَ وَلَعَلَا بَعْضُهُمْ عَلَىٰ بَعْضٍ ۚ سُبْحَانَ اللَّهِ عَمَّا يَصِفُونَ ٩١
(23:91) Never did Allah take to Himself any son, and never was there with him any [other] god—in that case would each god have certainly taken away what he created, and some of them would certainly have overpowered others; glory be to Allah above what they describe!
It was prevalent among the idolaters to consider all or some angels, some of the jinn, and some human saints to be God’s children. Christians followed the same line when they claimed: The Messiah is the son of Allah (). What they meant was a filiation and nativity where the child has some share of the reality and essence of divinity, where the child is derived and then separated from the Divine in one way or another. Thus, the child is called a deity that is born from another deity. This is “real filiation,” which is contrary to “claimed filiation.” What is meant by claimed filiation is that God adopts someone as a child in order to show the person’s high status or for some other purpose. Claimed filiation does not necessitate the child partaking in the reality of divinity. An example of claimed filiation is what the Jews [and Christians] claim: We are the sons of Allah and His beloved ones (). Although calling one “God’s son” in this sense is also impermissible, this meaning of child is not what is meant in the current verse of discussion, because the verse is in a context of denying multiple gods and deities, while this sense of filiation does not necessitate the child’s divinity.
Hence, what is meant by “taking a son” in this verse, is creating something by detaching and separating it from oneself, such that it would include some of the reality of the creator in one way or another. It is not meant in the sense of calling something that already exists as one’s son due to some purpose and objective, as some exegetes have suggested.
Never did Allah take to Himself any son (min walad), and never was there with him any [other] god (min ilāh)…: As you know, they [the polytheists] viewed the title “son” (walad) to be more specific than “god” (ilāh), because not all of their gods were God’s sons. Hence, this part of the verse escalates from a particular negation regarding sons, to a more universal one that includes the other gods. Also, the Arabic particle min in both sentences [translated as “any”] is extra, added for emphasis.
…in that case would each god have certainly taken away what he created…: This verse argues against the belief in multiple gods by stating that it entails certain problems. The assumption that there are multiple gods only makes sense if the gods are distinct from each other in one way or another, such that they are not united in terms of their divinity and lordship. Suppose that some part of the universe or a certain species had its own lord. This means that this lord has been given independent authority to manage and direct the affairs of that part or species, without needing anything beyond itself (including the one who has entrusted that authority to it). It is also evident that if two things are distinct from one another, then what issues from them would also be distinct from one another.
The implication of this scenario is that each god is independent in how it governs its territory and directs its kingdom. This entails that there is no united, connected and consistent system of direction and management which governs different parts of the universe and various species. For example, the system that governs the human world would be severed from the systems that govern other species and beings such as the animals, the plants, the lands, the seas, the plains, the mountains, the earth and the heaven. Each of these would be disconnected from the others. This necessitates the corruption of the heavens, the earth, and everything therein. However, this is certainly not true, because there is a united system that governs the creation, with its different components being coordinated and compatible with one another.
This should clarify what is meant in this verse: in that case would each god have certainly taken away what he created. That is: Each god would separate from others because each of them governs its jurisdiction differently.
…and some of them would certainly have overpowered others…: This sentence mentions another problem entailed by the multiplicity of gods, forming one more argument that negates such belief. The argument can be explained as follows: There are different systems of direction of affairs (sing. tadbīr) in the universe. The relationship between some of them is ʿarḍī (horizontal, latitudinal, parallel), such as the systems that govern the land versus the sea, or the systems that govern water versus fire. Another form of relationship between the affairs in the universe is ṭūlī (vertical, longitudinal, causal), where one system of direction is universal and dominant, while another is particular and subordinate. Examples of this relationship are: the direction of earthly affairs versus the direction of the plants on earth; the direction of the heavens versus the direction of one heavenly body therein; and the direction of the entire corporeal world versus the direction of any single corporeal being.
In the second kind of relationship, one system is general, universal and dominant compared to its subdivisions. If the subordinate systems are cut off from the superior system, they would perish because they subsist by it. For example, if there were no earth or no system that governs earthly beings in general, then there would be neither a human world nor a system that governs it in particular.
This entails that the god which governs a general system of direction should be superior and higher than a god which has been entrusted with the direction of affairs at a more inferior and subordinate level. However, it is rationally impossible for one god to be superior to another.
Some exegetes have explained this impossibility as follows: If one god is superior to another, it means that it can overpower and defeat it. This means that the lower god is deficient in power, and in need of something beyond itself to complete it. This shows some limit in the lesser gods, while limitation implies composition, and composition is a characteristic of contingent beings. This is a contradiction, because gods [by definition] are necessary beings.
The problem with this explanation is that the idolaters did not believe that their gods are necessary beings. They viewed their gods as contingent beings who have been entrusted with the direction of affairs of beings at lower planes of existence. They considered God to be the Lord of the gods, and the gods to be the lords of what is below them. The only necessary being to them was God, Who is the Lord of the lords and the God of the gods.
Instead, the superiority of one god over another is impossible because it contradicts the independence of the lower god [not because it contradicts the lower god’s necessity of being]. If one god is subordinate to another, it follows that it needs the superior god in its authority and jurisdiction. This hierarchy entails that the lower god receives help and relies on the higher god in its actions, effects and direction of affairs. This means that the lower god is merely a means that is used in directing the affairs of lower beings, not another independent god with its own impact and effect. Therefore, it cannot be a god, but it is only a means employed in the direction of affairs. This is a contradiction of the polytheists’ premise.
The above is what we can deduce from contemplating the verse. The exegetes have interpreted the verse’s argument in various ways, all of which are based on the idea that the belief in multiple gods entails that they are contingence beings (mumkin), which is a contradiction because a god must be necessarily existent (wājūb). However, the polytheists did not believe in the necessity of existence of any god except Allah. One exegete has gone to an extreme by interpreting the verse based on certain premises that are not referred to in the verse whatsoever, whether explicitly or implicitly. Another exegete has gone to the other extreme by saying that what is meant in the verse is casual impossibility as opposed to rational impossibility, and that the verse’s argument is a persuasive one that satisfies the public (iqnāʿī), as opposed to a decisive, irrevocable and apodictic one for the intellectuals (qaṭʿī).
As we said above, the polytheists believed in their gods as directors of affairs, not creators of the universe. Yet, the verse says: each god have certainly taken away what he created. This is not a contradiction and should not confuse the reader, because “direction” and “creation” are inseparable from one another. There are certain forms of creation that are part and parcel of direction. For example, part of directing a general system is to create its specific components. In other words, creating the particular is part of directing the universal. Hence, there is an overlap between the act of creation and the direction of affairs. This is why God describes our actions as things that are “created” or “made,” as He says: Allah has created you and what you do (); And He made for you of the ships and the cattle what you ride on ().
Given the above point, the polytheists effectively believed each of their gods to be a “creator” with respect to its lower planes of existence, meaning that it acts in that realm just as we act in ours. As with ījād (existentiation, giving existence to things), it is exclusively done by God alone, which is agreed upon by monotheists and polytheists alike, except for some theologians who have not distinguished between “action” and “giving existence.”
…glory be to Allah above what they describe: God finishes the verse by proclaiming His purity and transcendence [above their claims].
عَالِمِ الْغَيْبِ وَالشَّهَادَةِ فَتَعَالَىٰ عَمَّا يُشْرِكُونَ ٩٢
(23:92) The Knower of the unseen and the seen, so may He be exalted above what they associate [with Him].
This entire verse serves as an adjective for the noun “Allah” at the end of the last verse: glory be to Allah above what they describe (). Given the context of these verses, the current verse is mentioned after the last verse in order to show that God knows about His transcendence and freedom from the polytheistic ascriptions of the people. Thus, it is equivalent in meaning to the verse: Say: Do you [presume to] inform Allah of what He knows not in the heavens and the earth? Glory be to Him, and supremely exalted is He above what they set up [with Him] ().
This is an argument that negates the existence of partners for God, based on God’s witness that He does not know any partners for Himself. It is similar to the verse “Allah bears witness that there is no god but He” (), which is also based on His witness that He does not have any partners.
Some exegetes have said:
This verse is another argument to show why some gods would overpower others. Alternatively, it shows that some gods would be necessarily ignorant, which is an imperfection for them, and contrary to the exalted position of a god. The argument is: If there were multiple gods, then obviously each of them would not know the reality of another as it knows itself. This means a form of ignorance and deficiency [which contradicts the required omniscience of a god].
This interpretation suffers from the problem as the other arguments of the exegetes against polytheism. The problem with all of them is that they only prove that multiple gods cannot all be self-existent, whereas the idolaters only believed in the self-existence of God, not that of their other gods. Moreover, some of the premises in the above argument can be challenged.
…so may He be exalted (fa-taʿalā) above what they associate [with Him]: This sentence is a consequence and conclusion of all of the above arguments that negate polytheism, as indicated by the word “so” (the letter fāʾ).
قُلْ رَبِّ إِمَّا تُرِيَنِّي مَا يُوعَدُونَ ٩٣
(23:93-94) Say: O my Lord! If Thou shouldst make me see what they are threatened with: My Lord! Then place me not among the unjust.
In the previous verses, God narrated the following points from the polytheists: (1) believing in partners for God; (2) denying the resurrection; and (3) mocking God’s messengers. He then countered their views and provided the truth about these things. Having presented the truth, here God turns to threaten the polytheists with punishment. It is for this reason that God orders the Prophet to ask protection against God’s promised punishment—in case he is alive and present at the time of its occurrence.
Say: O my Lord! If (immā) Thou shouldst make me see (turiyannī) what they are threatened with: This verse orders the Prophet to supplicate and cry to God for help. The repetition of “My Lord” (Rabbi) in the next verse [] emphasizes the sense of pleading. The particle immā is in fact in-mā [where the letters nūn (n) and mīm (m) have merged]. The particle mā in immā is extra [that is, it does not add to the meaning of the particle in (lit. “if”)], but it serves to validate the stress on the letter nūn in turiyannī (make me see). Therefore, it is effectively a conditional statement: “If You indeed show me…”
… what they are threatened with…: This refers to the threats that were made earlier in this chapter. Therefore, the verse suggests that some of those threats were threats of worldly punishment [because it says, “make me see”].
رَبِّ فَلَا تَجْعَلْنِي فِي الْقَوْمِ الظَّالِمِينَ ٩٤
(23:94) My Lord! Then place me not among (fī) the unjust.
The particle fī literally means “in, among.” What is meant by being in or among the unjust is being subject to their punishment along with them.
وَإِنَّا عَلَىٰ أَنْ نُرِيَكَ مَا نَعِدُهُمْ لَقَادِرُونَ ٩٥
(23:95) And most surely We are well able to make you see what We threaten them with.
This verse serves to comfort the Prophet’s. God relieves him by saying that He will show him the punishment that the polytheists have been threatened with. Perhaps it refers to their punishment in the Battle of Badr, which God made the Prophet and the believers to see, thereby healing the burning resentment in their souls.
ادْفَعْ بِالَّتِي هِيَ أَحْسَنُ السَّيِّئَةَ ۚ نَحْنُ أَعْلَمُ بِمَا يَصِفُونَ ٩٦
(23:96) Repel evil by what is best; We know best what they describe.
The meaning is: “Retaliate their evil behavior with good. Not only that, but choose the best form of good.” This means repelling an evil act by the best of goods. For example, if they offend you by bothering you, you should do good to them to the best of your ability. If that is not possible, then do some good to them. If you are not capable of that either, then overlook their misbehavior.
…We know best what they describe: This sentence is a consolation to the Prophet. What is meant is that he should not be distressed and grieved by the insolence of the polytheists against their Lord, because He is well aware of their descriptions [of Him and His religion].
وَقُلْ رَبِّ أَعُوذُ بِكَ مِنْ هَمَزَاتِ الشَّيَاطِينِ ٩٧ وَأَعُوذُ بِكَ رَبِّ أَنْ يَحْضُرُونِ٩٨
(23:97-98) And say: O my Lord! I seek refuge in Thee from the evil suggestions (hamazāt, from hamzah) of the devils; And I seek refuge in Thee! O my Lord! From their presence.
Majmaʿ al-bayān says:
Hamzah means severe push and repulsion. The letter hamzah is called as such because it is pronounced from the end of the throat with force. The Devil’s hamzah is its thrust to sin by deceitful temptation.
Tafsīr al-Qummī says, “It [hamzāt] means the whispers of devils that cross your heart.”
These two verses order the Prophet (s.a.w) to seek refuge in his Lord from the deceptions of devils and from their presence. They implicitly identifies the presence and whispers of the devils as causes which have afflicted the polytheists with denial of religion and association of partners with God.
This is based on the specific Arabic structure of the sentence, where qalīlan is manṣūb in terms of inflection. (Trans.) ↩︎
That is: We have already been promised this. (Trans.) ↩︎
This is inferred from the use of the Arabic particle man (who, whoever), which is usually used for intelligent beings, although there are Qur’anic counter examples for it as well. The author’s interpretation is based on the primary meaning and common usage of the particle. (Trans.) ↩︎
This is called proof by contradiction (reductio ad absurdum), where the opposite of a desired conclusion is assumed to be true as a premise, and then it is shown that it leads to a contradiction, thereby concluding that the initial premise must have been false. (Trans.) ↩︎
A contingent being (mumkin al-wujūd) is one whose existence is not from itself, but it owes it to another source. Its existence is contingent on the existence and effusion of its cause. A necessary being (wājib al-wujūd) is self-existent and self-subsistent. Existence is necessary for it and inseparable from its essence. According to monotheism, God is the only Necessary Being, and all other beings are contingent. (Trans.) ↩︎
The gist of the author’s point is that the polytheists did not view their gods to be necessary beings, but they viewed them to be independent in their jurisdiction. In other words, in order to hold a being as a lord—which directs the affairs of the person, and whom the person worships in return—that being need not be self-existent, but it needs to be independent in its work and direction of affairs. However, there is no independent being in the universe but God. (Trans.) ↩︎
In both verses God bears witness. The difference is that in verse God bears witness to not having any partner, but in verse He bears witness that He does not know to have any partners. (Trans.) ↩︎
That is, the exegete needs to prove why “each of them cannot know the reality of another as it knows itself.” (Trans.) ↩︎
Since immā is in fact in-mā, if the particle mā is extra, immā would reduce to the Arabic particle in (lit. “if”). The stress on the letter nūn in turiyannī shows emphasis. It means: “If You should surely make me see…,” or “if it shall surely come that You make me see…” (Trans.) ↩︎