Verses 26–48

Chapter 15: Al-Ḥijr (The Rocky Tract) · Printed edition: Volume 23, pp. 179–216

This is the third set of verses following those at the commencement of this chapter, wherein the idolators mocked the Book and the Prophet and proposed to him a miracle other than the Qur’an. In this section, God, the Exalted, mentions the initial creation of humans and the jinn. He recounts His command to the angels and Iblīs to prostrate to Adam, their compliance, and Iblīs’s refusal, being of the jinn, leading to his expulsion. It also describes Iblīs’s vow to mislead the descendants of Adam. These verses conclude by addressing God’s decree regarding the felicity of the righteous and the wretchedness of those who go astray.

Commentary

وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ صَلْصَالٍ مِنْ حَمَإٍ مَسْنُونٍ ٢٦

(15:26) Certainly We created man out of a dry clay (drawn) from an aging mud,

al-Rāghib states in his al-Mufradāt: “The primary meaning of ṣalṣāl is the echoing sound produced by a dry object. Hence, we have the phrase ṣal al-mismār (echo of a nail). Dry clay is termed ṣalṣāl. The Almighty says: ‘He created man out of dry clay, like the potter’s’ (al-Raḥmān:14) and ‘Certainly We created man out of a dry clay (drawn) from an aging mud.’ The term ṣalṣālah refers to the residue of water. It is named as such due to the echoing sound it makes when moved within a container. Some also opine that ṣalṣāl refers to the foul odor emanating from clay, drawing a parallel with the phrase ṣalla al-laḥm (the meat decayed).”

He elaborates on the term ḥamʾah as well, saying, “It denotes foul-smelling black clay. As for the phrase, ‘from an aging mud,’ some interpret it as undergoing a transformation. The term lam yatasannahu implies that it hasn’t changed, with the particle ‘ha’ indicating a state of rest.”

This verse sheds light on the initial stages of human creation. Evidence lies in the verse: “He commenced man’s creation from clay. Then He made his progeny from an extract of a base fluid” (al-Sajdah:7-8). This verse delineates the creation of the human species and their emergence on Earth. The creation of the very first human mirrors the creation of subsequent ones. Mankind’s entirety originated from the first, suggesting that all humans share a common mode of creation.

The author of Majma’ al-bayyān al-bayān elucidates: “The foundational substance from which Adam was formed was from the soil, as evident from the verse: ‘He created him from dust’ (Āl ʿImrān:59). This dust was then transformed into clay, corroborated by the verse: ‘You created him from clay’ (al-A’rāf:12). This clay was then allowed to change until it became limp, as referred to in the verse: ‘We created man out of a dry clay (drawn) from an aging mud.’ Eventually, this mixture was left until it desiccated, which is indicated by the phrase, ‘We created man out of a dry clay.’ Hence, it is evident that these descriptions do not contradict but rather represent different phases of human creation.”

وَالْجَانَّ خَلَقْنَاهُ مِنْ قَبْلُ مِنْ نَارِ السَّمُومِ ٢٧

(15:27) and We created the jinn earlier, out of a piercing fire.

al-Rāghib states: “al-samūm is a hot wind that has a poisonous effect.”

The root of the word jinn is to hide or cover. This meaning extends to all the derivatives of the word, including jinn, majannah (shield), jannah (paradise), janīn (fetus), janān (with the opening meaning heart), janna ʿalayhi al-layl (the night enveloped him), and others.

The jinn are a hidden group of beings by nature, not visible to our senses. They have feelings and free will. The Noble Qur’an frequently mentions them and attributes to them wondrous deeds and swift movements, as seen in the story of Solomon. They have obligations, they live, die, and will be resurrected. Numerous scattered verses in the words of the Almighty indicate all of this.

As for the term jānn, the question arises: does it refer specifically to the jinn? Or does it refer to the father of the jinn, much like Adam is the father of humans? Some reports suggest it could be Iblīs himself, as per Imām al-Ḥasan’s narration. Or perhaps jānn refers to the progeny of Iblīs among the jinn. Or maybe it’s a specific kind of jinn as mentioned by al-Rāghib. These are various opinions with little conclusive evidence for most.

What seems clear from contemplating the Qur’anic verses is that God is contrasting two distinct species in these verses: He juxtaposes insān (human) with jānn, presenting them as two distinct species with no intrinsic connection in their creation. This interpretation is also reflected in the verse: “He created man out of dry clay, like the potter’s, and created the jinn out of a flame of fire” (al-Raḥmān:14-15).

Contextually, the verses under scrutiny clearly suggest that Iblīs belonged to the jinn. Otherwise, the mention of the statement: “and We created the jinn earlier, out of a piercing fire” would be meaningless. In another passage, God distinctly states about Iblīs: “He was one of the jinn, so he transgressed against his Lord’s command” (al-Kahf:50). Hence, the term jān in this verse either denotes the jinn as a whole or a specific category within the jinn. This is the sole instance in the Qur’an where this term appears. Everywhere else, the term jinn is employed, even in contexts that encompass both Iblīs and his counterparts. For instance, God proclaims: “the devils from among humans and jinn” (al-Anʿām:112). Another verse goes: “And the word became due against them, as it did against the nations that passed away before them of jinn and humans” (Fussilat:25). There’s also the verse: “O company of jinn and humans! If you can pass through the confines of the heavens and the earth, then do pass through it. But you will not pass through except by an authority” (al-Raḥmān:33).

The apparent juxtaposition between humans (insān) and the jān in some verses and between humans and jinn in others indicates that the terms jinn and jān refer to the same entity. This is evident.

When comparing the verse, “Indeed, We created man from a dry clay, (drawn) from an aging mud,” to the verse, “And We created the jinn earlier, from a piercing fire,” it becomes clear that the latter verse discusses the original creation of the jinn and their emergence as a distinct species. This is analogous to the creation of humans from dry clay. A question arises: Is the subsequent creation of the jinn lineage similar to the creation of the first jinn, specifically, from a piercing fire? This contrasts with human creation where the first human was formed from earth, while subsequent generations came from his sperm. The Qur’an does not explicitly mention this. Yet, it does refer to the progeny of Iblīs in the verse: “Will you then take him and his offspring for guardians in My stead?” (al-Kahf:50).

Another verse associates mortality with both humans and jinn: “And the word became due against them, as it did against the nations that passed away before them of jinn and humans” (Fussilat:25). It’s commonly understood that any species which has offspring and experiences death reproduces. A subsequent question is: Do the jinn reproduce similarly to humans through copulation, or do they have a different reproductive method?

The phrase in the verse, “And We created the jinn earlier,” is an annexation construction. However, its relation isn’t specified. The comprehensive interpretation of this verse is that the jinn were created before mankind. This understanding stems from the context comparing the two species.

The verse states that the jinn were initially created from a piercing flame. This doesn’t conflict with the verse which says: “and created the jinn out of a flame of fire” (al-Raḥmān:15). A flame of fire here denotes a flame accompanied by smoke. Combining insights from these two verses, it’s inferred that the jinn’s creation began with a piercing flame that ignited, becoming a smokeless flame of fire.

Consequently, the essence of these two verses () is: “By oath, We commenced the creation of the human species from a dry clay, which previously was a malodorous liquid. We initiated the creation of the jinn species from a piercing flame that ignited and transformed into a flame of fire.”

وَإِذْ قَالَ رَبُّكَ لِلْمَلَائِكَةِ إِنِّي خَالِقٌ بَشَرًا مِنْ صَلْصَالٍ مِنْ حَمَإٍ مَسْنُونٍ٢٨

(15:28) When your Lord said to the angels, ‘Indeed I am going to create a human out of a dry clay (drawn) from an aging mud.’

al-Rāghib states: “The term bashrah (epidermis) means the outer layer of the skin, while admah denotes what lies beneath it. The majority of linguists opine that humanity is termed bashar because their skin is exposed and not enveloped by hair, setting them apart from other animals whose skins are veiled by wool, fur, or fluff. Interestingly, both the singular and plural forms of the word bashar (human) are identical. This term is employed in the Qur’an as seen in: ‘Shall we believe two humans like ourselves?’ (al-Mu’minūn:47). Notably, every instance in the Qur’an that touches upon human appearance utilizes the word bashar. An example being: ‘It is He who created the human being (bashar) from water’ (al-Furqān:54).”

The passage commencing with, “When your Lord said to the angels,” has an implicit verb, making the complete meaning: “Remember when your Lord said to the angels….” This verse intriguingly transitions from the personal plural to the third person. This is analogous to our earlier discussion on the verse: “and indeed, it is your Lord who will resurrect them,” () where the verse addresses those who harbor doubts about resurrection. This verse also sheds light on the Day of Resurrection, eternal felicity, and perpetual distress.

The utilization of the first-person plural in preceding verses like “We created man” and “We created the jinn” is emblematic of majesty. This style of speech is frequently observed among the nobility when they speak of themselves, their aides, and their subordinates, symbolizing their elevated stature. In this context, God views the noble angels as mediums executing His commands in these matters. Yet, they don’t assist Him in the act of creating Adam. This is evident as they are the recipients of the message, learning about God’s will to create Adam and subsequently being instructed to prostrate before him after He shapes him and breathes His spirit into him. The essence of the verse is self-evident.

فَإِذَا سَوَّيْتُهُ وَنَفَخْتُ فِيهِ مِنْ رُوحِي فَقَعُوا لَهُ سَاجِدِينَ ٢٩

(15:29) So when I have proportioned him and breathed into him of My spirit, then fall down in prostration before him.’

The term taṣwīyah refers to the act of making something stable and well-proportioned, ensuring that each part is in its appropriate place and condition. Likewise, when speaking of the human body, taṣwīyah implies the precise arrangement of limbs and organs in their appropriate positions and states.

The words: “Indeed I am going to create a human out of a dry clay (drawn) from an aging mud. So when I have proportioned him and breathed into him of My spirit, then fall down in prostration before him,” possibly refer to the gradual formation of the first human body. Initially, the act of creation (khalq) assembled the various parts of the human being. Then came the act of proportioning (taṣwīyah), which involved placing each part in its suitable place and condition. Lastly, the act of breathing (nafkh) of the spirit into the human occurred. This interpretation does not conflict with the verse “He created him from dust, then said to him, ‘Be’, and he was” (Āl ʿImrān:59). The phrase, “then said to him, ‘Be’, and he was,” pertains to the creation of the human spirit or soul, not the physical body. This idea aligns with another Qur’anic verse which, after describing the gradual creation of the human body, states: Then We produced him as (yet) another creature (al-Mu’minūn:14).

The term nafkh generally means the act of blowing air into a body, either through the mouth or some other means. In the context of these verses, it metaphorically represents the divine act of originating the human spirit and linking it to the body. The spirit isn’t literally inside the body like air blown into a vessel. This concept is further elaborated in the verses: “Then We made him a drop of (seminal) fluid (lodged) in a secure abode. Then We created the drop of fluid as a clinging mass. Then We created the clinging mass as a fleshy tissue. Then We created the fleshy tissue as bones. Then We clothed the bones with flesh. Then We produced him as (yet) another creature” (al-Mu’minūn:13-14). Another relevant verse is: “Say, ‘You will be taken away by the angel of death, who has been charged with you. Then you will be brought back to your Lord’” (al-Sajdah:11).

The first set of verses illustrates that the human spirit is essentially connected to the body but without any addition to it. The second set indicates that although the spirit leaves the body at the time of death, nothing is physically removed from the body.

Therefore, the spirit exists independently but has a form of attachment to the body. This connection ceases upon death, and the spirit is separated from the body. We have touched upon these concepts in our commentary on the verse: “And do not call those who were slain in Allah’s way ‘dead’” (al-Baqarah:154), in the first volume of this book. We plan to further explore this topic in our forthcoming commentary on “Say, ‘The Spirit is of the command of my Lord’” (Al-Isrā’:85), God willing.

In the verse (under discussion), God bestows honor upon the spirit by referring to it as My spirit. This form of annexation not only serves as a means of honoring the spirit but also emphasizes God’s ownership of it.

The phrase in the verse, “then fall down in prostration before him,” explicitly directs the angels to prostrate to Adam. It’s plausible to interpret this part of the verse as meaning “fall down upon the ground in prostration before him.” If this interpretation holds, it highlights the importance for the angels to exhibit humility towards this new creation.

The comprehensive meaning of the verse thus becomes: “Once I have properly proportioned him, completed the creation of his physical body, and brought into being the noble spirit—associated with Myself—and attached it to his body, then fall upon the ground in prostration before him!”

فَسَجَدَ الْمَلَائِكَةُ كُلُّهُمْ أَجْمَعُونَ ٣٠ إِلَّا إِبْلِيسَ أَبَى أَنْ يَكُونَ مَعَ السَّاجِدِينَ ٣١

(15:30-31) Thereat the angels prostrated, all of them together, but not Iblīs: he refused to be among those who prostrated.

The terms ’ajma’ūn (all of them) and kulluhum are both used for emphasis, with the latter intensifying the former. This conveys that all the angels, without exception, prostrated before Adam. The sole exception was Iblīs. However, he wasn’t considered among the angels, as corroborated by the verse: “He was one of the jinn so he transgressed against his Lord’s command” (al-Kahf:50). Some commentators have proposed an unlikely interpretation that a subset of angels were termed as jinn, and Iblīs was among this group. Others have mistakenly interpreted “jinn” in this context to mean “covered creation,” encompassing both angels and other beings. Such interpretations are not plausible. As we’ve previously explained in our commentary on Sūrah al-Ā’rāf, Iblīs was commanded to prostrate before Adam, even though he wasn’t one of the angels. The meaning of these verses is clear.

قَالَ يَا إِبْلِيسُ مَا لَكَ أَلَّا تَكُونَ مَعَ السَّاجِدِينَ ٣٢

(15:32) He said, ‘O Iblīs! What kept you from being among those who have prostrated?’

The phrase, mā laka (what kept you) in the verse integrates both a subject and a predicate, translating to “what is that with you?” In this verse, the phrase allā takūn (from being) exemplifies the omission of the jussive particle (naz’ al-khāfiz). This phrase essentially asks, “Why weren’t you among those who prostrated?” Clearly, those who prostrated refer to the angels. Thus, the essence of this verse is: “What held you back from joining those who prostrated?”

قَالَ لَمْ أَكُنْ لِأَسْجُدَ لِبَشَرٍ خَلَقْتَهُ مِنْ صَلْصَالٍ مِنْ حَمَإٍ مَسْنُونٍ ٣٣

(15:33) Said he, ‘I will not prostrate before a human whom You have created out of a dry clay (drawn) from an aging mud.’

In the phrase “I was not to prostrate,” (lam akun li-asjuda ) as opposed to saying “I will not prostrate” (lā asjudu) or “I am not prostrating (lastu asjudu),” there is an implication that his refusal to prostrate is intrinsic to his nature. It is as if it was expected of him if one were to truly understand his essence. This verse indirectly conveys what is explicitly stated in another verse, “I am better than him: You created me from fire, and You created him from clay” (al-A’rāf:12).

We’ve previously examined the implications of prostrating before Adam, God’s directive to the angels and Iblīs, the compliance of the angels, and the defiance of Iblīs. For further insight, one can refer to our tafsīr of Sūrah al-Baqarah and Sūrah al-A’rāf.

قَالَ فَاخْرُجْ مِنْهَا فَإِنَّكَ رَجِيمٌ (٣٤) وَإِنَّ عَلَيْكَ اللَّعْنَةَ إِلَى يَوْمِ الدِّينِ٣٥

(15:34-35) He said, ‘Begone hence, for you are indeed an outcast, and indeed the curse shall lie on you until the Day of Retribution.’

The term rajīm (outcast) follows the fa’īl pattern, signifying something that has been acted upon. Rajm means to drive away, and it has commonly been used in the context of driving someone away using stones and pebbles. The term la’n (curse) signifies driving someone away from mercy.

From this, it becomes apparent that His statement, “and indeed the curse shall lie on you until the Day of Retribution,” serves as an elucidation for His previous statement, “you are indeed an outcast.” The act of rajm (driving away) led to his expulsion from the midst of the angels in the heavens or from a divine position. In essence, he was driven away from a station of closeness, a level of God’s unique mercy. This implies being distanced from God’s mercy, which the act of la’n (cursing) embodies.

In another passage of the Qur’an, the Glorious attributes this curse imposed on Iblīs to Himself: “And indeed My curse will be on you till the Day of Retribution,” (Ṣād:78). In both verses, the duration of the curse is specifically mentioned to last “until the Day of Judgment.”

The general imposition of the curse on him in the statement “the curse shall lie on you” is because every act of disobedience is linked to Iblīs. There is no act of disobedience wherein Iblīs doesn’t play a part, either by temptation or by whispering. He is the root cause of every sin, and every curse that accompanies these sins, even directly affecting the individuals who commit these sins, traces back to him. This recalls what has been mentioned in relation to another verse, “So that Allah may separate the bad ones from the good, and place the bad on one another, and pile them up together, and cast them into hell. It is they who are the losers,” (al-Anfal:37).

Sending a la’n (curse), when done by anyone other than God, essentially acts as a du’ā (supplication) wishing for someone to be removed from God’s mercy. In essence, the one who enacts this distancing from His mercy is God Himself. Therefore, this is an emphatic way to express the denial of mercy.

The author of Majma’ al-bayyān comments, “Some Qur’anic exegetes have observed that the word la’nah (cursing) is mentioned with the definite article in the phrase ‘indeed the curse shall lie on you.’ Yet, in another verse from Sūrah Sād, it is phrased as ‘My curse’ in a possessive form. This is due to its preceding phrase, ‘to what I created with My own Hands.’ Since the phrase ‘My own Hands’ is possessive, ‘My Curse’ in this verse follows suit. Earlier, it was said: ‘O Iblīs! What prevented you from being among the sājidīn (those who prostrate)?’ This verse uses the definitive form for the word sājidīn. The definitive form is also used for the word insān (man) in ‘We created man’ and for jinn in ‘We created the jinn.’” The author concludes that this verse clarifies that Iblīs was never a believer.

The verse highlights that the act of la’nah (cursing) is limited until the Day of Retribution. This limitation implies that the curse stems from the self-inflicted spiritual harm and maladies due to one’s transgressions before God. The opportunity for such wrongdoings concludes with the Day of Retribution, signaling the end of this world of action, in contrast to the hereafter, a realm of recompense. In essence, this life is where deeds are noted, and the Day of Retribution is the time for accountability and just compensation.

Several Qur’anic commentators interpret the limited duration of the curse until the Day of Retribution as evidence of its cessation on that day. The verse’s apparent meaning suggests that retribution will transpire on that particular day. This interpretation is reinforced by the reference to the Day of Judgement as the Day of Retribution in this verse, implying Iblīs’s curse lasts until then, followed by his punishment. If the retribution were to end prior to this day, it would be referred to as the “Day When Retribution Ceased,” rather than the Day of Retribution.

To address the ambiguity surrounding the ultimate end, some suggest that it represents the furthest limit set by the creation. This is analogous to the verse: “They shall remain in it for as long as the heavens and the earth endure” (Hūd:107). As you can observe, you have already understood its meaning, as discussed in the exegesis of Sūrah Hūd.

One could contend that the curse alluded to in the verse pertains to the curse of creation, set to end with the Day of Judgment. However, this stands in contrast to the eternal nature of the Divine curse and God’s act of distancing someone from His Mercy. This perspective seemingly overlooks the verse from Sūrah Ṣād, which states, “And indeed My curse will be on you till the Day of Retribution” (Ṣād:78).

قَالَ رَبِّ فَأَنْظِرْنِي إِلَى يَوْمِ يُبْعَثُونَ ٣٦

(15:36) He said, ‘My Lord! Respite me till the day they will be resurrected.’

The term indhār signifies granting a respite. Iblīs initiated his conversation with God using the address, my Lord, as he was making a supplication. Despite his concurrent arrogance, defiance, and disobedience towards God, he was compelled to address God in a manner invoking His boundless mercy due to his supplicatory stance. He sought God, invoking His dominion over him, hoping for His response, even in his defiance.

Iblīs’s plea to God starts with the particle fā, which leads the sentence “Respite me.” This indicates his intent to target all humans, not just Adam. As noted in our exegesis of verses in Sūrah al-Ā’rāf, Iblīs was directed to prostrate to all humans, with Adam merely symbolizing them as the focal point for this act. This is evident from the verse: “Certainly We created you, then We formed you, then We said to the angels, ‘Prostrate before Adam.’ So they (all) prostrated, but not Iblīs” (al-A’rāf:11). The angels were instructed to prostrate to humanity at large, not just the individual, Adam. This prostration was not just a symbolic act; it had a profound purpose. It was a gesture of the angels’ inherent humility towards humans, reflecting that angels, by their nature, are in service to humans. This underlines the elevated nature of humans. Essentially, angels aid humans, channeling blessings into their lives due to the unique merit and higher accomplishments humans possess, which even surpass those of angels.

The act of angels prostrating to mankind signifies their subservience in aiding human success. Indeed, they serve as agents paving the way for human prosperity. Such angels encompass those responsible for life, the harbingers of death, the bestowers of sustenance, the conveyors of revelation, those that accompany humans, the guardians, the recorders, and numerous others detailed in the Qur’an. Consequently, angels act as a guiding medium, assisting humans in their pursuit of perfection and accomplishment.

Upon reflecting on these verses, it becomes evident that Iblīs’s refusal to prostrate to Adam stemmed from his aversion to humble himself to humanity and to aid in their journey toward success and perfection. He chose not to embrace the role that angels had accepted. Thus, by declining to prostrate to Adam, he distanced himself from the company of the angels. This sentiment is echoed in the verse: “He said, ‘O Iblīs! What prevented you from being among those who prostrated?’” (). Furthermore, he expressed his intent to oppose humans for the entirety of their earthly existence.

The evidence of God’s disdain towards him is manifested in the imposition of an unbounded curse upon him, spanning from his act of defiance to the Day of Judgment. This duration aligns with the tenure of humanity on earth, ensuring the curse remains effective throughout this time frame. This imposition predates Iblīs’s declaration of his intent to lead humans astray, as stated: “I will mislead them all, every one of them” (). It suggests that his refusal to prostrate was born out of deep-seated animosity towards the human race, starting with Adam and extending to his last descendant.

Seemingly, the accursed one discerned from God’s pronouncement: “The curse shall lie on you till the day of Retribution” (), a linkage between his fate and that of humanity until the Day of Resurrection. Their tribulations and moral degradation are tied to his initial act of disobedience in not prostrating. This realization perhaps led him to plead for a delay in his doom until the resurrection of mankind. He implored: “My Lord! Respite me till the day they will be resurrected” (). Notably, he didn’t seek respite limited to Adam’s lifespan but extended his plea to encompass Adam’s progeny until their collective resurrection. This plea aligns with the continuation of the curse till the Day of Resurrection. Once granted, his concealed intentions emerged, as he proclaimed: “I will mislead them all, every one of them” ().

قَالَ فَإِنَّكَ مِنَ الْمُنْظَرِينَ ٣٧ إِلَى يَوْمِ الْوَقْتِ الْمَعْلُومِ ٣٨

(15:37-38) He said, ‘You are among those who are reprieved until the Day whose time is known.’

God’s response to Iblīs is revealing. In it, we observe that a portion of Iblīs’s plea is accepted, while another portion is declined. The part that is granted pertains to the respite in lifespan he sought. However, the declined segment pertains to the stipulation that the respite be extended “until the Day they are resurrected.” Reviewing the context of these verses, it becomes apparent that the Day with a predetermined time (the Day whose time is known) differs from the “Day they are raised again.” It wasn’t allowed for Iblīs to receive reprieve until the Day they rise again; instead, it was a different day. Undoubtedly, this day precedes the day humans are resurrected.

From this, the flaw in the argument of those who assert that these two days in the verses are identical becomes evident. An example supporting this is God’s statement: He said, “You are one of the reprieved” (al-A’rāf:15), which doesn’t impose any restrictions.

The claim that the two days in these verses are the same is refuted by what’s previously discussed. The argument citing the unbounded nature of the verse from Sūrah al-Ā’rāf is invalidated because it’s limited by what is said in this sūrah and in Sūrah Ṣād, especially the phrase: “until the Day whose time is known” (, ). This manner of stipulation is frequent in the Qur’an, where some sections attest to others, and some elucidate others.

The evident interpretation of the “Day whose time is known” is that it’s a predetermined moment within God’s knowledge. This resonates with His declaration: “We only send it down in a known measure” (). In the same vein, His statement: “For such there is a known provision,” (al-Ṣāffāt:41) mirrors this sentiment. Therefore, this time is undeniably known to God. Whether Iblīs is aware or unaware of it remains unclear based on the verse’s phrasing. Some argue that God purposely kept the specifics of this day ambiguous, not elucidating it. Hence, while it is discernible to God, it remains a mystery to Iblīs. They posit that had this day been explicitly revealed to Iblīs, it might tempt him into further misdeeds. However, this notion lacks concrete evidence. Just because we find the phrasing ambiguous doesn’t imply Iblīs did too. And to suggest that revealing the day would spur Iblīs to commit further wrongs—given he’s the origin of all evil—is speculative at best. Take heed of this!

Furthermore, Iblīs’s declaration, “I will mislead them all, every one of them,” () stands as evidence that he will endure until the last human, susceptible to his deceit, exists in this world. Iblīs inferred from God’s statement, “until the Day whose time is known,” () that it denotes the final day of humankind on earth, where he can continue his attempts to lead them astray.

Ibn ‘Abbās is attributed with the view, widely accepted by the majority, that “the day” alludes to the final day of divine accountability, coinciding with the initial trumpet’s blow when all beings will perish. This perspective seems anchored in the belief that Iblīs will persist as long as divine accountability exists, along with the potential for defiance and disobedience, mirroring humanity’s lifespan on earth. This era concludes with the inaugural trumpet’s sound, marking the end for all life. This moment represents the “Day whose time is known,” for which God has granted Iblīs a respite. Separating the first trumpet from the next—heralding resurrection—is a span of either four hundred or forty years, as per differing narrations. This difference underscores the contrast between Iblīs’s appeal and God’s decree.

This view would be plausible if not for the assertion that Iblīs will remain as long as there is divine accountability and the possibility of defiance and disobedience; the premise is put forth without clear evidence or explanation. This assumption is based on the belief that all disbelief and rebellion in humanity arise from Iblis’s temptations and insinuations, as indicated by verses such as: “Did I not instruct you, O children of Adam, not to worship Shaytān? Indeed, he is your evident foe” (Yasin:60), and His words: “Indeed, Allah gave you a true promise, while I made a promise and broke it” () among other similar verses.

The implication of this is that the existence of Iblīs will endure as long as the divine obligation remains. And the divine obligation persists as long as humanity exists, which is the primary assertion.

However, although attributing the sin of humans to the insinuation of Iblīs is generally understood from the verses and the narrations, the only thing these verses and narrations prove is that as long as there is sin and misguidance on earth, Iblīs will be there as well, not that as long as obligation exists, Iblīs will exist. We have no reason to prove the concurrence of the existence of sin and the existence of obligation.

On the contrary, both reason and scripture affirm that the ultimate destiny of humanity—attaining bliss—will dominate. Human society will gravitate towards virtue and righteousness. The sole entity to be worshiped on earth will be God. Consequently, the prevalence of disbelief and immorality will diminish, life will be pure, heart-related ailments and inner whisperings will fade away. More on this can be found in the discussions about prophethood in the second volume, and in the account of Noah in the tenth volume. God declares: “Corruption has appeared in both land and sea because of what people’s own hands have brought about so that they may taste something of what they have done so that hopefully they will turn back” (al-Rūm:41). Furthermore, He states: “We wrote down in the Psalms after the Reminder came: ‘It is My servants who are righteous who will inherit the earth’” (al-Anbiyā’:105).

It becomes clear from this that those who rely on this argument do so to indicate that the designated Day, known in time, which God has set as the endpoint of Iblīs’s reprieve, is the day when God, in His glory, will rectify human society. On that day, the roots of corruption will be severed, and only God will be worshiped. This is not referring to the day when all creations will perish with the sounding of the first trumpet.

قَالَ رَبِّ بِمَا أَغْوَيْتَنِي لَأُزَيِّنَنَّ لَهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ وَلَأُغْوِيَنَّهُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ ٣٩ إِلَّا عِبَادَكَ مِنْهُمُ الْمُخْلَصِينَ ٤٠

(15:39-40) He said, ‘My Lord, because You misled me, I will beguile them with the things upon the earth and mislead them all, every one of them, except Your servants among them who have been made sincere.’

The particle “bā” in the phrase: “because You misled me” (bi-mā aghwaytanī) signifies causality, while the particle “mā” within the same phrase transforms the verb’s meaning to align with its infinitive form. Essentially, the verse conveys: “Because of Your act of misleading me, I will rationalize my actions of deceiving them and maintaining them in sin.” This sentiment mirrors the declaration in the Qur’an: “We only misled them as we too were misled” (al-Qaṣaṣ:63). Some argue that the particle “bā” in the phrase serves as an oath. Meaning, Iblīs is essentially declaring: “By Your act of misleading me, I swear to deceive them.” Such an interpretation is highly speculative. Neither the Qur’an nor the sunnah presents an instance where an oath is sworn upon an act like misleading or misguidance. This interpretation doesn’t align with the gravitas typically associated with subjects of oaths.

Iblīs, May God curse him, attributed his misguidance to God, stating: “because You misled me.” Intriguingly, God neither contested this claim nor offered a response. It’s important to note that Iblīs isn’t suggesting he was misled during his refusal to bow to Adam. This is evident as there’s no direct link between his sins and humanity’s transgressions against their Lord, even if his sin is the genesis of theirs and he facilitates their sinful inclinations.

Iblīs is implying what benefits him from the prior statement of God: “And indeed, the curse shall lie on you until the Day of Judgement.” This refers to the perpetuation of the absolute curse upon him, which is being distanced from Divine Mercy and being misguided from the path of happiness. This misguidance is a repercussion of the deception he manifested from within himself and brought about on his own accord. Thus, any misguidance attributed to God is metaphorical and in response, not something initiated by Him. Such misguidance is conceivable and not beyond God’s ability. Hence, God does not refute it, as He says: “He misguides many by it and guides many by it. But He only misguides the deviators” (al-Baqarah:26). We have elucidated this in the commentary on this verse and at other points in this book.

Based on this understanding, the particle “bā” in this context signifies causality. This means that Iblīs misguides humanity as a consequence of his own misguidance. His state of being distanced from Divine Mercy and bereft of felicity is due to the Divine Curse imposed upon him. When he whispers into the hearts of humans, enticing them, or gains influence over someone, he does so from a position of estrangement from Divine Mercy and felicity. Thus, anyone who is swayed by him or comes under his influence is similarly distanced from Divine Mercy and felicity. In essence, he misleads by casting the effects of his own deception onto others, which is evident.

Upon reflection on the verse, the conclusion is that the intended meaning of “misguidance” is not the primary or initial misguidance. Instead, it refers to the figurative misguidance as a form of retribution, as indicated by the phrase “the curse shall lie on you” in the verse.

Qur’anic commentators largely agree that if the phrase “because You misled me” () is taken in its apparent meaning, implying misguidance, then the misguidance would have been initiated by God, centered around Iblīs’s refusal to prostrate before Adam. This has led them to view the statement as problematic, with interpretations varying based on differing theological perspectives on whether evil can be attributed to God and emanate from Him.

Adherents of the determinist view posit: if the act of misleading is ascribed to God without His repudiation, it suggests that both good and evil emanate from Him. This translates to, “O Lord, since You caused me to err by not allowing the prostration—this originates from You,” leading to the declaration, “I vow to lead them all astray.”

Others argue that attributing evil, misdeeds, or anything distasteful to God is untenable. They present several interpretations:

1. The phrase “to mislead” in the verse translates to “causing despair.” Thus, the statement implies: “My Lord! Since You made me lose hope in Your Mercy, I will lead them to despair by tempting them to disobey You.”
2. “To mislead” is understood as “diverting from the path to paradise.” The statement’s interpretation then becomes: “Because You diverted me from Your paradise’s path due to my defiance, I will lead all astray.”
3. The assertion “because You misled me” () refers to God’s command to prostrate before Adam. By not complying, Iblīs went astray. This “misguidance” denotes a broader interpretation of God leading Iblīs astray. Reflecting on prior discussions reveals that such deliberation on this statement might be redundant. These interpretations offer varied perspectives on the verse.

Similar to this is their exploration regarding the term “reprieve” in the verse: “You are among those who are reprieved” (). The inquiry centers on whether Iblīs is divinely preordained to lead astray and commit abhorrent acts? The prevailing thought suggests he isn’t.

The Mujawwizūn believe that this verse underscores that the concepts of good and evil, which human intellect employs to rationalize our deeds, don’t sway God’s actions. He possesses the authority to reward or chastise anyone, unfettered by any discernible rationale. His choices may even run counter to logical reasoning. They argue that if someone posits that a sagacious individual could imprison a group in a dwelling, ignite it, and release numerous deadly serpents inside, yet not have the intent for those trapped to suffer burns and bites, such a person has deviated from inherent human sensibility. Hence, the natural deduction is that God permitted Iblīs’s reprieve to lead certain individuals astray.

The Māni’ūn argue that when God granted “respite” to Iblīs, it was due to His foreknowledge that Iblīs and his progeny would ultimately die in disbelief and wickedness, leading them to Hell regardless of the respite. Furthermore, by acceding to Iblīs’ plea, God magnified the rewards for righteous believers. Iblīs’ declaration, “I will mislead them all” (), underscores this point. If it were God’s design to lead them astray, Iblīs wouldn’t have claimed this role for himself. There are various other justifications presented by the Māni’ūn to this effect.

What has caused them to overlook the numerous verses about testing and tribulation? For instance, the verse: “so that Allah may sift the bad out from the good” (al-’Anfāl:37), and also the verse: “so that Allah might test what is in your breasts and purge what is in your hearts” (Āl ʿImrān:154). These verses, among many others, underscore that systems of felicity and misery, as well as reward and punishment, rest upon the principle of trial and tribulation. Humanity stands at a crossroad between virtue and vice, and between joy and suffering; their outcomes are determined by their choices and actions.

If no caller beckoned humanity towards virtue—be it the esteemed angels or, for the sake of argument, God Himself—and no caller lured them towards wickedness, such as Iblīs and his kin, then the entire premise of a “trial” would lose its significance. As stated in the Qur’an: “Shaytān promises you poverty and commands you to avarice. Allah promises you forgiveness from Him and abundance” (al-Baqarah:268).

While God did provide Iblīs respite in his contention with humankind until the predetermined Day, He also fortified humanity with the guidance of angels, lasting as long as the world endures. God didn’t merely state to Iblīs, “You are granted respite:” He declared, “You are among those who are reprieved” (). This insinuates that others too were granted such respite, with Iblīs being merely one of them.

Similarly, while God granted Iblīs the capacity to entice mankind towards various deceptions, such as disbelief and defiance, He also fortified humanity with the guidance towards the truth. He instilled in the human heart a love for belief and naturally inclined them towards Tawhīd (monotheism). Humanity was endowed with the ability to distinguish between vice and virtue, and for those who believe in their Lord, He provided a guiding light to navigate amongst their peers, among other divine supports. The Qur’an proclaims: “Allah guides to the truth” (Yūnus:35). It further mentions: “Allah has given you love of faith and made it pleasing to your hearts” (al-Ḥujurāt:7). Another verse articulates: “Set your face firmly towards the dīn, as a pure natural believer, Allah’s natural pattern on which He made mankind” (al-Rūm:30). Yet another reveals: “By the soul and Him who fashioned it, He inspired it with (the ability to discern between) immorality and piety” (al-Shams:7). The verse: “Is someone who was dead and whom We brought to life, supplying him with a light by which to walk among people” (al-Anʿām:122) emphasizes this point. And reinforcing the divine commitment, the scripture states: “We will certainly help our Messengers and those who believe both in the life of this world and on the Day the witnesses appear” (Ghāfir:51). The utilization of the first person plural conveys the involvement of the angels.

Human beings, at the inception of their creation, are neutral entities, neither destined for joy nor sorrow. They stand at a crossroads with two diverging paths before them:

(1) The path of virtue and obedience, tread by the angels who are inherently predisposed to obey.

(2) The path of wickedness and rebellion, the way of Iblīs and his legions, characterized solely by resistance and defiance.

As individuals navigate through life, the path they gravitate towards will define their journey. Companions from the chosen path will enhance its allure, guiding them to its ultimate destination, be it Heaven or Hell, bliss or despair.

From the discussions thus far, it’s evident that the postponement of Iblīs’s reckoning until a predetermined Day isn’t an arbitrary decision, nor does it contravene the principles of causality. This delay is purposeful, enabling Iblīs and, conversely, the angels opposing him, to set in motion the essential tests and challenges for humanity. This context isn’t suitable for further objections.

The segment of the verse that reads: “I will beguile them with the things upon the earth” () can mean “I will make falsehood appear attractive to them” or “I will glamorize disobedience for them.” The first meaning is broader in scope, even though the direct object is not explicitly mentioned in either case. Clearly, the focus isn’t on the object. The verb in this context is used in its intransitive form, highlighting the origin of this beguilement, which subtly hints at deception. It’s commonly understood that when one says: “zayyana lahu kadhā wa kadhā,” it translates to “he was deceived by such and such.” The verse’s surrounding context suggests that the pronoun “them” refers to Adam and his descendants. The act of beguiling them with earthly matters is synonymous with deceiving them through the allure of this temporal world, a primary trigger for going astray. Therefore, the adjoining statement: “I will mislead them all, every one of them” () serves to link the resultant consequence to its underlying cause.

The verse underscores, or rather reaffirms, what we previously elaborated on in the commentary concerning Adam’s Garden in the first volume of this book. It emphasizes that Adam’s act of eating from the forbidden tree was influenced by the cunning whispers of Iblīs. However, this act wasn’t a violation of a mandate but rather a deviation from divine advice. Consequently, it doesn’t tarnish Adam’s infallibility. This verse further illustrates Iblīs’s awareness that his only opportunity to deceive and lead them astray was on earth. He had no power to deceive Adam and his spouse in the Garden. His utmost capability was to instigate their exile from the Garden and facilitate their habitation on earth. This removal (from the Garden) allowed for their procreation, providing Iblīs with an opportunity to mislead both them and their descendants away from the truth and the righteous path. God says: “O Children of Adam! Do not let Shaytān tempt you into trouble as he expelled your parents from the Garden, stripping them of their covering and disclosing to them their private parts” (al-A’rāf:27).

Regarding Iblīs’s declaration, “except Your servants among them who have been made sincere” (), this is an exception to Iblīs’s otherwise unrestricted misleading. It implies that there exists a distinct group within humanity, known as the mukhlasūn (with a fathah over the letter lām, as per the prevalent recitation). The context of this statement reinforces that this particular group consists of those who have wholeheartedly devoted themselves to God, and it was God Himself who instilled this sincerity in them. We’ve already touched upon the concept of sincerity in our commentary on Sūrah Yusuf. Essentially, the mukhlasūn are individuals whom God has selected for His exclusive devotion, subsequent to their own sincere commitment to Him. Consequently, they harbor no allegiance to anyone but God, both in their actions and in their hearts. Being so engrossed in God, they remain impervious to Shaytān’s temptations. Any attempts by Shaytān to ensnare them only serve to reinforce their connection with God, drawing them closer to His remembrance.

From this perspective, it becomes evident that the exception pertains solely to succumbing to Iblīs’s misguidance, not his attempts at beautification. While Iblīs, may God curse him, endeavors to beautify (evil) for all, only those outside the circle of the mukhlasūn can be misled by him.

From prioritizing the mention of “servants” and then clarifying them as the mukhlasūn, it can be inferred that the true essence of servitude is when God exclusively dedicates a servant for Himself. This means that no one possesses the servant except God. It further highlights that a person should not perceive any ownership for themselves, not of their being, their attributes, their effects, or their deeds. The dominion and sovereignty, with emphasis on the pronunciation of “dominion” (mulk), belong solely to God.

قَالَ هَذَا صِرَاطٌ عَلَيَّ مُسْتَقِيمٌ ٤١

(15:41) He said, ‘This is a Straight Path to Me.’

Based on the context, it is evident that this is an indirect assertion that all affairs are under His dominion, and none exist independently of Him. Just as the course of a ship on the open sea informs its passengers of the inescapability of preparation and the necessary precautions for a maritime journey, similarly, the route of a caravan traversing mountainous terrains necessitates readiness to navigate its towering heights and challenging routes. Hence, this straight path is inherently bound to God’s edicts and mandates, for it is a direct path towards Him, and He is the alpha and omega of all. Every matter is under His lordship and dominion.

The context also elucidates God’s declaration: “This is a Straight Path to Me” (). This reflects Iblīs’ proclamation: “I will mislead them all, every one of them, except Your servants among them who have been made sincere” (). Iblīs, by making such a claim, implied his exemption from God’s decree, positing himself above God’s will concerning human creation, their role as His representatives, and their servitude to Him. This sentiment is echoed elsewhere where God states: “You will not find most of them thankful” (Al-Isrā’:17).

Therefore, the essence of this verse is: “You contend that you will mislead the majority, thinking this power and will is yours, wrongly assuming your autonomy from God in executing this. Yet, only I preside over this affair and solely I adjudicate it. It only transpires by My decree. If you mislead them, it is with My consent. Should you be barred from doing so, it is by My will. You hold no sway in this, and possess nothing unless I permit it. Your strength is but a grant from Me. Concerning your dominion, I have ordained: “You have no authority over any of My servants except for the misled who follow you” ().

إِنَّ عِبَادِي لَيْسَ لَكَ عَلَيْهِمْ سُلْطَانٌ إِلَّا مَنِ اتَّبَعَكَ مِنَ الْغَاوِينَ ٤٢

(15:42) You have no authority over any of My servants except for the misled who follow you,

The verdict being referred to pertains to the matter of misguidance as discussed in the preceding verse. God emphasizes that this affair is exclusively His domain, and none can partake or exert influence over it.

In essence, Adam and all his descendants are God’s servants. It is not merely the sincere ones among them, contrary to Iblīs’s assertion: “except Your servants among them who have been made sincere” (). God did not grant him any dominion over His servants to autonomously govern their destinies or lead them astray. He only endowed him with influence over a subset: those who went astray, chose to follow him, and entrusted him with their guidance. It is over this group alone that he holds sway.

Upon a detailed scrutiny of the verse, it appears to counteract Iblīs’s declaration: “I will mislead them all, every one of them, except Your servants among them who have been made sincere” () in three fundamental ways:

First: Iblīs erroneously categorized God’s servants as exclusively those who are sincere, believing he had no dominion over them. He assumed his influence extended over all others. Contrarily, God clarifies that “His servants” encompass all, and Iblīs only has sway over a certain faction from among them, those who willingly heed his guidance. The idea of Iblīs exerting influence over anyone beyond this group is refuted by God.

Second: Iblīs, may he be accursed, professed autonomy in his mission to mislead humanity. This is evident in his assertion: “I will mislead them all” (), posited in defiance and as an act of retribution against God. God rebuts this by deeming it a misguided assumption. Such influence can only manifest under God’s ordained decree. Iblīs’s power to lead astray is only facilitated by God and extends merely to those who, due to their own flawed decisions, choose to follow him; they are the ones truly misled.

Iblīs has never acted autonomously, nor has he thwarted any of his Lord’s plans. His act of misleading is in accordance with God’s decree; those led astray by him remain in that state because of him. Iblīs indirectly acknowledged this, saying: “My Lord, because You misled me” (). Furthermore, his exception of the sincere was also under the overarching decree of God. All judgments rest solely with God.

The essence of this noble verse is the delineation of Iblīs’s authority: he can only influence those who are predisposed to being misled while those who are made sincere by God—after their personal commitment to sincerity—are beyond Iblīs’s reach, all in accordance with God’s decree. This interpretation aligns with a pivotal tenet of Tawhīd (monotheism) as elucidated in the Qur’an. For instance, the verse: “Judgement comes from no one but Allah” (Yūsuf:67) or “He is Allah. There is no god but Him. Praise be to Him in this world and the Next World. Judgment belongs to Him” (al-Qaṣaṣ:70), as well as “It is the truth from your Lord” (Āl ʿImrān:60) and “Allah confirms the Truth by His words” (Yūnus:82). Numerous verses reinforce the idea that all affirmations and negations stem from God, prevailing by His command.

From this, it’s clear that some Qur’anic commentators have taken a lenient approach in their interpretation of the verse: “except for the misled who follow you” (). They assert that when individuals heed Iblīs’s call and become his followers, he attains authority over them, leading them astray from the path of righteousness to the allure he presents. Evidently, this authority Iblīs acquires is a consequence of their misguided decisions, not an inherent power or a privilege granted by God.

The flaw in this perspective is that it diminishes Iblīs’s autonomy and inherent influence, attributing it instead to the inherent nature of things. If Iblīs lacks intrinsic power and cannot act without his Lord’s sanction, then all entities share this characteristic. They neither have inherent judgment nor intrinsic attributes; even their very existence hinges solely on God’s will. Grasp this notion!

Third: Iblīs’s authority to mislead people he can is indeed facilitated by God’s decree. However, he doesn’t possess the inherent ability to mislead without an initial or prior cause. It’s implausible to attribute such misleading directly to the divine realm. Instead, Iblīs’s authority is more like a retribution based on the prior inclination of individuals to be led astray.

Evidence for this can be found in the verse: “Except for the misled who follow you,” () meaning Iblīs only misguides those who initially lean towards his deception. Essentially, individuals first incline towards his deception, then Iblīs exacerbates their deviation. Thus, there’s a difference between the initial inclination (ghawāyah) and the subsequent misleading (ighwā’). The former is a result of human wrongdoing (or choices), while the latter is due to Iblīs and is a divine retribution.

If this act of misleading by Iblīs was initial and towards those undeserving, then he alone would be blamed, not the human. This is reminiscent of what he will proclaim on the Day of Judgement, as narrated: “I had not authority over you, except that I called you and you responded to me. Do not, therefore, blame me but blame yourselves” (). Thus, the blame lies with the sinful human, who is accountable for his disobedience, not Iblīs.

Indeed, Iblīs is blameworthy for his actions stemming from his poor choices, specifically the act of misleading. God granted him this authority as retribution for his refusal to prostrate to Adam when commanded. This ability to mislead solidified his authority over it, as alluded to elsewhere in His words: “Indeed, We have made the devils allies to those who do not believe” (al-A’rāf:27). Furthermore, a verse that clearly supports our entire premise is: “It has been decreed upon him that whoever turns to him, he will mislead them and will guide them to the punishment of the Blaze” (al-Hajj:4).

From the preceding discussion, it becomes apparent that the term “My servants” refers to all of humanity. The exception in the phrase “those who follow you” is continuous and not detached. The word “from” (min) in the phrase “from the misled” is explanatory. The discourse is structured to refute Iblīs’ claim. The verse encapsulates two divine decrees in the context of what is excepted and what it’s excepted from, among other things.

From the above, it’s evident that the view of some, which holds that “My servants” refers specifically to those whom Iblīs exempted and described as “Your servants among them,” is not entirely straightforward. This interpretation suggests a disjointed exception, implying that Iblīs has authority over those he can mislead, but the truly sincere are beyond his reach. The implication is that the sincere are out of your dominion, but you have been granted authority over those misled followers of yours.

Upon deeper reflection of the previously discussed matters, this perspective undermines the fundamental narrative flow, negating the confrontational tone and the discourse’s positioning in the realm of divine grandeur and pride. It demotes the divine address, turning it into a mere paraphrasing of Iblīs’s words while preserving its essence, whether as an affirmation or acknowledgment. It’s as if Iblīs says, “I will lead them all astray except the sincere,” and God responds, “You cannot mislead the sincere, but you can mislead the rest!”

Some have also interpreted “My servants” to mean all of humanity, while still considering the exception as disjointed. This might be based on the assumption that a majority can’t be exempted from a general rule. For example, one wouldn’t say, “He has authority over a hundred except for ninety-nine.” It’s well-known that among humans, the misled outnumber the sincere by a significant margin.

The perspective presented here suggests that when considering the exception in the context of specific numbers, the exception seems inconsistent. However, when viewed in terms of categories or types, it makes more sense. Humans can be categorized into various groups: the sincere believers, those who do not have the cognitive faculties to be held liable by God (or the weak in faith), and those who have followed Iblīs and are thus astray. The verse makes an exception for the last group by their category, leaving the other categories unmentioned.

Some believe that the exception is disjointed, careful not to confirm Iblīs’s authority even over the misled. They argue that such authority would contradict the absolute sovereignty or justice of the Divine. According to this view, the verse means that Iblīs has no inherent authority over “My servants.” Those misled individuals who follow him have voluntarily relinquished their reins to him, allowing him to exert influence over them. Such a situation isn’t because Iblīs inherently possesses this authority, such that it would challenge God’s creation, nor is it directly from God, which would question His divine justice.

Within the verse, it is conveyed that Iblīs holds authority over the astray, not inherently but as granted by God. This doesn’t contradict God’s justice in creation, as this is a consequential authority and not an inherent one. There’s no contradiction between God decreeing this authority and individuals choosing to follow Iblīs on their own free will. All of this has been clarified in what we have previously discussed.

Furthermore, verses such as “It is decreed upon him that whoever turns to him, he will mislead them” (al-Hajj:4), and “Indeed, We have made the devils allies to those who do not believe” (al-A’rāf:27) clearly indicate the affirmation of Iblīs’s authority and that it’s by divine ordainment.

وَإِنَّ جَهَنَّمَ لَمَوْعِدُهُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ ٤٣

(15:43) and indeed Hell is the tryst of them all.

Clearly, the term maw’id denotes a place, specifically the promised rendezvous. When Hell is referred to as “the tryst of them all,” it signifies it as the location (or meeting place) where God’s assurance of punishment to them will materialize.

This assertion accentuates His omnipotence and the reality that all matters revert to Him. It is akin to God addressing Iblīs, stating: “The authority you possess over the astray isn’t inherent to you and doesn’t diminish Our capability. It is We who granted you this authority over them due to their allegiance to you. Furthermore, they shall face the anguish of Hell as retribution.”

The aforementioned pronouncement specifically speaks of their penalty, omitting Iblīs and his destined punishment. The focus here is to elucidate their fate (or condition). This stands in contrast to the verses: “I will surely fill hell with you and all of those who follow you,” (Ṣād:85) and “indeed the Hell shall be your requital, an ample reward” (al-Isrā’:63). The framing of these verses diverges from the verse under discussion.

لَهَا سَبْعَةُ أَبْوَابٍ لِكُلِّ بَابٍ مِنْهُمْ جُزْءٌ مَقْسُومٌ ٤٤

(15:44) It has seven gates and to each gate belongs a separate portion of them.

He, in His divine wisdom, has not clearly specified in His explicit words what these gates are meant to signify. Are they like the doors in walls that lead everyone to a single courtyard? Or are they levels and degrees differing in the type and intensity of punishment? Often, diverse categories are referred to as “doors,” just as one would say “categories of sustenance” (abwāb al-rizq), “categories of evil” (abwāb al-sharr), and “categories of mercy” (abwāb al-rahman). God states, “We opened for them the gates of all (good) things” (al-An’ām:44). Sometimes the means to something or the ways to reach it are termed as ‘doors’, like the “pathways to sustenance” due to various types of earnings and dealings.

It’s plausible to derive the second meaning from various verses about Hell, such as His words: “The faithless will be driven to Hell in throngs.When they reach it, and its gates are opened…” (al-Zumar:71), and “Indeed the hypocrites will be in the lowest reach of the Fire” (al-Nisā’:145), among other verses.

Supporting this is His saying, “and to each gate belongs a separate portion.” The apparent meaning suggests that the specified class (juz’) is allocated to a gate (bāb), which is more consistent with the interpretation of a gate as a category (ṭabaqah) rather than an entrance (madkhal). Some interpret the assigned portion (or allotted share, juz’ muqasūm) as a distinct group or sect (firīq mu’ayyin) separated from others, which seems evident.

Based on this, the fact that Hell has seven gates indicates that the punishment prepared within it varies into seven categories. Each category then divides according to the division of the group that enters and resides within. This implies that the sins leading to entry into Hell are divided into seven categories, as well as the paths leading to and reasons prompting those sins. This supports the traditions conveyed about these meanings, as will be elaborated upon, God willing.

إِنَّ الْمُتَّقِينَ فِي جَنَّاتٍ وَعُيُونٍ ٤٥ ادْخُلُوهَا بِسَلَامٍ آمِنِينَ ٤٦

(15:45-46) Indeed the Godwary will be amid Gardens and Springs: ‘Enter it in peace and safety!’

Meaning, they are settled in gardens and springs. It will be said to them: “Enter it in peace,” a description that cannot be detailed nor is its attribute withheld, signifying that you are safe from all harm and evil.

When God mentioned His decree concerning those who followed Iblīs from among the misled, He also stated His decision for the righteous, which is Paradise. The description of Godwary (or piety, taqwā) is found in the Messenger’s words as avoiding what is forbidden by God. Repeatedly, the Qur’an has conveyed the glad tidings of Paradise to the pious (muttaqūn), implying that the pious encompass more than just the devoted.

Some argue that the context of these verses unmistakably suggests that the pious are the same individuals previously described as those who have achieved sincerity. They also maintain that generic terms are wholly applicable to all their individual members.

This perspective stems from the interpretation that the “servants” mentioned in the verse: “Indeed as for My servants, You do not have any authority over them” (), refer exclusively to those rendered sincere, so much so that they confine the scope of this statement solely to this group. However, we have highlighted that “servants” encompasses all of humanity, with only the misguided being the exception. God has clearly stated that the misguided will be destined for the Fire. In contrast, this verse underscores that Paradise is the ordained abode for everyone other than the misguided. The fate of those incapable of accountability and those committing grave sins remains unaddressed. Regarding those who perpetrate severe sins and pass away unrepentant, their ultimate fate hinges on potential intercession. Hence, the ones left are the pious among the believers, a category broader than those deemed sincere. Their decreed fate is entry into Paradise.

Concerning the notion that an absolute term should be applied to a ‘complete individual,’ this is a mistaken view. Instead, the term should refer to an ‘individual’ as commonly understood. A more detailed discussion on this matter is available in the field of Islamic legal principles.

In his exegesis, Imām al-Rāzī notes that the term al-Muttaqīn (the Godwary or pious) in the verse refers to those who abstain from polytheism (shirk). He attributes this interpretation to a consensus among the majority of the Companions and the Successors, citing their views as evidence.

He elaborates further:

“This is indeed the correct and valid understanding. What supports this claim is that the term al-Muttaqī refers to someone who has exercised taqwā even just once, similar to how al-Ḍārib (one who strikes) refers to someone who has struck even just once. Thus, it is not necessary for the description to be accurate that one must embody all facets of taqwā. Supporting this view is the fact that one who fulfills even a single aspect of taqwā is considered to have taqwā, as fulfilling any individual aspect inherently encapsulates the essence of taqwā. Therefore, anyone who demonstrates taqwā should rightfully be termed Muttaqī. This is why some have said: ‘The apparent meaning of an imperative does not require repetition.’

The apparent reading of the verse suggests that anyone who refrains from even a single sin is entitled to gardens and springs in the hereafter. However, there is a unanimous consensus within the community that this entitlement is conditional upon abstaining from disbelief.

Furthermore, this verse appears after Iblīs’s statement: “Except Your exclusive servants among them,” which follows God’s proclamation: “Indeed as for My servants, You do not have any authority over them.” Consequently, faith is a critical factor in this ruling. Therefore, it’s essential that no additional conditions should be imposed, as limiting the general rule should be minimized to align more closely with the original and apparent meaning of the text.

Therefore, it is confirmed that the ruling in question applies universally to all who declare: “There is no god but God, Muḥammad is the Messenger of God,” even if they belong to the ranks of the sinful. This is an unequivocal affirmation, and the message is plain to see.”

The essence of his argument suggests that the verse includes anyone who abstains from shirk, even if they engage in all the major sins that lead to Hellfire according to the Noble Qur’an, or neglect all obligatory duties that, when neglected, also warrant the same punishment. However, anyone deeply engrossed in reflecting upon the Divine verses will find it incontrovertible that such an individual is not termed Muṭṭaqī by the Qur’an nor counted among the Muṭṭaqīn. Indeed, the Qur’an frequently refers to the Muṭṭaqīn, explicitly promising them Paradise in nearly twenty instances, and often describes them as those who steer clear of prohibitions. Thus, taqwā is defined in the narrations in this same vein, as we have mentioned.

Indeed, simply meeting the conditions to be described by a particular term is different from actually being labeled with that term. One is not called a “believer,” “doer of good,” “obedient,” “sincere,” or “patient,” especially when these descriptors imply an ongoing state, unless these characteristics are firmly rooted in them. If al-Rāzī’s claim about the Muṭṭaqīn holds true, then the same reasoning would also apply to categories such as the wrongdoers, immoral, corrupt, criminals, misguided, and the lost—all of whom God has warned with Hellfire. This would result in a puzzling inconsistency and imbalance in the divine text. If one argues that some verses could shift the meaning of these labels to cover isolated or occasional acts—just like the verses concerning repentance and intercession—then other verses could similarly shift the scope of this specific verse to cover a Muṭṭaqī who commits a sinful act once or twice. Examples include the verses warning against major sins such as fornication, unjust killing, usury, and misappropriating the wealth of orphans, and other similar verses.

Subsequently, al-Rāzī provides various unfounded justifications to elucidate his explanation, referencing the sequence of statements by Iblīs and God. Given our previous discussions, it’s evident that this argument holds no weight. He further contends that introducing an additional condition to this verse beyond faith contradicts its primary meaning. However, the primary meaning is referenced only in the absence of linguistic cues. As you’re well aware, numerous Qur’anic verses offer clear constraints on this matter.

Regarding his statement that this contradicts the apparent meaning (of the verse), it appears he’s alluding to the clear meaning of a statement when taken at face value. Yet, he seems to have missed the fact that the straightforward understanding of an unqualified statement stands as evidence only when there’s no valid explanation that can specify its scope.

In reality, the verse only encompasses those in whom the quality of Taqwā has taken root—that is, abstaining from acts that God has forbidden. These individuals are the ones assured of eternal happiness and Paradise. Furthermore, what is gleaned from both the Qur’ān and the Sunnah is that people professing Tawḥīd—those who affirm that there is no god but God—will not remain in Hell forever and are guaranteed entry into Paradise. This is distinct from what the verse concerning the term Muṭṭaqīn suggests.

وَنَزَعْنَا مَا فِي صُدُورِهِمْ مِنْ غِلٍّ إِخْوَانًا عَلَى سُرُرٍ مُتَقَابِلِينَ ٤٧ لَا يَمَسُّهُمْ فِيهَا نَصَبٌ وَمَا هُمْ مِنْهَا بِمُخْرَجِينَ ٤٨

(15:47-48) We will remove whatever rancor there is in their breasts–brothers, (reclining) on couches facing one another. Therein neither weariness shall touch them, nor will they (ever) be expelled from it.

The term “resentment” (al-ghill) refers to grudges or ill-will. Some say it encompasses both grudges and envy that may drive a person to harm others. The term “couches” (al-surur) is the plural of “couch” (sarīr), and “hardship” (al-naṣb) refers to the physical and emotional difficulties that come from external factors.

The verses describe specific blessings among the multitude of blessings in Paradise to underline certain points. They emphasize that the residents of Paradise are in a state of peace and security, free from the trials that those who have gone astray have to face—such as the loss of happiness, sovereignty, and dignity. God tells us that they are safe even from themselves since He has removed any resentment (or rancor) from their hearts. They sit as “brothers, (reclining) on couches facing one another,” and the significance of their sitting arrangement (facing one another) will be covered in later narrational discussions, God willing.

Moreover, they are secure from external causes and factors, so no hardship touches them in the first place. They are in a state of peace and security from the side of their Lord, and they will never be expelled from Paradise. Thus, they are blessed and honored from every angle. Neither misery nor weakness will affect them—not from themselves, not from the rest of creation, and not from their Lord.

Discourse

The discussion “An Excursus” appears here in the printed volume. Read it in the Al-Mizan App.

Examining Narrations

1. In the exegesis of Tafsīr al-Ayyāshī, it is reported from Muḥammad b. Muslim, who narrates from Imām al-Bāqir, “I asked him about the verse from the Qur’an: ‘And I breathed into him of My spirit.’ He said: This is a spirit that God created, and He breathed it into Ādam.”
2. Additionally, Abū Baṣīr narrates from Imām al-Sādiq regarding the verse, ‘So when I have proportioned him and breathed into him of My spirit,’ the Imām said: “He created a form and created a spirit, then commanded the angel to breathe it into the form. This spirit is not something that diminishes anything from God; it is from His power, exalted is He.”

Author’s comment: Both narrations emphasize that the spirit breathed into Ādam is a creation of God and is not something that takes away from His essence or attributes. It is an act of His divine power.

3. In another narration in Tafsīr al-Ayyāshī, as well as in the account from Samāʿah, it is related from the Imām al-Sādiq: “Ādam was created and the spirit was breathed into him. When I asked him about the spirit, he said: ‘It is His (God’s) power from the celestial realm.’”

Author’s comment: This means that it is His active power, emanating from His essential power, as evidenced by the preceding report.

4. In Ma’ānī al-Akhbār, it is narrated through its chain of transmission from Muḥammad b. Muslim, who said, “I asked Imām al-Bāqir about the verse of God, the Mighty and Majestic, ‘And I breathed into him of My spirit.’ He said: ‘It is a spirit that God chose, favored, created, and attributed to Himself, and preferred it over all other spirits. Then He commanded that it be breathed into Ādam.’”
5. In al-Kāfī, through its chain of transmission, Muḥammad b. Muslim said: “I asked Imām al-Bāqir about what is narrated that God created Ādam in His own image. He replied: ‘It is in the image of a created, originated form that God chose and preferred over all other differing forms. He attributed it to Himself, just as He attributed the Kaʿbah to Himself, saying, “My House” and “And I breathed into him of My spirit.”’

Author’s comment: These narrations are among the most enlightening on the nature of the spirit (rūh) and include profound insights. We will clarify their meanings when discussing the reality of the spirit, God willing.

6. In Tafsīr al-Burhān, it is reported from Ibn Bābūyah through his chain of narrators from Imām al-Ṣādiq regarding the verse, “Indeed, you are of those reprieved until a known Day.” He said, “On the day when the trumpet will be blown once, Iblīs will die between the first and second blowing.”
7. In Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, it is narrated from Wahb b. Jumayʿ, and in Tafsīr al-Burhān, from Sharaf al-Dīn al-Najafī, omitting the chain of transmission from Wahb, the wording attributed to the latter from Imām al-Ṣādiq who said: “I asked him about Iblīs and the verse, ‘My Lord, then reprieve me until the Day they are resurrected,’ and God’s reply ‘Indeed, you are of those reprieved until a known Day.’ Which day is it? He replied, ‘O Wahb, do you think it is the day on which God will resurrect people? Rather, God has reprieved him until the day when our Qāʾim will rise. He will then seize him by his forelock and strike off his head. That day is the known time.’”
8. In Tafsīr al-Qummī, it is narrated through its chain from Muḥammad b. Yūnus from a man who heard from Imām al-Ṣādiq concerning the verse, “Indeed, you are of those reprieved until a known Day,” he said: “The known Day is when the Messenger of God will slaughter him on the rock that is in Jerusalem.”

Author’s comment: These reports pertain to the concept of Rajʿah (the return) and carry similar meanings to the preceding narrations. There are other reports about this from the path of the Ahl al-Bayt.

It is possible that the first narration among the last three could have been issued in the context of Taqqiyah (dissimulation). The three narrations can be reconciled without contradiction, in light of what was previously discussed on the topic of Raj’ah in the first part of the book. It is worth noting that the narrations from the path of the Ahl al-Bayt often interpret most of the verses related to the Resurrection as referring at times to the appearance of al-Mahdī, at times to the Raj’ah, and at other times to the Resurrection. These three days share the unveiling of truths but differ in intensity. The rule that applies to one of them extends to the others. Understand this.

9. In Tafsīr al-ʿAyyāshī, it is narrated from Jābir from Imām al-Bāqir, who said: “I asked, ‘What is your explanation` of God’s statement, “Indeed, as for My servants you do not have any authority over them”? He replied, ‘God means you have no power to make them enter either Paradise or Hell.’”
10. In Tafsīr al-Qummī regarding the verse, “It has seven gates,” one of the infallibles replied:“Each gate is for the followers of a certain school of thought, and Paradise has eight gates.”

Author’s Comment: The various accounts elaborate on the structure and purpose of the gates of Hell. These are not to be understood as mere physical gates but should be comprehended at a metaphysical level. The discourse is not limited and should not be understood as exhaustive.

11. In al-Durr al-manthūr, it is cited from Aḥmad’s Kitāb al-Zuhd, narrating from Khattāb b. ʿAbdullāh, who said that Imām ʿAlī described: “Do you know how the gates of Hell are? We said, ‘Like these doors?’ He said, ‘No, but they are like this,’ and he placed one hand over the other and spread one hand upon the other.”
12. Also, it cites Ibn al-Mubārak, Hunād, Ibn Abī Shaybah, ʿAbd b. Ḥumayd, Aḥmad in his book on Asceticism, Ibn Abī al-Dunyā in the Description of Hell, Ibn Jarīr, Ibn Abī Ḥātim, and al-Bayhaqī in the Resurrection, narrating from Imām ʿAlī: “The gates of Hell are seven, some above others. The first will be filled, then the second, then the third, until all are filled.”
13. Further, Ibn Mardawayh and al-Khaṭīb in his Tārīkh Baghdād narrate from Anas, who said that the Messenger of God said concerning the verse, “and to each gate belongs a separate portion of them,” that “One portion (of people) associated partners with God, another doubted God, and another was heedless of God.”

Author’s Comment: This narration enumerates the components of the gates rather than the gates themselves. From the context, it’s clear that they are not limited only to these three.

14. Finally, in the same source, it cites Ibn Mardawayh narrating from Abū Dharr, who said the Messenger of God stated: “There is a gate in Hell through which none shall enter except those who betrayed me concerning my family and shed their blood after me.”

Author’s comment: The word “betrayed” (khafarahu) implies deceit and the breaking of covenants.

The traditions below delve into various aspects of the afterlife, particularly Paradise and Hell, as well as the deep spiritual connection among the Ahl al-Bayt and their followers. It is worth noting that the insights provided in these accounts are consistent with what we have previously discussed.

15. In al-Durr al-manthūr, it is cited from Ahmad, Ibn Hibban, al-Tabari, Ibn Mardawayh, and al-Bayhaqi in “The Resurrection,” narrating from ʿUtba b. ʿAbdullāh who reported from the Prophet as saying: “Paradise has eight gates and Hell has seven, and some are greater than others.”

Author’s comment: The traditions, as you can see, substantiate what we have put forth earlier.

16. In Tafsīr al-Qummī, regarding the verse, “And We will remove whatever rancor there is in their breasts,” one of the infallibles stated that this refers to enmity.
17. In Tafsīr al-Burhān, narrated from al-Hafiz Abu Naʿim through his chain of narrators from Abū Huraira, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib is reported to have asked the Messenger of God: “Who is more dear to you, me or Fāṭimah?” The Prophet replied: “Fāṭimah is dearer to me than you, but you are more honored to me than her. I foresee you at my pool (Hawḍ), defending it against people. You will have pitchers as numerous as the stars, and you, al-Ḥasan, al-Ḥusayn, Ḥamzah, and Jaʿfar will be brothers in Paradise, reclining on elevated couches, and you will be with me along with your followers.” Then the Messenger of God recited the verse, “(They are) brothers, (reclining) on couches facing one another.” No one will look into the faults of another.
18. From Ibn al-Maghāzilī in Manāqib Ahl al-bayt, raising it to Zayd b. Arqam, it is reported: “I entered upon the Messenger of God, who said, ‘I create brotherhood among you as God created brotherhood among the angels.’ Then he said to ʿAlī, ‘You are my brother,’ and recited the verse, ‘(They are) brothers, (reclining) on couches facing one another.’ The friends for the sake of God will look at each other.”

Author’s Comment: This account is also narrated from Aḥmad in his Musnad, attributed to Zayd b. Awfā from the Prophet, and the narration is extensive.

In these accounts, the interpretation of God’s statement, “(They are) brothers, (reclining) on couches facing one another” is elucidated in two ways: One is that no one will look into the faults of another, and the other is that friends for the sake of God will look at each other. These interpretations hint at the idea that the ‘facing one another’ in the verse symbolizes the absence of tracking each other’s faults and mistakes, something that people with resentment in their hearts would do. It is a subtle yet meaningful interpretation.

The Prophet’s recitation of the verse () is merely from the perspective of flow and applicability, not that the verse was revealed specifically about the Ahl al-Bayt. The context of the verses does not fit this notion at all.

Similar accounts include narrations from ʿAlī stating that the verse was revealed about the people of Badr. In another narration from him, it is said to have been revealed about Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. A different narration from ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn (peace be upon them) says it was revealed about Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, and ʿAlī. Other accounts attribute the revelation to various combinations of the early companions, including ʿAlī, ʿUthmān, Ṭalḥa, al-Zubayr, and others, as well as one narration from Ibn ʿAbbās stating that it was revealed concerning ten individuals including Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, ʿAlī, Ṭalḥa, al-Zubayr, Saʿd, Saʿīd, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf, and ʿAbdullāh b. Masʿūd.

Despite the variations in these narrations, they are applications (of the verse) by the narrators, not explicit explanations of the verse’s revelation. The context of this verse, within a series of verses describing God’s decrees and judgments from the time of Adam’s creation, involving the angels and Iblīs, strongly suggests that the verse was not revealed specifically about any of the aforementioned individuals.

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1. Editor’s note: In terms of interpretation, this means that although the direct grammatical construction doesn’t specify the exact nature of the temporal relationship, the surrounding context allows for a comprehensive understanding—thus, the conclusion that jinn were created before humans is derived from the overall comparison of the two entities within the Qur’anic narrative. ↩︎

2. Editor’s note: This verse also implies that the beginning of the soul or spirit was the body itself. ↩︎

3. See Eng. vol. 25. (Ed.) ↩︎

4. Editor’s note: In Arabic, this phrase serves as an interrogative expression that literally means “what is for you?” or “what is that with you?.” Here, “mā” is an interrogative particle that asks about the nature or identity of something, and “laka” is a prepositional phrase, where “la-” means “for” and “-ka” is a possessive pronoun meaning “you.” So, the phrase “mā laka” is integrated as both subject and predicate, encapsulating the idea of asking about something that concerns or belongs to you. ↩︎

5. Editor’s note: Both phrases could be used to indicate a refusal to prostrate, but they carry slightly different nuances. Lā asjudu is a straightforward expression of refusal, whereas lastu asjudu suggests a more inherent or characteristic refusal, as if to say prostrating is not something that one does by nature. ↩︎

6. Eng. volumes 1 & 15 respectively. (Ed.) ↩︎

7. Editor’s note: Before the command to prostrate before Adam, Iblīs and the angels were in the station of sanctity with no distinction. However, they later split: the angels continued in humble servitude and obedience to God as depicted in the Qur’an, while Iblīs deviated from this path, separating himself from the angels. ↩︎

8. Editor’s note: In the exegesis of Ch. 11, verse 107, the author says: “God links the permanence of Heaven and Hell and their inhabitants to the persistence of the heavens and earth because the heavens and earth, in their general sense (in that they will be transformed into a new heavens and a new earth in the hereafter), are eternal and not transient. However, these heavens and earth that we experience in this world will come to an end based on the observable order. As for the heavens that shade Heaven, for instance, and the earth that carries it, which are illuminated by the light of their Lord, they are permanent and never fading. The universe will never be devoid of them” (Eng. vol. 21). ↩︎

9. Editor’s note: Adam was setup as the qiblah (direction) for their prostration much like the Ka’bah which is set as a direction in worship and is symbolic to facing God. Adam was presented to the angels on behalf of all humans. ↩︎

10. This comment still relates to what is attributed to Ibn ‘Abbās. (Ed.) ↩︎

11. English volumes 3 and 20 respectively. (Ed.) ↩︎

12. Editor’s note: The author’s lengthy discussion revolves around the persistence of Iblīs in relation to human obligations and sins. While some verses suggest Iblīs’s influence as the root cause of human misdeeds, there’s no clear evidence linking his persistence to the continuity of human obligations. Conversely, reason and scripture highlight humanity’s eventual shift towards righteousness, lessening the influence of Iblīs. ↩︎

13. Editor’s note: This is a statement of His omnipotence. Just because He doesn’t initiate misguidance without reason doesn’t mean He lacks the ability to do so. He can guide and misguide as He wills, but His actions are based on divine wisdom, justice, and a knowledge that humans cannot fully comprehend. ↩︎

14. Editor’s note: The terms “Mujawwizūn” or “Māni’ūn” aren’t commonly associated with any specific well-known theological school or sect. However, as per the context, it could be referring to a group or individuals who permit or allow a particular theological stance or opinion. ↩︎

15. Editor’s note: In other words, the mukhlasūn represent a unique spiritual echelon, marked by their sincere devotion and God’s favor. While they commit wholeheartedly to God, His grace further cements their status. Immune to Shaytān’s deceptions, any diversionary tactics only amplify their divine connection, turning potential pitfalls into pathways to even deeper devotion. ↩︎

16. Editor’s note: To simplify this discussion, Iblīs’s ability to mislead is bound by divine decree, emphasizing his limited agency. The verse () underscores this, indicating he only intensifies the errant tendencies of those predisposed to his influence. ↩︎

17. Editor’s note: “Disjointed exception” refers to an exception that seems out of place or counterintuitive in the context of a given statement. In this instance, saying “My servants” encompasses all of humanity but then implying the majority are exempted contradicts common linguistic and logical conventions. ↩︎

18. Editor’s Note: In the author’s commentary on verse , it is stated that intercession will have no effect on the sin of polytheism if it remains unrepented. See Eng. vol. 8 under the verse . ↩︎

19. Editor’s note: In summary, Imām al-Rāzī’s main contention is about the inclusiveness and depth of the term “al-Muttaqīn,” arguing that its essence can be achieved by abstaining from shirk, even if they engage in all the major sins that lead to Hellfire and that this understanding has significant historical and textual backing. The author counters this claim. ↩︎